THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MARGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE by Bista, Rishav
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Economics Economics 
2012 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE 
MARGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Rishav Bista 
University of Kentucky, rishavbist@uky.edu 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Bista, Rishav, "THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MARGIN IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE" (2012). Theses and Dissertations--Economics. 6. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/6 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Economics by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written 
permission statements(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be 
included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use 
doctrine). 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive 
and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. 
I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide 
access unless a preapproved embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s dissertation 
including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by 
the statements above. 
Rishav Bista, Student 
Dr. Josh Ederington, Major Professor 
Dr. Aaron Yelowitz, Director of Graduate Studies 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MARGIN
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Business and
Economics at the University of
Kentucky
By
Rishav Bista
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Josh Ederington, Professor of Economics
Lexington, Kentucky 2012
Copyright c© Rishav Bista 2012
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MARGIN
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the impact of various trade
policies on the extensive (new trading relationships) and intensive (increase in trade
of existing relationships) margins of trade, whereas past studies have been limited to
aggregate trade flows. An inquiry into the extensive and intensive margins of trade
reveals that total aggregate trade masks the heterogeneous trade creating effect of
policy variables. Furthermore, this dissertation also takes into account the economet-
ric issues that have plagued the traditional empirical model that analyzes the impact
of these policies on trade.
The first chapter examines the impact of hosting and bidding for mega-events on
exports. Rose & Spiegel (2011b) find that hosts and unsuccessful bidders (candidates)
experience a similar positive impact on total aggregate exports. They attribute the
Olympic effect to the signal a country sends when bidding to host the games. This
chapter inquires whether this Olympic signal leads to new trading relationships or
an increase in trade in existing relationships. The results indicate that only hosts
(not candidates) experience a permanent increase in exports at the intensive margin.
While hosting the Olympics is consistently correlated with a permanent deepening of
existing trade relationships, it is at the expense of the number of trading relationships.
The second chapter examines the impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
membership on the extensive and intensive margin of imports. Accounting for several
estimation issues that have plagued the literature, results indicate that the benefit
of the WTO is realized entirely through the extensive margin. The results are in
line with the literature that attributes WTO to reducing market uncertainty through
tariff binds rather than reduction, thus increasing entry in the export market even
when the applied protection is unchanged.
The third chapter examines the impact of fiscal episodes (fiscal stimuli and con-
solidation) on the extensive and intensive margins of exports. The results indicate
that fiscal consolidation leads to an increase in total exports, while a fiscal stimulus
leads to a decrease in total exports. Furthermore, fiscal consolidation leads to an
increase in exports solely through the extensive margin.
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1 Introduction
Past studies in international trade have analyzed the impact of various policies such
as trade liberalization and membership in multilateral organizations on total ag-
gregate bilateral trade (or total volume of trade) flows. In my dissertation, using
disaggregated product level trade data, I examine the impact of these variables by
disaggregating total trade into two margins of trade - extensive and intensive mar-
gin. The extensive margin is defined as the change in number of products traded or
changes in the number of trading partners; hence it measures trade diversification or
new trading relationships. The intensive margin is defined as the change in volume
of trade of existing products between two countries; hence it measures whether trade
of a given product is more or less intense.
In recent years, the theoretical models of trade have ushered into the “new trade
theory” that emphasizes firm-level productivity differences in trade structure. Recent
studies such as Helpman et al. (2008) incorporate firm-level heterogeneity and advo-
cate for the decomposition of trade volume into the extensive and intensive margin.
Theoretical predictions of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) indicate that decline in
variable trade costs (e.g. reduction in tariffs) increase the extensive as well as the
intensive margin. Furthermore, Chaney (2008) mentions that a reduction in fixed
costs (e.g. information costs) affects only the extensive margin. Disentangling total
trade into the extensive and intensive margin, I argue and find that the impact of
these variables on total aggregate trade masks the heterogeneous trade creating effect,
and hence underestimates the impact of these policy variables or trade agreements.
Hence there might be a need of reassessment of trade agreements or policies directed
towards international trade.
Recent studies indicate the importance of the intensive margin of trade for long-
run export growth. Besedes & Prusa (2010) argue that the survival of trading re-
lationships is important for long-run export growth, implying that a critical part of
improved export growth for developing countries may be focusing on existing relation-
ships. On the other hand, increases in the extensive margin or export diversification
reduces the risks of balance of payments crises and large fluctuations in domestic
output after-shocks that can negatively affect the performance of the external sec-
tor, such as price fluctuations in international markets or output swings in trading
partners (Agosin (2007), Lederman & Maloney (2003)). Feenstra & Kee (2008) sug-
gest that increases in sectoral export variety boost country productivity as the new
exporting basket can improve the use and allocative efficiency of the economy.
Furthermore, I take into account the econometric issues that have plagued the
traditional empirical model that analyzes these trade policies. The log-linear gravity
model of trade has been extensively employed to analyze trade flows. However, re-
cent empirical trade literature indicates that the traditional log-linear gravity model
leads to inconsistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedastic residuals. Under
heteroskedasticity, the parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS lead to
biased estimates of the true elasticities (see Liu (2009), Silva & Tenreyro (2006), and
Felbermayr & Kohler (2010a)). Various studies have proposed the Poisson regression
as an alternative solution, notably Flowerdew & Aitkin (1982) and more recently by
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Silva & Tenreyro (2006). Hence, in this dissertation I implement the Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation proposed by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) as
an appropriate methodology to estimate the impact of various trade policies on the
extensive and intensive margin of trade.
In my first chapter, I examine the impact of hosting and bidding for mega-events
(e.g. Olympics, World Cup) on international exports. Utilizing the traditional log-
linear gravity model, Rose & Spiegel (2011b) find large effects of hosting and bidding
(unsuccessful candidates) for mega-events on international exports. They attribute
the Olympic effect to the signal a country sends when bidding to host the games,
rather than the act of actually hosting the game itself. Utilizing product level data, I
inquire whether this Olympic signal leads to new trading relationships (the extensive
margin) or an increase in trade in existing relationships (the intensive margin). In
addition, I implement alternate specifications such as a Tobit specification with zero
trade flows and the PPML estimation to examine the Olympic effect.
In my second chapter, I examine the impact of the WTO membership on product
level extensive and intensive margin of imports. In addition, I also take into account
the role of product heterogeneity and heterogeneity of the WTO members based on
their level of development and its impact on the two margins of import. Furthermore,
I utilize the PPML estimation and account for several estimations issues that have
plagued the literature.
In my third chapter I examine the impact of fiscal episodes (fiscal stimuli and
consolidation) on total exports and product level extensive and intensive margin of
exports. Hence, this paper provides evidence on the mechanism by which such fiscal
episodes stimulate exports. This chapter also analyzes whether the impact of fiscal
episodes on exports is contingent upon importers’ fiscal policy stance.
2
2 Revisiting the Olympic Effect
2.1 Introduction
According to Rose & Spiegel (2011a), Qatar reportedly pledged to spend more than
$50 billion on infrastructure and stadiums in preparation to host the 2022 World
Cup. Brazil acquired the right to host the 2016 Olympic Games with a $15 billion
bid, which amounts to $2000 per citizen (more than two months of GDP per capita).
These imposing costs on the hosts might not be compensated by the revenues earned
or legacy of large facilities that are left behind, engendering economists’ skepticism
of these mega-events. Nonetheless, countries fiercely compete to acquire the rights to
host these mega-events.
Rose & Spiegel (2011b) are the first to examine the economic impact of hosting
mega-events (e.g. Olympics, World Cup) in terms of international trade. Utilizing
the log-linear gravity model of trade, they find that hosting a mega-event has a
positive impact on national exports (results also extend to bilateral imports). The
effect is statistically robust, permanent, and large; exports are, on average, around
20% higher for countries that have hosted the Olympics. Surprisingly, they find
that countries that were unsuccessful candidates (henceforth candidates) to host the
Olympics have a similar (in magnitude) positive impact on exports.1 They provide
numerous robustness checks for their results.2 They conclude that the Olympic effect
on trade is attributable to the signal a country sends when bidding to host the games,
where such a signal is used by countries wishing to liberalize. They further postulate
that hosting the game in and of itself has no impact on a nation’s trade fundamentals
or a big-push type of process (e.g. Murphy et al. (1989)). Rose & Spiegel (2011a)
claim that while hosting the games is sufficient to boost trade, it is not necessary.
Unsuccessful bids for Olympics generate similar benefits (in terms of trade) to those
of hosts at a substantially lower cost, comparable to the notion of “winner’s remorse”.
Hence, in line with many economists, they corroborate the skepticism of the actual
hosting of a mega-event.
This paper builds upon the literature in several ways. First, this study utilizes
disaggregated product-level trade data to analyze whether the Olympic effect leads
to new trading relationships (the extensive margin) or an increase in trade in existing
relationships (the intensive margin). The extensive margin is measured as the number
of product-country trade relationships that a country engages in. Hence, the measure
of the bilateral extensive margin is the count of the number of products exported by
country i to country j at time t (e.g., U.S. exports 24 different products to Zambia
1The rationale for estimation for unsuccessful candidates, according to Rose & Spiegel (2011b), is
to form a valid quasi-experimental counter factual control group for Olympic hosts.
2They perform matching methodology for issues associated with selection bias and endogeniety
(whether more open countries are more likely to bid for, or obtain hosting rights to the Olympics).
Based on their Probit tests controlling for openness, country size and per capita income, they find
that openness enters insignificantly throughout, suggesting that reverse causality is not an issue.
They perform two kinds of matching - matching actual Olympic hosts (treatments) to candidates
and matching union of hosts and candidates to non-candidates. Their results confirm that selection
bias or endogeneity is not an issue.
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in year 2000). The intensive margin is defined as the average volume of trade in these
existing product-country trade relationships. Hence, the bilateral intensive margin is
defined as the exports per product (e.g., if U.S. total exports to Zambia in year 2000
is $24,000 and it exports 24 different products, then the intensive margin is $1,000
per product). Recent literature indicates the intensive margin as the most important
factor for long-run export growth (Felbermayr & Kohler (2006a), Helpman et al.
(2008), Besedes & Prusa (2010) ). Furthermore, it is found to be more important
for the survival of trading relationships, especially for developing countries (Besedes
& Prusa (2010), Amurgo-Pacheco & Pierola (2008)). The log-linear estimation with
product level trade data reveals that the Olympic effect leads to a permanent increase
in exports solely through the intensive margin of trade. In other words, hosting
and bidding for mega-events leads to deepening of existing trade relationships at the
product level. However, I find that the effect of hosting the Olympics on the extensive
margin of exports is negative and statistically significant, implying that the Olympic
effect actually leads to a decrease in new trading relationships at the product level.
Second, this chapter accounts for the presence of zero trade flows and analyzes the
impact of the Olympic effect on exports. It is common in empirical analyses utilizing
the gravity specification (including Rose & Spiegel (2011b)) to only use positive trade
flows. However, excluding zero trade observations implies loss of information, partic-
ularly on new trading relationships (the extensive margin). The literature indicates
that the presence of zero trade flows in trade data is not random (countries do not
trade because the cost might be high). According to Liu (2009), this is the classic
problem of sample selection bias. The coefficients obtained using only positive trade
flows are estimated inconsistently. A traditional means of dealing with the presence
of zero trade flows has been the Tobit model. I show, using the random effect Tobit
model, that the Olympic effect with aggregate export data is not robust to accounting
for zero trade flows. In fact, I find that hosts and candidates of mega-events actually
experience a permanent decrease in exports.3
Third, this paper implements the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
estimation proposed by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) as an appropriate methodology to
estimate the impact of the Olympic effect on trade. When the errors are heteroskedas-
tic, the transformed errors will generally be correlated with the covariates violating an
assumption of OLS. Under heteroskedasticity, the parameters of log-linearized mod-
els estimated by OLS lead to biased estimates of the true elasticities (see Liu (2009),
Silva & Tenreyro (2006), and Felbermayr & Kohler (2010a)).
Utilizing the PPML estimation technique with positive trade flows, results indicate
that the impact of hosting or bidding for mega-events in Rose & Spiegel (2011b) log-
linear specification is highly exaggerated. Using aggregate trade data, I find that the
impact of hosting for Summer Olympic Games on exports is statistically insignificant,
while for candidates it is negative and statistically significant. In addition, while the
impact on hosting the World Cup is positive and significant, the magnitude is minimal
3However, the Olympic effect on total exports with the disaggregated product level data manifests
itself differently. I find a permanent increase in total exports for hosts and candidates. In line
with Liu (2009), the random effect Tobit model is very sensitive to small differences in data or
specifications.
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compared to the log-linear model. The results indicate that the the Olympic effect is
not robust to alternate specifications (both including and excluding zero-trade flows).
Utilizing the PPML technique for the disaggregated product level trade data, the
Olympic effect on total exports remains insignificant. However, disentangling total
trade at the extensive and intensive margin reveals that the total trade (at aggregate
level) masks the heterogeneous impact on trade. The Olympic and World Cup hosts
experience a permanent increase in exports at the intensive margin; however, they
do so at the expense of the extensive margin. In other words, the Olympic effect
intensifies export volume for existing product relationships while reducing the number
of products exported. However, the candidates do not experience increases in exports
at either margin (in fact the coefficients are negative for both margins).
Finally, this paper analyzes the gravity model with the fixed-effect quantile re-
gression to examine whether the Olympic effect has heterogeneous impact on different
levels of exports between country-pairs. The results obtained for the Olympic hosts
are robust. The Olympic effect on total exports is insignificant at different levels
of exports. The Olympic effect on the extensive margin is negative and statistically
significant only for the 50th percentile or above. The results further confirm that
the Olympic hosts experience a permanent increase in exports only at the intensive
margin. More importantly, the Olympic effect leads to an increase in the intensive
margin of exports for higher as well as lower level of exports between country-pairs.
The argument that both hosts and candidates send signals of liberalization and
thereby experience a permanent increase in exports is not supported by the results.
Rose & Spiegel (2011b) end with a cautious note: their argument does not explain
why countries appear to vigorously compete to win the bids. This study provides
some answer to the puzzle: only hosts experience a permanent increase in exports,
solely through the intensive margin of trade. This implies that there might be other
influences besides signaling that increases exports, or the signal that candidates send
might not have been strong enough to be perceived by their trade partners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 estimates the Rose &
Spiegel (2011b) empirical specification with aggregate trade data. Section 3 discusses
the role of the Olympic effect on the extensive and intensive margin with positive
trade flows and the log-linear model. Section 4 takes into account the presence of
zero trade flows and utilizes the random effect Tobit model. Section 5 utilizes the
PPML technique to estimate the Olympic effect on trade with positive trade flows
and the full sample (including zero trade flows). Section 6 utilizes the fixed-effect
quantile regression to assess the impact of the Olympic effect across export levels.
Section 7 summarizes the main findings of the paper.
2.2 The Olympic Effect on Aggregate Exports - Positive Trade Flows
Utilizing the log-linear gravity model, Rose & Spiegel (2011b) formally analyze the
impact of hosting and bidding for mega-events in terms of international trade. In
this section, I implement their empirical specification analyzing aggregate trade data
with various estimation strategies.
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2.2.1 Empirical Specification: Log-Linear Gravity Model
Rose & Spiegel (2011b) empirically examine the two sides of the argument associated
with hosting of a mega-event. Economists’ skepticism about the public provision of
infrastructure for sporting events arises from the notion that these events usually end
up imposing large costs on their hosts that are not nearly compensated by subsequent
revenues.4 In line with Siegfried & Zimbalist (2000) and Coates & Humphreys (2003),
Rose & Spiegel (2011b) state that the projects associated with mega-events are com-
parable to “white elephants” (e.g. poorly used facilities associated with idiosyncratic
sports), built to accommodate a one-time peak in demand. Furthermore, they assert
that any benefits derived from infrastructure investments could be achieved indepen-
dently of the games. Proponents of the mega event argue that national reputations
are affected by the experience of hosting the Olympics as they greet more tourists or
gain exposure on the international stage. Preuss (2004) argues the Seoul games in
1988 were designed to raise international awareness of Korean manufactured goods,
so as to promote Korean exports. Some refer to the non-pecuniary benefit of host-
ing mega-events, such as civic pride (e.g. Rappaport & Wilkerson (2001), Carlino &
Coulson (2004), and Maennig & du Plessis (2007)).
The Rose & Spiegel (2011b) specification of the gravity model estimated by OLS
is of the following form:
lnTijt = β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart + γZijt + ijt (1)
where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, and t denotes time. Tijt denotes
real exports value of country i to j at time t. Hostit is a binary variable which is unity
if i hosted a post-war Summer Olympic games at or before time t, and zero otherwise.5
This variable represents the permanent export effect associated with hosting of a
Summer Olympic game.6 Impa are the list of importer dummies that take the value
of one if a=j, and zero otherwise. Expb are the list of exporter dummies that take
the value of one if b=i, and zero otherwise. These dummies are comprehensive sets of
exporter and importer fixed effects that take into account any time-invariant country-
specific factors. Y eart is a year-specific fixed effect implemented to take into account
any time-specific common trends or effects (e.g. business cycles, oil price shocks).
The row vector Zijt represents a list of common gravity control variables (or proxies)
between the bilateral country pair that are not absorbed by the fixed effects. It
includes the natural logs of variables such as the bilateral distance (Dij), population
( Popit, Popjt), annual real GDP per capita (GDPpcit, GDPpcjt) and product of
4According to Rose & Spiegel (2011b), the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympic games
are estimated to have cost at least $100 million when around 100 million Chinese live on less than
$1/day.
5Dummies for the effect of hosting the World Cup are constructed the same way as the Olympic
hosts.
6In their working paper version, Rose & Spiegel (2011b) find no consistent pattern for the significance
of coefficients for the Olympic hosts when the variable was redefined to be unity only in the year of
actual games, and zero otherwise. Refer to table 26 for the complete list of Summer Olympic/World
Cup hosts and candidates.
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the areas of the countries (Areaij). It further includes bilateral pair dummies such
as country pairs using the same currency at time t (CUijt), country pairs i and j
sharing a common language (ComLangij), country pairs i and j having a regional
trade agreement at time t (RTAijt), country pairs sharing a common land border
(ComBorderij), number of island countries in the country pair (Islandsij), country
pairs colonized by the same country (ComColij), country i colonized j at time t or
vice versa (Colijt) and if country i ever colonized j or vice versa (EverColij). All
the gravity control variables are similar to Rose & Spiegel (2011b) specification. 
represents the omitted influences, assumed to be well behaved.
To ensure that the results are robust, I also implement the specification of the
following form:
lnTijt = β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1aij +
∑
α2Y eart + γZijt + ijt (2)
where aij are a list of country pair dummies that take the value of one if i exports
to j, and zero otherwise. These country pair dummies are a comprehensive set of
dyadic-specific fixed effects that absorb any time-invariant characteristics common to
a country pair. Inclusion of year fixed effects and country/dyadic-specific fixed effects,
according to Rose & Spiegel (2011b), can be viewed as a difference-in-differences
estimator. Zijt includes all the other control variables mentioned in equation (1)
pertinent to the gravity model of trade. The paper further tests if the effects on trade
for candidates is similar to those for hosts. Dummies for permanent effects of the
candidates are constructed the same way as the Olympic and World Cup hosts. Rose
& Spiegel (2011b) explain that failed candidacies form a valid quasi-experimental
counter-factual control group for Olympic hosts after the inclusion of conditioning
variables.
2.2.2 Data
The bilateral export (aggregate trade) data are retrieved from Rose’s website. This
study utilizes a panel data set that consists of observations for every 5 years beginning
in 1950 and ending in 2000 for 193 countries. The countries are listed in table 28. The
gravity variables, however, are retrieved from Liu’s dataset.7 According to Liu (2009),
the GDP and population data are retrieved from several standard sources including
the PWT 6.1, PWT 5.6, WDI 2003, Maddison Historical Statistics, International
Financial Statistics (IFS) and the United Nations Yearbooks (UNSYB). Refer to
table 25 for the complete description of data sources.
7Dr. Xuepeng Liu graciously provided me with his dataset, which is not publicly available. Liu (2009)
utilizes this dataset to analyze the impact of WTO membership on aggregate imports accounting
for zero trade flows. Rose’s website also provides the gravity variables. However, large amount
of observations are dropped in the Rose & Spiegel (2011b) analysis due to missing GDP data.
Dropping of observations due to missing GDP data might not be random. Primarily, missing
GDP data are associated with developing countries. Liu’s dataset also contains missing GDP data,
however the missing GDP data are much smaller compared to Rose dataset.
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2.2.3 Empirical Results
The results from the log-linear gravity model utilizing Rose’s export data, with only
positive aggregate trade flows, are shown in table 1. Rose & Spiegel (2011b) utilize
annual observations for 196 countries from 1950-2005 while this paper utilizes five-
year intervals for 193 countries between 1950-2000. The results are presented with
year effects along with two different sets of fixed effects (exporter and importer or
dyadic-country pair). The coefficient of Summer Olympic host (permanent effect) on
exports is statistically significant and positive.8 Taken literally, countries that have
hosted the Summer Olympic Games have exports that are permanently higher by 27%
(e0.24− 1 = 27%) with exporter and importer fixed effects and 21% (e0.19− 1 = 21%)
with dyadic fixed effects. These findings are consistent with that of Rose & Spiegel
(2011b). They find that the exports are permanently higher by 35% with exporter and
importer fixed effects and 27% with dyadic fixed effects for Summer Olympics hosts.
Table 2 reports the results with the inclusion of the World Cup hosts. The effect of the
Olympics host remains positive and statistically significant for both of the estimation
strategies as can be seen in columns (1) and (2). The coefficient for the hosting of a
World Cup is positive and statistically significant, and is higher than for the Olympics
hosts.9 Thus, the notion that hosting a mega-event permanently enhances exports is
intact and is in line with the Rose & Spiegel (2011b) results. Table 3 compares trade
patterns of host countries with the inclusion of the candidates. The impact of both
hosts and candidates on permanent exports are statistically significant, positive and
large.
Based on similar permanent increase in exports experienced by hosts and bidders
alike, Rose & Spiegel (2011b) argue that a country that wishes to liberalize its trade
might want to signal this by bidding to host a mega-event. In doing so, they postulate
that it generates extra trade-related investment. They argue that these bids are good
signals because it creates a political atmosphere where back-sliding on either trade
liberalization or mega-events becomes difficult. In their paper, Rose & Spiegel (2011b)
consider a signal of a “burning money” type, not informative in its own sense, but
informative due to the fact that sending a signal is only attractive to a set of countries
that sincerely intends to pursue liberalization.
8In their working paper version, Rose & Spiegel (2011b) also estimate the impact of hosting Winter
Olympic games. However, they do not find strong effects of hosting the Winter games on exports
as the coefficients are small and statistically insignificant (especially after including either of the
fixed effects). They mention that this result is not particularly surprising as the scale of the Winter
Games has always been dwarfed by those of the Summer games, and the geographic requirements
of the Winter games place more constraints on potential hosts. Furthermore, they mention that
with a few exceptions, the Winter games have tended to be held in relatively small towns, often
those considered to be winter resorts (especially early on). Hence in their current paper and mine,
only the impact of Summer Olympics on exports is taken into account.
9Since there is a considerable amount of overlap between Olympics and the World Cup hosts, perhaps
some impact of hosting the Olympics on exports might have been captured by the World Cup hosts.
For example, Mexico, Germany, U.K., Spain, Italy and the U.S. have hosted both of the mega-events
by 2000.
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2.3 The Extensive and Intensive Margin : Log-Linear Gravity Model
In recent years, the theoretical models of trade have ushered into the “new trade
theory” that emphasizes firm-level productivity differences in trade structure. Re-
cent studies such as Helpman et al. (2008) incorporate firm-level heterogeneity and
advocate for the decomposition of trade volume into the extensive and intensive mar-
gin. This chapter builds on the Rose & Spiegel (2011b) specification by inquiring
whether this Olympic effect leads to new trading relationships (the extensive mar-
gin) or an increase in trade in existing relationships (the intensive margin). Various
studies have analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on these two margins, no-
tably Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). Theoretical predictions of Melitz (2003) and
Chaney (2008) indicate that decline in variable trade costs (e.g. reduction in tariffs)
increases the extensive as well as the intensive margin. Furthermore, Chaney (2008)
shows that a reduction in fixed costs (e.g. information costs) affects only the extensive
margin. Hence, if the Olympic effect is purely a signaling effect, as argued by Rose &
Spiegel (2011b), where trade liberalization leads to the reduction of variable costs, we
should see an increase in the extensive as well as the intensive margin. Proponents
of mega-events (such as Preuss (2004) and International Olympic Committee) argue
that hosts receive exposure on the international stage. This exposure supposedly
increases international awareness of their product and market, also known as the vis-
ibility effect, leading to increased exports. This argument implies a reduction in fixed
costs due to a decrease in information costs for exporters. In this case, we should see
an increase solely on the extensive margin.
Recent studies indicate the importance of the intensive margin of trade for long-
run export growth. Besedes & Prusa (2010) argue that the survival of trading rela-
tionships is important for long-run export growth, and that the majority of growth in
exports occurs at the intensive margin. Moreover, there is relatively less export per-
sistence in developing countries, implying a critical part of improved export growth
for developing countries may be focusing on existing relationships. Felbermayr &
Kohler (2006a) postulate that the intensive margin historically explains the majority
of export growth, leaving room for the extensive margin to increase in importance for
future export growth. Helpman et al. (2008) find that the majority of the growth in
trade since 1970 occurred between countries that had an existing trade relationship,
implying the intensive margin is the most important component of export growth.
Amurgo-Pacheco & Pierola (2008) also find that export growth is primarily deter-
mined along the intensive margin, especially for developed economies. Given the
importance of the intensive margin for long-run growth, if bidding for or hosting
mega-events increases the intensive margin significantly then it could be an appeal-
ing avenue for long-run export growth, especially for developing countries.
Recent studies have also illustrated the importance of the extensive margin or
export diversification. Export diversification, or a broader export basket, reduces the
risks of balance of payments crises and large fluctuations in domestic output after-
shocks that can negatively affect the performance of the external sector, such as price
fluctuations in international markets or output swings in trading partners (Agosin
(2007), Lederman & Maloney (2003)). Feenstra & Kee (2008) suggest that increases
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in sectoral export variety boost country productivity as the new exporting basket can
improve the use and allocative efficiency of the economy. Hummels & Klenow (2005)
indicate that export growth, based solely on the intensive margin can have terms-of-
trade effects, especially for large economies which can be reduced by broadening the
exporting base of the country.
In terms of aggregate trade data, the extensive margin of trade can only be cap-
tured by accounting for zero trade flows in the data. For example, assume that the
U.S. never exported to Zambia until 1985, and starts exporting from 1986 onwards.
This generally constitutes an increase in the country-level extensive margin of trade
(or increase in trading partners). However, with disaggregated data one can calculate
the extensive margin even with positive trade flows. For example, an increase in the
extensive margin could also be realized, if the U.S. exported 24 different products to
Zambia compared to 15 products the previous year.
2.3.1 Empirical Specification
In this section I utilize disaggregated data at the four-digit Standard International
Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2 product level to construct a measure of the
two margins. The methodology applied in this paper to analyze the two margins
of exports is commonly referred to as the count method. Previous studies, such as
those of Nitsch & Pisu (2008), Bernard et al. (2007), Flam & Nordstrm (2006), and
Dutt et al. (2011), have adopted a similar methodology to decompose total trade
into the extensive and the intensive margin. In the traditional log-linear form, the
decomposition of total exports can be expressed as follows:
ln(Tijt) = ln(Nijt) + ln(
Tijt
Nijt
) (3)
where Tijt, the real aggregate bilateral exports (sum of total exports for all products
for a given year) or total exports between a country pair is decomposed into two dif-
ferent dependent variables (Nijt and
Tijt
Nijt
). Nijt (the extensive margin) is the number
of products exported per year per country pair and
Tijt
Nijt
(the intensive margin) is the
average volume of exports per product per year. Utilizing the log-linear gravity model
specification, total exports can be expressed by the following estimation equation :
lnTijt = β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart + γZijt + ijt (4)
The estimation equation for the extensive margin of exports (or the number of prod-
ucts exported) is given as :
lnNijt = β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart + γZijt + ijt (5)
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and for the intensive margin (or the average volume of exports per product) is given
as :
ln(
Tijt
Nijt
) = β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart + γZijt + ijt (6)
I further estimate the role of the extensive and the intensive margin with a compre-
hensive set of dyadic-specific fixed effects similar to equation (2) .10
There are alternative means of constructing the extensive and the intensive margin
of trade, but these methods require data at the firm level.11 This study acknowledges
that there might be some limitations to the count method of constructing the two
margins. According to Baldwin & Nino (2006), each of the product categories en-
compass a range of individual goods, so one cannot hope to pick up the full extensive
margin. Hence, this measure cannot ascertain the full link between the Olympic ef-
fect and the number of varieties as some changes in the intensive margin may capture
changes in the extensive margin.
2.3.2 Data
The disaggregated product level export data is based on the 4-digit Standard In-
ternational Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2. SITC is a system that encodes
all internationally traded products. The system makes it easier for compiling and
also promoting the comparability of international trade statistics. There are 1,249
tradable product categories under this classification. The data is retrieved from the
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. Within WITS, the dataset is
retrieved from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) Comtrade database.
This dataset is used in the analysis for the extensive and the intensive margins of
trade. The level of disaggregation affects the extensive margin between countries as
there are data available at finer level of classification. However, there are measure-
ment errors associated with finer level of disaggregation and furthermore the choice
of the 4-digit classification was made to ensure that the data coverage is the longest
possible (e.g. 1962 onwards). The data set consists of exports for 193 countries span-
ning from 1965-2000 for every five years.12 The rest of the data for gravity variables
are retrieved from the Liu dataset.
10Variable Z includes all the pertinent control variables for the gravity model of trade.
11An alternative measure of the margins at the product level is used by Hummels & Klenow (2005).
They define the extensive margin as a weighted count of the categories in which a country exports
relative to the categories exported by the rest of the world. The intensive margin is defined as
the nominal exports from a country, relative to the nominal exports from the rest of the world
in the categories that the country also exports. Hence, the extensive margin can be viewed as
a measure of diversification and the intensive margin as a measure of trade volume. Dutt et al.
(2011) mention that the count method and the Hummels & Klenow (2005) method of extensive
and intensive margins are comparable with each other. In their study they find the correlation of
the extensive margin between the count and the Hummels & Klenow (2005) method to be around
0.86, and the correlation between the intensive margins to be around 0.88.
12 The data set for UN Comtrade begins from 1962 onwards. Refer to appendix table ?? for further
description of the dataset.
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2.3.3 Empirical Results
Table 2 tabulates results for the impact of hosting (and candidacy of) mega-events
utilizing disaggregated exports data. Table 4 reports the results for the extensive and
intensive margin of exports for Summer Olympic hosts. The coefficient on total ex-
ports is sensitive to different estimation strategies. With the exporter and importer
fixed effect, the results indicate that the countries that have hosted the Summer
Olympic games have exports that are permanently higher by 12%. With the country-
pair fixed effects, the coefficient on Summer Olympic hosts is positive but statistically
insignificant. However, the intensive margin of exports is positive, economically sig-
nificant, and is robust to both estimation techniques. The hosting of the Summer
Olympic Games leads to higher exports at the intensive margin on average by about
26%. In other words, the Olympic hosts experience an increase of 26% on the average
volume of exports per product with existing relationships, indicating the deepening
of trade relationships at the product level.
The coefficient on the extensive margin of exports is negative, statistically signifi-
cant, and robust to both exporter and importer or country-pair fixed effects. Olympic
hosts experience a permanent decrease in the extensive margin of exports on average
by about 13%. In other words, the Olympics host exports on average 13% fewer
varieties of products between country pairs. This result suggests that the Olympic
effect does not induce (in fact it reduces) trade in products not previously traded by
a country pair. Hence the visibility argument proposed by Preuss (2004) and the In-
ternational Olympic Committee is not supported by the results. The results indicate
that the Olympic effect on exports is realized entirely through the intensive margin
at the expense of the extensive margin, which is at odds with the argument.
Rose & Spiegel (2011b) findings indicate that the trade-expanding effects of host-
ing an event like the Olympics are broadly comparable to those associated with host-
ing the FIFA World Cup. To test whether this finding extends to our data set and
more importantly to the extensive and intensive margin of trade, I also include the
World Cup hosts in the equation. Table 5 reports the results with the inclusion of the
World Cup hosts. The coefficient on World Cup hosts is significant and positive and
is robust to each estimation strategy. Similar to the Olympic hosts, the coefficient
on the intensive margin of trade is positive and statistically significant, while the
coefficient on the extensive margin of exports is negative and statistically significant.
Next I compare the trade patterns of Olympic hosts with candidates.13 The results
are tabulated in table 6 . The coefficient on total exports for candidates is positive
and significant with the exporter and importer fixed effect, although insignificant with
the country-pair fixed effect. In addition, the results indicate that the positive and
permanent effect on trade is realized entirely through the intensive margin of trade,
which is positive and significant with both estimation strategies. Similar to the hosts,
the coefficient on the extensive margin is negative although statistically insignificant,
for the candidates.
13Rose & Spiegel (2011b) mention that in contrast to the Olympics, there has been relatively little
competition to host the World Cup, so one cannot plausibly compare hosts and unsuccessful
candidates for the World Cup.
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Hence, the result with the log-linear specification indicates that the Olympic effect
leads to an increase in total imports, although it is insignificant with country-pair
fixed effects. Furthermore, it leads to a permanent increase in the intensive margin
of exports at the expense of the extensive margin of exports.
2.4 Olympic Effect on Trade: The Presence of Zero Trade Flows- Full Sample
Results from the log-linear regression with positive trade flows indicated a positive
impact of the Olympic effect on the total and the intensive margin of exports with
a negative impact on the extensive margin. With only positive trade flows, perhaps
the failure to account for zero trade flows underestimated the role of the Olympic
effect at the extensive margin. Similarly, the positive impact on total exports and the
intensive margin might have been exaggerated. Selection bias occurs when a subset
of the data is systematically excluded due to a particular characteristic. According to
Liu (2009) and Helpman et al. (2008), the presence of zero trade flows in trade data
is not random, as it is conditioned upon various factors such as distance and trade
costs. According to Wooldridge (2006) and Heckman (1979), if the sample selection
is based on the value of the dependent variable, then the parameters of the estimated
model will always be biased if estimated with OLS. Hence, with only positive trade
flows, the gravity model has endogenous sample selection issues.
In this section, I take into account the presence of zero trade flows in the data to
correct for the sample selection issues. Coefficient estimates from log-linear regres-
sions are inconsistent when a large number of zero trade flows are present in the data.
Hence I implement an ad hoc modification of the gravity model where the zero trade
flows are treated as a corner solution estimated by the random effect Tobit model.
2.5 Non-Linear Gravity Model of Trade - Full Sample
Traditionally when large numbers of zeros are present in the data, a standard Tobit
model is applied, treating zero trade flows as a corner solution problem. This is a
special case of censored regression (censored towards the left).
Assume a traditional gravity model where exports from country i to j are denoted
by Tij. To account for zero trade flows a common methodology is to substitute ln(T )
with ln(T + 1) to keep zero trade values after the logarithm transformation. As
presented in Liu (2009), the standard censored Tobit model assumes that:
T ∗ = Zβ + µ, µ|Z ∼ Normal(0, σ2) (7)
where T ∗ is the latent exports variable and Z are the regressors. Based on the law of
iterated expectations, we can express equation (7) as the following:
E(T |Z) = P (T > 0|Z) ∗ E(T |Z, T > 0) (8)
where P (T > 0|Z) is the conditional probability based on the notion that we have
positive trade flows. The classic problem of sample selection bias arises from the
fact that most literature (such as that of Rose & Spiegel (2011b)) only considers
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E(T |Z, T > 0). The equation (8) can be further broken down, assuming that the
conditional probability of positive trade follows a standard Probit model (e.g., P (T >
0|Z) = Φ(Zβ
σ
)), into:
E(T |Z, T > 0) = Zβ +σ
[
φ(Zβσ )
Φ(Zβσ )
]
= Zβ + σλ
(
Zβ
σ
)
(9)
Hence, we have
E(T |Z) =
(
Zβ
σ
)
Zβ + σφ
(
Zβ
σ
)
(10)
With only positive trade flows, according to Liu (2009), the classic OLS estimation of
a log linear gravity model omits the variable λ(Zβ
σ
) in equation (9) . The correlation
that exists between λ and Z is the reason for the inconsistent estimation of the
parameters.14
2.5.1 Data
Past studies that account for zero trade flows typically assume that the country
pairs not covered in the dataset have zero bilateral trade (e.g. Felbermayr & Kohler
(2006a)). However, according to Liu (2009), on average for any given year, one
third of countries have missing data. Hence, it is likely that more missing positive
trade flows are incorrectly assigned as zero during the earlier years than latter years.
The consequence of incorrectly assigning zero values to missing trade data is non-
trivial and leads to biased estimates. Liu (2009) further mentions that if this error
is positively correlated with the impact variable (Olympic host dummy in my case),
it will lead to an overestimation of the role of the impact variable at the extensive
margin.
To minimize such errors while accounting for zero trade flows in the dataset (for
both aggregate and disaggregated dataset), this study matches the zero trade flows
with Liu’s trade dataset. Liu (2009) mentions that zero observations in his dataset are
systematically recorded accounting for more than 50% of the dataset. He retrieves
trade data from various sources to minimize the error associated with incorrectly
assigning zero values for missing data.15 The trade data from UN Comtrade does
not report zero trade flows but those categories are omitted from the trade data
14Another alternative to the Tobit model that has gained tract in recent empirics is the Helpman
et al. (2008) two-stage estimation procedure. The estimation applies a Heckman-sample selection
procedure. According to Liu (2009), even though this model is better suited to explain zero trade
flows than the traditional gravity model, for identification purpose, however Helpman et al. (2008)
assume that the common religion variable affects the probability of having positive trade flows
(selection equation), but does not affect trade volumes (outcome equation). Liu (2009) mentions
that the validity of this exclusion condition is often hard to justify and the difficulty to find good
instruments might be a concern of their proposed two-stage procedure.
15He uses trade data retrieved from the World Export Data (WED); the World Trade Flows (WTF)
dataset and the original IFS Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) dataset.
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altogether.16 The positive trade data for aggregate and disaggregate trade flows are
the same as described in Section 2.2 and Section 3.2, respectively.
2.5.2 Empirical Results : Random Effects Tobit Regression
Table 7 reports the results with the random effect Tobit regression for aggregate
exports.17 According to Liu (2009), as a rule of thumb, the coefficients from the Tobit
model should be multiplied by the share of non-zero observations (43% in my sample)
when compared with the coefficients from the OLS regressions. Taken literally, when
a country hosts a Summer Olympic game, it experiences a permanent decrease in
trade on average by 32% (e−0.90∗43% − 1). In contrast, the results from the log-linear
regression with positive trade flows (Table 1 ) indicate that hosting the Olympics
permanently increases exports on average by 24%. Thus the result suggests that the
Olympic effect on total aggregate exports is not robust with zero trade flows.
Table 8 reports the results with the inclusion of the World Cup hosts. Coefficients
on both the hosts are negative and statistically significant. The results indicate
that Olympics and World Cup hosts experience a permanent decrease in exports on
average of 26%. The results obtained from the log-linear model (table 2 ) indicated
that, on average, the hosts experienced a permanent increase in exports. Table 9
reports the results with the inclusion of the Summer Olympic candidates. In contrast
to the log-linear gravity model with positive trade flows, the random effect Tobit
regression indicates that hosting (and bidding for) mega-events actually results in a
permanent decrease in exports. The general conclusion is that the Olympic effect on
total aggregate exports is not robust to the inclusion of zero trade flows. In fact, the
results from the random effect Tobit regression for aggregate exports indicates that
the Olympic effect is actually negative and permanent.
Once we turn to the analysis using disaggregate trade data accounting for the
extensive and intensive margin of trade, the coefficients on the variables for total
exports become positive and statistically significant (tables 10, 11 and 12). Taken
literally, countries that have hosted the Summer Olympic games have exports that are
permanently higher by 9% compared to 12% for log-linear model (table 4 ). However,
the effect on exports at the extensive and intensive margin turns out to be statistically
insignificant. Table11 indicates that World Cup hosts experience similar increases in
exports, with a minimal increase in exports at the intensive margin. Table 12 reports
the results with the inclusion of the candidates. Both hosts and candidates experience
a permanent increase in total exports. The results further indicate that the candidates
actually experience a permanent decrease in the intensive margin of exports, with a
permanent increase in the extensive margin.
These results indicate that the Olympic effect with Tobit regression is not robust.
In line with the findings of Liu (2009), random effect Tobit regressions are very
16 Liu dataset only has either positive or zero trade flows in his dataset. The rest are assumed to be
missing trade. This paper matches the zero trade and missing trade flows according to Liu dataset
to minimize error for attributing zeros to missing trade.
17 Fixed effect Tobit estimation is not available. There is no sufficient statistic allowing the fixed
effect to be conditioned out on the likelihood (Liu (2009)).
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sensitive to small differences in data or specifications. He mentions that the Tobit
model hinges crucially on the assumption of homoskedasticity and normality.18 Hence
according to Liu (2009) and Felbermayr & Kohler (2010a), the Tobit model might
be even more inconsistent than the OLS in the presence of heteroskedastic and non-
normal residuals. The test for normality and homoskedasticity on the residual from
the Tobit regression cannot be performed, as one cannot observe the latent variable
(T* in equation (7) ). Hence the paper reverts to the Poisson regression as a suitable
means to deal with zero trade flows.
2.6 Gravity Model and Econometric Issues: An Alternative Specification - The Pois-
son Model
Recent empirical trade literature indicates that the traditional log-linear gravity
model leads to inconsistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedastic residuals.
Various literatures have proposed the Poisson regression as an alternative solution,
notably Flowerdew & Aitkin (1982) and more recently by Silva & Tenreyro (2006).
To illustrate the problem, assume a traditional gravity model of trade in its simplest
form where exports from country i to j, denoted by Tij, is proportional to the product
of the two countries’ GDP (indicated by Yi andYj) and inversely proportional to the
distance (Dij) between them. The stochastic version of the model takes the following
form:
Tij = λ0Y
λ1
i Y
λ2
j D
λ3
ij ij (11)
where ij represents the random component of the specification with E(ij|Yi, Yj, Dij)
= 1 and assumed to be independent of the regressors. Hence, the expected value of
the trade flow can be written as the following equation:
E(Tij|Yi, Yj, Dij) = λ0Y λ1i Y λ2j Dλ3ij (12)
Traditionally, equation (11) is log-linearized and the parameters are estimated using
the least-squares method. Hence, we have the specification of the following form:
lnTij = lnλ0 + λ1lnYi + λ2lnYj + λ3lnDij + lnij (13)
According to Silva & Tenreyro (2006), the validity of this specification depends criti-
cally on the assumption that ij and lnij are independent of the regressors. Jensen’s
inequality states that the expected value of the log of a random variable is not equal
to the log of its expected value (i.e., E(lnT ) 6= lnE(T )), but also depends on the
higher-order moments of its distribution. Hence, if the variance of the error term ij
in equation (11) depends on GDP or distance, then the expected value of lnij will
also depend on the regressors, violating the condition for consistency of OLS. Con-
sistent with their argument, they find overwhelming evidence that the error term in
18 Refer to equation(7) . See also Felbermayr & Kohler (2006a) about the crucial assumptions of
the Tobit model.
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the usual log-linear specification of the gravity equation are heteroskedastic, leading
to inconsistent estimates of elasticities of the interest variables.
Silva & Tenreyro (2006) explore the property of ij based on the characteristics of
the trade data. They postulate that in a traditional log-linear gravity model where
Tij is non-negative, when E(Tij|Z(covariates)) approaches 0, the probability of Tij
being positive must also approach 0. This implies that V (Tij|Z), the conditional
variance of Tij, tends to diminish as E(Tij|Z) approaches 0. In other words, when
E(Tij|Z) is close to its lower bound it is highly unlikely that large values of trade are
observed, and, as they cannot be offset by equally large deviations in the opposite
direction (trade cannot be negative), the variance also tends to diminish accordingly
(leading to small dispersion around the mean). Similarly, on the other hand, when
the expected value of Tij is far away from its lower bound, it is possible to observe
large deviations from the conditional mean in either direction, leading to greater
dispersion. Thus, according to Silva & Tenreyro (2006) in practice ij, will generally
be heteroskedastic and its variance will depend on the covariates. They mention
that heteroskedasticity is critical not only for efficiency but also for its consistency, as
regressions produce the estimate of ln(T ) rather than T itself. Hence, they suggest the
gravity equation be estimated in the multiplicative form (without taking logarithm
of Tij) and allowing for heteroskedasticity. Using nonparametric tests, Henderson &
Millimet (2008) confirm that the concerns over estimation in levels versus logs, posed
in Silva & Tenreyro (2006), are well-founded.
The common assumption of the PPML estimation method is that the conditional
variance is proportional to the conditional mean, i.e., E(Tij|Z) ∝ V (Tij|Z), although
the Poisson model is consistent even when the variance function is mis-specified.19
According to Silva & Tenreyro (2006), even if E(Tij|Z) ∝ V (Tij|Z) does not hold, the
PPML estimator is likely to be more efficient than other estimators (i.e., non-linear
least square estimators) when heteroskedasticity increases with the conditional mean.
All that is needed for this estimator to be consistent is the correct specification of
the conditional mean. Therefore, the data do not have to be Poisson at all, and the
dependent variable need not be an integer for the estimator to be consistent. This is
the well-known pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) result first noted by Gourieroux
et al. (1984). There are various alternatives to estimate the gravity equation multi-
plicatively, such as nonlinear least squares (NLS) and the Gamma Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood estimator (GQMLE).20
19 Silva & Tenreyro (2006) justify the hypothesis that conditional variance is proportional to the
conditional mean for the Poisson Model. According to Winkelmann (2008), a maximum-likelihood
estimator is called a pseudo maximum-likelihood estimator if it remains consistent even if the
likelihood function is misspecified.
20According to Liu (2009), NLS provides more weight to large predicted trade observations in its first
order condition. By contrast, GQMLE assumes that the conditional variance is proportional to the
square of conditional mean and hence gives less weight to large predicted trade flows. According
to Silva & Tenreyro (2006), there seems to be a substantial trade-off between the quantity of data
and their variances since larger trade flows and GDP usually have smaller measurement errors
with larger variances. The first order conditions of the Poisson model give the same weight to
all observations. They suggest (based on a simulation study) that the Poisson model performs
remarkably better than the other models under heteroskedasticity.
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As emphasized by Wooldridge (2002), the dependent variable for PPML estima-
tion does not have to be count data, and the fixed effect Poisson estimator works when-
ever the conditional mean assumption holds. Hence, the dependent variables could
be a nonnegative continuous variable. The random effect Poisson model needs addi-
tional maintained assumptions for efficiency against the fixed effect Poisson model.
The Hausman specification test, however, rejects the random effect model in favor of
the fixed effect model. Hence, the fixed effect Poisson model is used in this analysis.
2.6.1 Empirical Specification: The Poisson Model
The gravity equation is now estimated multiplicatively (in levels) allowing for het-
eroskedasticity. Based on the commonly used conditional mean specification
(E(Tijt|Zijt)= exp(Zijtβ)) in the Poisson Model, I have the specification of the fol-
lowing form for the aggregate trade data:
Tijt = exp(β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1aij +
∑
α2Y eart + γZijt) + ijt (14)
This paper employs the Poisson fixed effect estimator (country pair fixed effect),
with robust clustered standard errors and year fixed effects. The coefficient can be
explained as elasticity if the dependent variable (Tijt) is in levels and the covariates
are in logarithms. Compared to equation(2) , Tijt represents real bilateral exports
for a country pair in a given year in levels.21 Furthermore, this paper also employs
the Poisson specification with importer and exporter fixed effects to ensure that the
results are not sensitive to different estimation strategies. Hence, I also implement
specification of the following form:
Tijt = exp(β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart + γZijt)
+ ijt (15)
To account for the role of extensive and intensive margin of trade (using disaggre-
gated data) with a non-linear Poisson model, the decomposition of Tijt (total exports)
can be expressed as follows:
(Tijt) = (Nijt) ∗
(
Tijt
Nijt
)
(16)
where Tijt, the real aggregate bilateral exports, is decomposed into (Nijt and
Tijt
Nijt
).
Nijt is the extensive margin, and
Tijt
Nijt
is the intensive margin of exports. The estima-
tion equation for the extensive margin of exports or the number of products exported
with country-pair fixed effect is given as :
Nijt = exp(β0 + β1Hosti,t +
∑
α1aij +
∑
α2Y eart + γZijt) + ijt (17)
21Refer to equations (1) and (2) for elaborate discussion on the variables. Zijt represents all other
gravity control variables.
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and the estimation equation for the intensive margin or the average volume of exports
per product is given as :
(
Tijt
Nijt
) = exp(β0 + β1Hostit +
∑
α1aij +
∑
α2Y eart + γZijt) + ijt (18)
I further estimate the role of the extensive and intensive margin by employing exporter
and importer fixed effect Poisson estimation. It also employs the Poisson model to
account for the presence of zero trade flows.22 Accounting for zero trade flows is not
only a more appropriate specification, it also allows for a natural way to examine
whether new trading relationships were generated by the Olympic effect. In other
words, with zero trade flows we can account for country pairs that did not trade
initially, but started to trade after a country hosted a mega-event.
2.6.2 Empirical Results : The Poisson Model with Aggregate Exports
The results from the Poisson regressions for aggregate positive trade flows are reported
in table 13 .23 The coefficient on Summer Olympic host is negative but statistically
insignificant with importer and exporter fixed effects and negative and statistically
significant with country-pair fixed effects. In other words, countries actually expe-
rience a decrease in total aggregate exports from hosting the Olympic games. This
is in stark contrast to the result obtained from table 1 (log-linear model) where the
hosts experienced a permanent increase of exports on average by 24%.
With the aggregate trade data, the result reinforces the claim by Silva & Tenreyro
(2006) that if the variance of ijt depends on the regressors such as GDP, the con-
ditional expectation of ln(ijt) will also depend on GDP leading to biased estimates
of the true elasticity if estimated by OLS. Silva & Tenreyro (2006) mention that the
bias tends to be positive for the coefficients on variables (e.g. GDP) that relate to
larger volumes of trade and, presumably, to larger variance. Since the host countries
(or bidders) have larger GDPs on average compared to non-hosts (or non-bidders),
if the variance of the error term increases with GDP, then the error term exhibits
higher variance also for the host dummy.24 Hence, the higher order moments of the
error term would be related to the host dummy, leading to biased and exaggerated
OLS estimates. The results remain robust to accounting for the presence of zero trade
flows (full sample) as illustrated by the panel on table 13 . This suggests that, in this
case, heteroskedasticity rather than sample selection is responsible for the disparity
between the PPML results and that of OLS with positive trade flows. I tested for the
presence of heteroskedasticity in the data with the modified Wald test for group-wise
heteroskedasticity for the residuals in the fixed-effect regression model. The null hy-
22 The dataset utilized are the same as before. Refer to Sections 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2 for further
illustration on aggregate data, disaggregate data and with zero trade flows respectively.
23Observations are dropped if there is only one observation per group for the country pair fixed effect
estimation; hence this estimation tends to have fewer observations than the one with importer and
exporter fixed effects.
24In my data, the average log(GDP) for all countries is 10.10, while the average log(GDP) of hosts
and bidders are 13.43 and 13.08 respectively.
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pothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected by the data.25 Hence, the Olympic effect is
not robust to specification and sample selection issues.
Table 14 reports the results with the inclusion of the World Cup hosts. Unlike
the Olympic hosts, the coefficient on World Cup hosts is positive and statistically
significant, and the result is robust with both fixed effects. Taken literally, hosting of
the World Cup permanently increases exports by around 7%(e0.07−1). The magnitude
of permanent increase in exports for the Olympics and the World Cup host was 9%
and 40%, respectively, for the log-linear model (table 2 ) with country-pair fixed
effects. This result further reinforces the argument that the coefficient with the
log-linear model was highly exaggerated. The panel on table 14 also reports the
result with the full sample. The result does not change significantly compared to
the Poisson regression with positive trade flows, further reinforcing the notion that
heteroskedasticity rather than sample selection is responsible for the disparity between
the results for PPML and that of OLS.
Table 15 compares the trade patterns of Olympics hosts with candidates. The
effect of hosting the Olympics on total aggregate exports is statistically insignificant,
compared to a permanent increase of 16% with the log-linear model (table 3 with
country pair fixed effects).26 However the effect on candidates is negative and sta-
tistically significant. Results indicate that the candidates experience a permanent
decrease in exports on average by 7%, compared to a permanent increase of 38% with
the log-linear model. The general result for the Poisson regression extends to the
specification with the full sample. The general implication is that the traditional log-
linear model produces biased estimates, which in our case means that the role of the
Olympic effect (hosts and candidates) has been exaggerated. A plausible argument
as to why hosting (or bidding) could have negative impact on exports would be that
there is significant costs (e.g. investment in infrastructure) to hosting and bidding for
the Olympic games.27 These substantial costs have to be financed by the government,
potentially through taxation. This increase in taxation could constrain the financial
sector of the economy. Furthermore, hosting of mega-events entails significant di-
version of attention and resources for the government (e.g. building of idiosyncratic
sporting facilities) from other investments (e.g. other infrastructure investments, or
policies conducive to trade).
2.6.3 Empirical Results : The Poisson Model with the Extensive and the Intensive
Margin of Exports
Turning to table 6, the paper reports the results for the role of extensive and intensive
margins of trade with country pair fixed effects. Table 16 indicates that the impact
25I conducted the test for the residuals from table 2 . I obtained a test statistic of 2.9e+36 and a
p-value of 0. Hence, there was overwhelming evidence indicating heteroskedasticity in my data.
26The coefficients on Olympic hosts are negative but statistically insignificant for both of the esti-
mation strategies.
27 According to Rose & Spiegel (2011b), the candidate cities that could be potential hosts are
nominated by IOC after a phase of about ten months on the basis of questionnaire and technical
assessments. The relevant criteria for assessment include: government support, public opinion,
general infrastructure, security, venues, accommodation and transport.
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of hosting Summer Olympic games on total exports is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. However, results for the extensive and the intensive margin of trade reveals
a different story. The results indicate that total trade masks significant heterogeneity
in terms of the impact of hosting the Summer games. Olympic hosts do experience
a permanently higher impact on exports at the intensive margin of about 75%. The
magnitude for the Poisson specification is almost thrice compared to the log-linear
model (21%). In other words, there is substantial deepening of existing trade relation-
ships at the product level for Olympic hosts. However, hosts experience a permanent
decrease in the extensive margin of exports by 10% compared to a decrease of 14%
with the log-linear model (table 4 ). Based on the results, hosting the Olympics does
not enhance trade in products not previously traded by a country pair and is robust
to both of the specifications. With the full sample (table 16 , right panel), the results
indicate that the Olympic hosts experience a permanent increase of exports at the
intensive margin by 58% (compared to 75% with the positive trade flows). However,
the positive and significant impact of the Olympics on the intensive margin is robust
to both positive trade flows and full sample. Similarly, the results remain robust for
the extensive margin even after accounting for zero trade flows further reinforcing the
notion that the Olympic effect does not contribute to the extensive margin. On aver-
age, the hosts experience a permanent decrease in the number of products exported
(extensive margin) by 11%.
Table17 reports the results with the inclusion of the World Cup hosts. The World
Cup hosts experience a permanent increase in total exports by 7%. The results
indicate that there exists heterogeneity among the type of mega-events and its impact
on total exports. The results further indicate that both the Olympic and World Cup
hosts experience permanently higher exports through the intensive margin of trade at
the expense of the extensive margin. The Olympics and World Cup hosts have exports
at the intensive margin that are permanently higher by 60% and 28% respectively.
For the extensive margin, the Olympic and the World Cup hosts have exports that are
permanently lower by 9% and 5% respectively. The results remain robust to the full
sample, further reinforcing the notion that the extensive margin did not contribute
to the permanent increase in exports.
Table 18 compares whether the hosts experience trade patterns that are any dif-
ferent from the candidates. The coefficients on both the hosts and candidates for
total exports are negative and statistically significant. The Poisson regression indi-
cates a permanent decrease in total exports for hosts and candidates by 10% and
11% respectively. In contrast to the log-linear model (table 6 ), the Poisson results
indicate that only hosts of the Summer Olympic Games experience a positive impact
on exports at the intensive margin. At the intensive margin, the hosts experience
a permanent increase in exports by 77% (25% for log-linear model) and the candi-
dates experience a permanent decrease in exports by 23% (7% increase for log-linear
model). Both the hosts and candidates experience a permanent decrease of exports
at the extensive margin. These results for Poisson regression with positive trade flows
extends to the full sample. These results are in contrast to the one obtained by Rose
& Spiegel (2011b), suggesting that there might be an additional effect in conjunction
to the signaling effect that leads to permanent increase in exports for the hosts, or
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perhaps the signal sent by the candidates are not strong enough to be perceived by
their bilateral trade partners.
Table 7 reports the results with the exporter and importer fixed effects and are
similar to those in table 6. The key difference is that the Olympic effect on total
aggregate exports is not significant (table 19 ) with positive trade flows and with the
inclusion of candidates (table 21 ).28
Rose & Spiegel (2011a) claim that while hosting the games is sufficient to boost
trade, it is not necessary. However, the argument that both hosts and candidates
alike send signals of liberalization and thereby experience a permanent increase in
exports is not supported by the results obtained in this study. Similarly, the result
is also in contrast to the argument put forth by Preuss (2004), where hosting the
mega-event supposedly improves international relations as well as raises international
awareness of their market, promoting trade ties.
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis - Fixed Effects Quantile Regression
In this section, I analyze the gravity model with the fixed-effect quantile regression
to examine whether the Olympic effect has a heterogeneous impact on different levels
of export volumes. Instead of concentrating at the conditional mean of the sample
distribution, quantile regression provides the estimates at different quantiles of the
conditional distribution. In terms of this paper, quantile regression allows me to
analyze how hosting the Olympic Games affects exports that vary in amount across
country pairs. If the Olympic effect is relevant only country-pairs that already have
high volume of exports, it would lead to an overestimation of the trade-creating
effect for country-pairs that have exports at the lower quantile (or volumes) of the
distribution. On the other hand, if the Olympic effect is equally relevant even for
country-pairs with low volume of exports, this intensifies its importance.
Following Koenker & Bassett (1978) and Koenker & Hallock (2001), instead of
solving for the conditional expectation function as in the OLS estimation, 29 the
28I also ran the specification with the inclusion of the remoteness variable for a country pair. This
variable serves as a proxy for multilateral resistance according to Anderson & van Wincoop (2003).
Essentially, Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) argue that trade flows between countries are not only
determined by factors such as economic mass and distance, but also by the ratio of ‘bilateral’ to
‘multilateral’ trade resistance (MTR). According to the specification in Liu (2009), remoteness
of a country is defined as the distance to the rest of the world weighted by all other countries’
GDP in a given year. The remoteness variable for a given country pair is the product of the two
countries’ remoteness. It is defined as:
Remoteijt =
(∑
m 6=iDistancemiGDPmt∑
m 6=iGDPmt
)(∑
m 6=j DistancemjGDPmt∑
m 6=j GDPmt
)
(19)
Adam & Cobham (2007) mention that the failure to control for MTR can cause upward bias to the
estimated effect of control variables on trade. However, there was not any substantial difference
in the results with the inclusion of the remoteness variable. Hence, these results are not reported
in the paper.
29The least squares regression estimates the sum of the squared residuals, which gives much weight
to outliers.
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minimization problem of the conditional quantile function is solved by finding the
regression line that equates the number of positive and negative residuals. Following
similar specification to Eaton (2009) in a panel format, I estimate the following linear
model for the τ th conditional quantile, Q, of bilateral exports T ,
QTijt(τ |Zijt, αi) = Z
′
ijtβτ +
∑
α1Exp+
∑
α2Y eart , i = 1, ...N & t = 1, ....T (20)
where Tijt is the real bilateral exports at time t and Q(τ |) is the conditional quantile
function for quantile τ(0 < τ < 1).30 The explanatory variables are the vector Zijt,
α1Exp and α2Y eart are exporter and time fixed effects respectively. The quantile
regression model specifies the coefficient β as potentially varying per quantile, hence
a function of τ . The parameters β are estimated by
argminβ,α
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
wkρτk(Tijt − Z ′ijtβ(τk)−
∑
α1Exp−
∑
α2Y eart) (21)
where wk refers to weights attached to each quantile.
I use the simultaneous quantile regression with the panel bootstrap procedure
with 20 repetitions to obtain an estimate of the entire variance-covariance of the
estimators.31 The OLS estimates that are obtained based on the conditional expecta-
tion of the sample distribution are susceptible to heteroskedasticity issues. However,
if the estimates are based on the conditional median of Tijt (or other conditional
quantile), the estimates of the elasticities of interest can be obtained with the log-
linear model using the appropriate quantile regression estimator (Koenker & Bassett
(1978); Koenker & Hallock (2001)). Hence, the dependent variable is now measured
in logarithms.32
The results for the simultaneous fixed effect quantile regression are reported in
table 8. I take four conditional quantiles into account (τ = 25th (Q25), 50th (Q50
-the median),75th (Q75), 90th (Q90)). Table 22 reports the results for the total
exports for Olympic hosts. The results remain robust to the one obtained with the
PPML estimation. The Olympic effect on total exports does not differ between the
individual percentiles. In other words, the Summer Olympic hosts do not experience
a permanent increase in total exports at either quantiles or level of exports. Table 23
reports the results for the extensive margin of exports. The results indicate that the
Olympic hosts experience a permanent decrease in the extensive margin only for the
50th percentile or above.
Table 24 reports the results for the intensive margin of exports. The Olympics
effect on the intensive margin exhibits a monotonic behavior. In other words, the
30Eaton (2009) mentions that the conditional quantile function is defined as QT (τ |Z) = inf{T :
FT |Z(y) ≥ τ} where FT |Z is the conditional distribution of T given Z, and τ is conventionally
used to designate the quantiles over the interval (0, 1).
31The results reported in this paper are essentially unchanged even with 100 bootstrap replications.
32Silva & Tenreyro (2006) mentions that the conditional median might be problematic when Tijt has
a large mass of zero observations. In this case the conditional median of Tijt will be a discontinuous
function of the regressors, which is generally not compatible with the standard economic theory.
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Olympic effect on the intensive margin are relatively constant for all percentiles. The
test of equal coefficients for the 25th percentile and the 90th percentile cannot be
rejected at any level of significance. These results further confirm that the Olympic
hosts experience a permanent increase in exports only at the intensive margin. More
importantly, they experience increased exports at the intensive margin for higher as
well as lower level of exports.
2.8 Conclusion
This study contributes to the existing literature in various important ways. Utiliz-
ing a Poisson model specification at the aggregate trade level, the results indicate
that the traditional log-linear model exaggerated the impact of hosting/bidding for
mega-events on exports. Summer Olympic hosts and candidates do not experience a
permanent increase in exports, while that of World Cup hosts is marginally positive
and significant. This result is robust to accounting for zero trade flows (full sample).
The results indicate that the Olympic effect is not robust to empirical specification
and sample selection issues. The traditional log-linear gravity model is not capable
of handling issues of heteroskedastic residuals leading to biased estimates of the true
elasticities.
However, utilizing disaggregate trade level data with the Poisson model indicates
that total exports mask the heterogeneous impact of mega-events. The results indi-
cate that hosting the mega-events matters. The Summer Olympic and World Cup
hosts experience a permanent increase in exports solely at the intensive margin of
trade. The Poisson regression further indicates that both hosts experience a perma-
nent decrease in the extensive margin of exports. In other words, hosting of mega-
events boosts trade volume of existing trade relationships at the expense of potential
new products or number of products traded. However the candidates do not experi-
ence any increase in exports at both margins, casting doubt on the signaling effect.
Furthermore, the results from the fixed effects quantile regression indicate that Sum-
mer Olympic hosts experience an increase in the intensive margin for all percentiles
of exports distribution.
Recent literature indicates the importance of the intensive margin of trade for
long-run export growth. Besedes & Prusa (2010) indicate that the survival of trading
relationships is important for long-run export growth, and that the majority of growth
in exports occurs at the intensive margin. Moreover, they imply that there is much
less export persistence in developing countries, implying a critical part of improved
export growth for developing countries may be focusing on existing relationships.
Perhaps an avenue to maintain long-run export growth, especially for developing
economies, could be hosting a mega-event. However, this export growth comes at the
expense of the extensive margin of exports. Additional studies find that the majority
of the growth in trade since 1970 occurred between countries that have had an existing
trade relationship, implying the intensive margin is the most important component of
export growth (e.g. Helpman et al. (2008), Felbermayr & Kohler (2006a)). Amurgo-
Pacheco & Pierola (2008) also find that export growth is primarily determined along
the intensive margin, especially for developed economies.
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The economic benefit of hosting mega-events is realized through a permanent
increase in exports at the intensive margin, which is shown to be important for long-
run export growth and persistence through time. Rose & Spiegel (2011b) end with a
cautious note: their model does not necessarily explain why countries submit repeated
or multiple bids for mega-events, or why open economies bid for mega-events. This
paper provides some answer to the puzzle: the hosting of the event matters, as
countries experience a large increase in exports at the intensive margin. In contrast,
the candidates do not experience an increase in exports at either margin, suggesting
that bidding itself is not a sufficient condition for a positive impact on exports.
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2.9 Tables
Table 1: Olympic Effect on Aggregate Exports: Log-Linear Regression,
Positive Trade Flows - Olympics Hosts
Summer Olympics Host 0.24*** 0.19***
(0.04) (0.04)
Log distance -1.23*** —–
(0.02)
Log Exporter population -0.28*** 0.13***
(0.06) (0.07)
Log Importer population 0.50*** 0.90***
(0.06) (0.06)
Log Exporter real GDP p/c 1.50*** 1.47***
(0.04) (0.04)
Log Importer real GDP p/c 0.95*** 1.06***
(0.03) (0.04)
Currency union 0.64*** 0.55***
(0.08) (0.07)
Common language 0.32*** —–
(0.05)
RTA 0.57*** 0.38***
(0.03) (0.04)
Common border 0.36*** —–
(0.08)
Islands 1.87*** —–
(0.49)
Log product area 0.74*** —–
(0.05)
Common colonizer 0.47*** —–
(0.04)
Current colony 1.21*** 0.43***
(0.16) (0.12)
Ever colony 1.30*** —–
(0.09)
Year effects Yes Yes
Exporter fixed effects Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes
Dyadic fixed effects Yes
R2 0.68 0.87
N 93,910 93,910
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every
five year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable is the logarithm of
real export from country i to j. Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 2: Olympic Effect on Aggregate Exports: Log-Linear Regression,
Positive Trade Flows - Olympics and World Cup Hosts
Summer Olympics Host 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.04) (0.04)
World Cup Host 0.44*** 0.34***
(0.04) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes
Exporter fixed effects Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes
Dyadic fixed effects Yes
R2 0.68 0.87
N 93,910 93,910
Olympic=WC effect? (p-value) 0.00*** 0.00***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every
five year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable is the logarithm of
real export from country i to j. Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables
in Table 1 are also included but not reported.
Table 3: Olympic Effect on Aggregate Exports: Log-Linear Regression,
Positive Trade Flows - Olympics Host and Candidates
Summer Olympics Host 0.17*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04)
Candidates 0.40*** 0.32***
(0.03) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes
Exporter fixed effects Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes
Dyadic fixed effects Yes
R2 0.68 0.87
N 93,910 93,910
Host=Candidate ? (p-value) 0.00*** 0.00***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every five year
from 1950-2000. Dependent variable is the logarithm of real export from
country i to j. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in
parenthesis. All the other control variables in Table 1 are also included
but not reported.
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Table 4: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Log-Linear Gravity
Regression, Positive Trade Flows - Olympics Host
Total Extensive Intensive Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin Exports Margin Margin
Olympics Host 0.11** -0.13*** 0.24*** 0.07 -0.15*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.69 0.78 0.50 0.88 0.92 0.74
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240
Table 5: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Log-Linear Gravity
Regression, Positive Trade Flows - Olympics and World Cup Host
Total Extensive Intensive Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin Exports Margin Margin
Olympics Host 0.04 -0.09*** 0.14*** 0.02 -0.11*** 0.13***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
WC Host 0.17*** -0.10*** 0.27*** 0.15*** -0.11*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.69 0.78 0.50 0.88 0.92 0.77
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240
Olymp.=WC? 0.10* 0.82 0.02** 0.12 0.99 0.05*
(p-value)
Notes: 193 countries for every five year from 1965-2000. Dependent variable is the logarithm of real export from
country i to j. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in
table 1 are also included but not reported.
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Table 6: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Log-Linear Gravity
Regression, Positive Trade Flows - Olympics Host and Candidates
Total Extensive Intensive Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin Exports Margin Margin
Olympics Host 0.09** -0.13*** 0.23*** 0.07 -0.15*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Candidates 0.12*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.04 -0.03 0.07**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.69 0.78 0.50 0.88 0.92 0.77
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240
Host=Cand.? 0.67 0.00*** 0.02** 0.62 0.00*** 0.00***
(p-value)
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Table 7: Olympics Effect on Aggregate Exports : Random Effect Tobit
Regression, Full Sample - Olympics Hosts
Summer Olympics Host -0.90***
(0.08)
Log distance -2.99***
(0.04)
Log Exporter population 2.69***
(0.02)
Log Importer population 2.11***
(0.02)
Log Exporter real GDP p/c 3.05***
(0.03)
Log Importer real GDP p/c 2.35***
(0.03)
Currency union 3.60***
(0.16)
Common language 1.46***
(0.12)
RTA -0.14**
(0.06)
Common border 0.33
(0.22)
Islands 0.65***
(0.07)
Log product area -0.36***
(0.02)
Common colonizer 1.49***
(0.10)
Current colony -1.14***
(0.26)
Ever colony 3.53***
(0.29)
Year effects Yes
Country pair Random effects Yes
Rho 0.50
N 203,431
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries
for every five year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable
for the Tobit regression is log (T+1), where T is the real
export from country i to j. Robust standard errors are
clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Olympics Effect on Aggregate Exports : Random Effect Tobit
Regression, Full Sample - Olympics and World Cup hosts
Summer Olympics Host -0.70***
(0.09)
World Cup Host -0.70***
(0.08)
Year effects Yes
Country pair Random effects Yes
Rho 0.50
N 203,431
Olympic=WC effect? (p-value) 0.98
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Table 9: Olympics Effect on Aggregate Exports : Random Effect Tobit
Regression, Full Sample - Olympics Hosts and Candidates
Summer Olympics Host -0.79***
(0.08)
Candidates -0.49***
(0.07)
Year effects Yes
Country pair Random effects Yes
Rho 0.50
N 203,431
Olympic=WC effect? (p-value) 0.02**
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries
for every five year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable
for the Tobit regression is log (T+1), where T is the real
export from country i to j. Robust standard errors are
clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 10: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Random Effect Tobit
Regression, Full Sample - Olympics Host
Total Export Ext. Margin Int. Margin
Olympics Host 0.21** -0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country pair Random effect Yes Yes Yes
Rho 0.64 0.70 0.51
N 144,982 144,982 144,982
Table 11: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Random Effect Tobit
Regression, Full Sample - Olympics and World Cup Host
Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin
Olympics Host 0.15*** -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
WC Host 0.19*** -0.01 0.04**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country pair Random effect Yes Yes Yes
Rho 0.64 0.70 0.51
N 144,982 144,982 144,982
Olympics=WC effect? 0.50 0.68 0.09*
(p-value)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for
every five year from 1965-2000. Dependent variable for the
Tobit regression is log (T+1), where T is the real export from
country i to j. Robust standard errors clustered by country
pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in
table 1 are also included but not reported.
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Table 12: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Random Effect Tobit
Regression, Full Sample - Olympics Host and Candidates
Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin
Olympics Host 0.20*** -0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Candidates 0.08*** 0.06** -0.11***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country pair Random effect Yes Yes Yes
Rho 0.64 0.70 0.51
N 144,982 144,982 144,982
Host=Candidates ? 0.02** 0.01** 0.00***
(p-value)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for
every five year from 1965-2000. Dependent variable for the
Tobit regression is log (T+1), where T is the real export from
country i to j. Robust standard errors clustered by country
pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in
Table 1.A are also included but not reported.
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Table 13: Olympic Effect on Aggregate Export : Poisson Regression (
Positive Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics Hosts
Positive Full Sample Positive Full Sample
Summer Olympics Host -0.01 -0.06 -0.07* -0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log distance -0.78*** -0.79*** —– —–
(0.04) (0.04)
Log Exporter population 0.17 0.65*** 0.12 0.49***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Log Importer population 0.13 0.38*** 0.23** 0.43***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Log Exporter real GDP p/c 1.27*** 1.27*** 1.26*** 1.29***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log Importer real GDP p/c 1.00*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.06***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Currency union 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.64*** 0.74***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20)
Common language 0.41*** 0.42*** —– —–
(0.10) (0.11)
RTA 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.42***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Common border 0.27*** 0.26*** —– —–
(0.07) (0.07)
Islands 0.43 -0.54 —– —–
(0.33) (0.34)
Log product area —– 10.89 —– —–
(6.68)
Common colonizer 0.06 0.08 —– —–
(0.11) (0.11)
Current colony 1.21*** 1.22*** 0.68*** 0.51***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18)
Ever colony 0.23* 0.24* —– —–
(0.14) (0.14)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter fixed effects Yes Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes Yes
Country pair fixed effects Yes Yes
N 93,910 203,431 88,305 162,447
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every five year from 1950-2000.
Dependent variable -real export, is measured in levels. Positive trade flows only contains real exports
greater than 0. Full sample contains real exports including zeros in levels. Robust standard errors
clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 14: Olympic Effect on Aggregate Export : Poisson Regression (
Positive Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics and World Cup Hosts
Positive Full Sample Positive Full Sample
Summer Olympics Host -0.05 -0.10** -0.11** -0.13**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
World Cup Host 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter fixed effects Yes Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes Yes
Country pair fixed effects Yes Yes
N 93,910 203,431 88,305 162,447
Olympic=World Cup effect? 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(p-value)
Table 15: Olympic Effect on Aggregate Export : Poisson Regression (
Positive Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics Hosts and Candidates
Positive Full Sample Positive Full Sample
Summer Olympics Host -0.02 -0.06 -0.07* -0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Candidates -0.06* -0.06* -0.06** -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter fixed effects Yes Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes Yes
Country pair fixed effects Yes Yes
N 93,910 203,431 88,305 162,447
Host=Candidates? (p-value) 0.30 0.77 0.46 0.55
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every five
year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable -real export, is measured
in levels. Positive trade flows contains real exports greater than 0.
Full sample contains real exports including zeros in levels. Robust
standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All
the other control variables in Table 1 are also included but not
reported.
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Table 16: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Poisson Regression (Positive
Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics Host
Positive Full Sample
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Olympics Host -0.10** -0.11*** 0.56*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.46***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 67,156 67,156 67,156 101,541 101,541 101,541
Table 17: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Poisson Regression (Positive
Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics and World Cup Host
Positive Full Sample
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Olymp. Host -0.13*** -0.09*** 0.47*** -0.14*** -0.10*** 0.37***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
WC Host 0.07** -0.05*** 0.25*** 0.07** -0.06*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Count. pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 67,156 67,156 67,156 101,541 101,541 101,541
Olym.=WC? 0.00*** 0.01** 0.18 0.00*** 0.10* 0.39
(p-value)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every five
year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable -real export, is measured
in levels. Positive trade flows contains real exports greater than 0.
Full sample contains real exports including zeros in levels. Robust
standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All
the other control variables in Table 1 are also included but not
reported.
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Table 18: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Poisson Regression (Positive
Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics Host and Candidates
Positive Full Sample
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Olympics Host -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.57*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.47***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
Candidates -0.12*** -0.05*** - 0.21** -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.26***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pair FE
N 67,156 67,156 67,156 101,541 101,541 101,541
Host=Can.? 0.69 0.00** 0.00*** 0.89 0.00*** 0.00***
(p-value)
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Table 19: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Poisson Regression (Positive
Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics Host
Positive Full Sample
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Olympics Host -0.06 -0.10*** 0.65*** -0.07* -0.13*** 0.49***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.12) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exp & Imp FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 140,601 140,601 140,601
Table 20: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Poisson Regression (Positive
Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics and World Cup Host
Positive Full Sample
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Olympics Host -0.09** -0.08*** 0.56*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.42***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
WC Host 0.07*** -0.04*** 0.23*** 0.07** -0.08*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exp & Imp FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 140,601 140,601 140,601
Olym.=WC ? 0.00*** 0.02** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.48 0.13
(p-value)
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Table 21: Extensive and Intensive Margin : Poisson Regression (Positive
Trade Flows and Full Sample) - Olympics Host and Candidates
Positive Full Sample
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Export Margin Margin Export Margin Margin
Olympics Host -0.06 -0.10*** 0.66*** -0.08* -0.13*** 0.50***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
Candidates -0.13*** -0.04*** - 0.20** -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.27***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.09)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exp & Imp FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 140,601 140,601 140,601
Host=Cand.? 0.29 0.00** 0.00*** 0.52 0.02** 0.00***
(p-value)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every five
year from 1950-2000. Dependent variable -real export, is measured
in levels. Positive trade flows contains real exports greater than 0.
Full sample contains real exports including zeros in levels. Robust
standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All
the other control variables in Table 1 are also included but not
reported.
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Table 22: Fixed Effect Quantile Regression for Olympics Hosts: Positive
Trade Flows - Total Exports
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Olympics Host 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
PseudoR2 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.48
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240
(q25)=(q90) ? 0.63
(p-value)
Table 23: Fixed Effect Quantile Regression for Olympics Hosts: Positive
Trade Flows - Extensive Margin
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Olympics Host -0.01 -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.15***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
PseudoR2 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.50
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240
(q25) =(q90)? 0.00***
(p-value)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every
five year from 1965-2000. Dependent variable is measured in logs.
t-statistics are computed using bootstrap standard errors with 20
replications. The results are the same with 100 replications. All
the other control variables in Table 1 are also included but not
reported.
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Table 24: Fixed Effect Quantile Regression for Olympics Hosts: Positive
Trade Flows - Intensive Margin
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Olympics Host 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
PseudoR2 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.31
N 72,240 72,240 72,240 72,240
(q25) =(q90) ? 0.12
(p-value)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 193 countries for every five
year from 1965-2000. Dependent variable is measured in logs. t-statistics
are computed using bootstrap standard errors with 20 replications. The
results are the same with 100 replications. All the other control variables
in Table 1 are also included but not reported.
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2.10 Appendix
Table 25: Data Sources - Aggregate trade data
• All the common gravity variables are obtained from the dataset provided by
Liu .
• FOB exports (for aggregate trade data ) retrieved from Rose’s website are mea-
sured in US $, taken from IFS Direction of Trade CD-ROM, deflated by US
CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), all items, 1982-84=100.
• According to Liu (2009), the GDP and population data are from several stan-
dard sources including the PWT6.1, PWT 5.6, WDI2003, Maddison Historical
Statistics, International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the United Nations Year-
books (UNSYB).
• Country-specific data (retrieved from Liu dataset) such as area, island-nation
status, contiguity, language, colonizer, and independence are taken from 2003
CIA World Factbook website by Liu.
• Currency-union data taken from Glick-Rose (2002).
• Regional trade agreements taken from WTO website :
http : //www.wto.org/english/tratope/regione/eife.xls
• World Cup hosting, participants and years of membership in FIFA are retrieved
from : http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/index.html
• Information on Olympic Hosts (along with candidates) are retrieved from Rose’s
website.
Disaggregate trade data
• Exports at product level are obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) database.
• Within the database, the export data is retrieved from the United Nations
Statistics Division (UNSD) COMTRADE (Commodity Trade) database.
• Export data is available at the four-digit SITC- Revision 2 classification.
• All the other variables are obtained from Liu’s dataset (described in detail in
Appendix25).
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Table 26: Hosts and Candidate Cities for Post-war Summer Olympic
Games
Year Host Candidates
1948 London, UK Baltimore, Lausanne, Los Angeles, Minneapolis
Philadelphia
1952 Helsinki, Finland Amsterdam, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles
Minneapolis, Philadelphia
1956 Melbourne, Australia Buenos Aires, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles
Mexico city, San Francisco
1960 Rome, Italy Brussels, Budapest, Detroit, Lausanne
Mexico City, Tokyo
1964 Tokyo, Japan Brussels, Detroit, Vienna
1968 Mexico city, Mexico Buenos Aires, Detroit, Lyon
1972 Munich, Germany Detroit, Madrid, Montreal
1976 Montreal, Canada Los Angeles, Moscow
1980 Moscow, USSR Los Angeles
1984 Los Angeles, USA None
1988 Seoul, Korea Nagoya
1992 Barcelona, Spain Amsterdam, Belgrade, Manchester, Melbourne
Toronto
1996 Atlanta, USA Athens, Belgrade, Manchester, Melbourne
Toronto
2000 Sydney, Australia Beijing, Berlin, Istanbul, Manchester
2004 Athens, Greece Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Rome, Stockholm
Data available at : http : //www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/indexuk.asp?OLGT = 1&OLGY = 1992
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Table 27: Hosts and Candidate Cities for Post-war World Cup Games
Year Host Candidates
1950 Brazil
1954 Switzerland
1958 Sweden
1962 Chile Argentina, Germany
1966 England Germany, Spain
1970 Mexico Argentina
1974 Germany Spain
1978 Argentina Mexico
1982 Spain Germany
1986 Mexico Canada, US
1990 Italy England, Greece, Russia
1994 US Brazil, Morocco
1998 France Morocco, Switzerland
2002 Japan/South Korea Mexico
2006 Germany Brazil, England, Morocco
South Africa
Note: Hosts for years 1950, 1954 and 1958 were the only bidders.
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Table 28: Country List
Afghanistan Cote D’Ivoire India Netherlands St. Pierre & Miq.(b)
Albania Croatia Indonesia Netherlands Antilles St. Vincent & Gren.
Algeria Cuba Iran New Caledonia Sudan
Angola Cyprus Iraq New Zealand Suriname
Antigua & Barbuda Czech Rep Ireland Nicaragua Sweden
Argentina Czechoslovakia (b) Israel Niger Switzerland
Armenia Denmark Italy Nigeria Syria
Aruba Djibouti Jamaica Norway Tajikistan
Australia Dominica Japan Oman Tanzania
Austria Dominica Rep. Jordan Pakistan Thailand
Azerbaijan Ecuador Kazakhstan Panama Togo
Bahamas Egypt Kenya Papua N. Guinea Tonga
Bahrain El Salvador Korea, Rep. Paraguay Trinidad & Tobago
Bangladesh Eq. Guinea Kuwait Peru Tunisia
Barbados Estonia Kyrgyzstan Philippines Turkey
Belarus Ethiopia Laos Poland Turkmenistan
Belgium Faeroe Islands Latvia Portugal Tuvalu
Belize Fiji Lebanon Puerto Rico (a) U.A.E.
Benin Finland Liberia Qatar U.K.
Bermuda French Guiana (b) Libya Reunion (b) U.S.A.
Bolivia France Lithuania Romania Uganda
Bosnia& Herzegovina French Polynesia (b) Luxembourg Russia Ukraine
Brazil Gabon Macau Rwanda Uruguay
Brunei Gambia Macedonia Samoa (a) Uzbekistan
Bulgaria Georgia Madagascar Sao Tome & Principe Vanuatu
Burkina Faso Germany Malawi Saudi Arabia Venezuela
Burundi Ghana Malaysia Senegal Vietnam
Cambodia Greece Maldives Serbia Yemen Arab Rep.
Cameroon Greenland Mali Seychelles Yemen P.D. Rep.
Canada Grenada Malta Sierra Leone Yemen, Rep. of
Cape Verde Guadalupe (b) Martinique (b) Singapore Yugoslavia
C.A.R. Guatemala Mauritania Slovakia Zambia
Chad Guinea Mauritius Slovenia Zimbabwe
Chile Guinea-Bissau Mexico Solomon Is.
China Guyana Moldova Somalia
Colombia Haiti Mongolia South Africa
Comoros Honduras Morocco Spain
Congo, Dem. Rep. Hong Kong Mozambique Sri Lanka
Congo, Rep. of Hungary Myanmar St. Kitts & Nevis
Costa Rica Iceland Nepal St. Lucia
Note: (a) means aggregate date; (b) means bilateral data for Rose & Spiegel (2011b) aggregate data.
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3 Reconciling the WTO Effect: An Inquiry into the Extensive and Intensive Margin
of Imports
3.1 Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO), and its predecessor the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have in effect served as the constitution of the post-
war international trading system (Staiger (2006)). Since 1947, membership in the
GATT/WTO has grown from 23 countries to its present size of 153 countries, and
average ad-valorem tariffs on industrial goods have been reduced from over 40% to be-
low 4% through eight rounds of multilateral negotiation (the Doha Round is currently
ongoing). Although the theory indicates that a reduction in trade barriers should in-
crease trade flows, the empirical literature on the impact of the WTO membership
has been rather ambiguous. In his seminal paper, Rose (2004) uses a standard gravity
model of trade and reveals little evidence of the GATT/WTO promoting trade. Rose
& Spiegel (2011a) findings further suggests that WTO members did not systemati-
cally follow more liberal trade policies than non-members.
Subsequent studies based on Rose (2004) findings have produced disparate results.
Subramanian & Wei (2007) examine heterogeneity of trade flows for WTO members
across countries (based on their level of development) and sectors. They mention that
since developing members were not as actively engaged in reciprocal liberalization,
trade liberalization should occur on products of export interest to industrial countries
but not that of developing countries. Hence, they postulate that imports between in-
dustrial members should be large, while imports between industrial and developing
members should be small or even non-existent. They find that the industrial countries
that participated more actively than developing countries in reciprocal trade nego-
tiations witnessed a large increase in trade. Tomz et al. (2007) distinguish formal
members from non-member participants (NMPs), and find that NMPs are at least as
liberalized as the formal members. Taking these NMPs into account, they find that
bilateral trade is 70% higher if both trading partners are formal GATT/WTO mem-
bers or NMPs. Eicher & Henn (2011) mention that conventional literature on WTO
fails to account for three sources of omitted variable bias: multilateral resistance,
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and individual regional trade agreement (RTA)
effects. They unify Rose (2004), Subramanian & Wei (2007), and Tomz et al. (2007)
specifications in one comprehensive approach that minimizes omitted variable bias,
and conclude that WTO effects on trade flows are not statistically significant. This
seems to a severe blow to the recent literature suggesting significance of WTO in
promoting bilateral trade.
However, total aggregate trade could mask significant heterogeneity in terms of
the impact of the WTO membership. This paper utilizes disaggregated product
level trade data to examine whether the WTO creates new trade relationships (the
extensive margin) or increases trade in existing relationships (the intensive margin).
The extensive margin is measured as the number of products imported by a country
pair for a given year and the intensive margin is defined as the average volume of
imports in existing products between a country pair for a given year.
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Past studies such as Liu (2009) and Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b) have examined
the role of the WTO membership at the country-level extensive and intensive margin
of imports with aggregate trade data. They mention that past studies have ignored
the fact that many country pairs exhibit zero trade flows by restricting the sample to
only positive trade flows. Hence, they take into account the issue of sample selection
bias in the traditional gravity model. Trade with only positive trade flows is viewed as
the country-level intensive margin (trade between partners that already trade with one
another) of imports. Hence, the difference in trade with zero trade flows (full sample)
and positive trade flows is defined as the country-level extensive margin. Furthermore,
they implement the Poisson regression as advocated by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) to
address the issue of heteroskedasticity prevalent in the log-linear gravity model. Liu
(2009) finds a stronger role for WTO in creating new relationships (country-level
extensive margin) compared to increase in trade among existing partners (country-
level intensive margin). In contrast, Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b) find that the WTO
increased imports only at the country-level intensive margin.33
With aggregate trade data, the extensive margin of trade could only be captured
by accounting for zero trade flows in the data. For example, assume that the U.S.
never exported to Italy until 1985, and starts exporting from 1986 onwards. This
generally constitutes an increase in the country-level extensive margin of trade (or
increase in trading partners). However, with aggregate data information on trade
margins might be missing due to the failure to account for the number of products
traded at the disaggregate level. For example, an increase in the extensive margin
could also be realized, if US exported 24 different products to Italy compared to
10 products the previous year. Hence, a key feature of the product-level extensive
and intensive margin implemented in this study is that it allows to account for the
extensive margin of imports even with positive trade flows.
In a recent working paper, Dutt et al. (2011) examine the role of the WTO at the
extensive and the intensive margin of exports with product level data. They imple-
ment a dummy for country pair where both are members of the WTO. They find that
WTO membership increases the extensive margin of exports, while it has a negligible
or even a negative impact on the intensive margin. They implement the traditional
log-linear model for positive trade flows and Helpman et al. (2008) selection model
to deal with the zero trade flows, both of which are subjected to heteroskedasticity
issues due to the log-linearization of the dependent variable. They do not implement
the multilateral resistance controls in their Helpman et al. (2008) specification and
resort to one average RTA control, both leading to omitted variable bias issues.34
Furthermore, Dutt et al. (2011) adopt the mutually-inclusive coding for the WTO
membership. Eicher & Henn (2011) mention that the diversity of results in the empir-
ical WTO literature seems to suggest that econometric specifications or data-coding
conventions crucially influence the magnitude of WTO trade effects. There are sev-
33Their study differs from Liu (2009) in two ways - they implement dummies for multilateral re-
sistance controls and they average the data over formative GATT periods while Liu (2009) uses
yearly observations and implements Dalgin et al. (2006) specification of the remoteness term.
34Eicher & Henn (2011) mention that the key reason for the insignificant WTO effect in their
specification is due to accounting for multilateral resistance controls.
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eral key differences between Dutt et al. (2011) study and mine. I take into account
the multilateral resistance controls and the individual RTA effects to minimize omit-
ted variable bias in the specification.35 This paper also employs mutually-exclusive
coding of WTO membership to isolate its impact from other effects (e.g. RTA and
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)).36 Eicher & Henn (2011) mention that
mutually inclusive coding might have exaggerated the WTO effect when increase in
trade flows is attributed to both the RTA and WTO memberships as opposed to just
the RTA. Furthermore they mention that with mutually inclusive coding, the WTO
dummy could exhibit collinearity with the importer-year dummy that controls for
multilateral resistance.
In this chapter, with similar WTO dummy as Dutt et al. (2011), I find positive
impact of WTO membership on total trade and extensive margin with the log-linear
model. However, with the PPML estimation for both positive and zero trade flows,
the effect is significant but more importantly, negative.
I further examine the heterogeneity of trade flows for WTO members across coun-
tries based on their level of development. Past literature, with the exception of
Subramanian & Wei (2007) fail to account for this heterogeneity. Subramanian &
Wei (2007) mention that the theory suggests the impact of a countrys’ membership
in the WTO depends on what the country does with it and whom it negotiates with.
The results indicate that any positive benefit of the WTO membership is realized
entirely through the extensive margin while the impact on the intensive margin is
insignificant or even negative. However, the positive impact of the extensive margin
is heterogeneous and is contingent upon the importer-exporter relationships. In other
words, the industrial WTO members experience increase in imports at the extensive
margin only from the developing WTO members and vice-versa. The result is robust
to accounting for multilateral trade resistance terms, individual RTAs and zero-trade
flows. In contrast to Subramanian & Wei (2007), the developing countries also ben-
efit from the WTO membership. However, the benefit is realized entirely from the
extensive margin of imports, and only from the industrial WTO members.
Finally, this study takes into account the role of product heterogeneity based on
Rauch (1999) classification. Rauch (1999) classified product categories into three
groups: homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated products. Differentiated
goods are subjected to heterogeneity in manufactures (Rauch & Casella (2003));
higher networking effect (Rauch (1999)); lower price elasticities (Erkel-Rousse &
Mirza (2002)) and smaller border effects (Evans (2003)). The results are similar
across both homogeneous and differentiated goods. In other words, for both goods,
the increase in imports is from the extensive margin and is contingent upon importer-
exporter relationships. The results are at odds with the theoretical predictions of
Chaney (2008) model. Given a reduction in the variable costs, Chaney (2008) pre-
dicts that homogeneous (differentiated) goods should witness a larger increase in the
intensive (extensive) margin. However, my results indicate that the increase in im-
35I do not take into account the country-pair fixed effects in the PPML specification. Refer to the
Appendix-B for an extensive argument in regards to the exclusion of country-pair fixed effect.
36With the exception of Subramanian & Wei (2007) and Eicher & Henn (2011) past studies have
employed mutually-inclusive coding that is subjected to various issues.
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ports is entirely on the extensive margin for both homogeneous and differentiated
goods.
The results are more in line with the theoretical predictions of several studies
(e.g. Mansfield & Reinhardt (2008), Francois & Martin (2004), Handley (2011) and
Sala et al. (2010)) that attribute the benefit of the WTO membership to tariff binds
which reduces market uncertainty rather than tariff reduction itself. Sala et al. (2010)
and Handley (2011) mention that even though the reduction of bound rates may
in practice command no reduction of the applied rates, it can reduce or eliminate
uncertainty leading to increased entry of firms in the export market. The tariff
bindings above applied rates are unable to generate market access via the intensive
margin of trade. Sala et al. (2010) further predict that bound tariffs are more effective
with higher risk destination markets (e.g. developing countries) where a large binding
overhang can command substantial market access for these countries.
The results indicate that past studies might have underestimated the role of the
WTO by failing to account for the product level extensive and the intensive margin
of imports. Furthermore, the importer-exporter relationship is relevant to reap any
benefit from the membership. The fact that the entire benefit is realized from the
extensive margin perhaps provides empirical support to the “new-new trade theory,”
that advocates for the indirect benefits of WTO achieved through reduction of market
uncertainty via tariff binds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the ex-
tensive and the intensive margin of imports along with several estimation issues in
the empirical literature. It then specifies the traditional log-linear gravity model and
discusses the issues associated with it. It then proposes the PPML estimation for
both positive and zero-trade flows. Finally, it talks about the data and reports the
results. Section 3 examines the impact of heterogeneity of the WTO membership
across countries based on their level of development. Section 4 examines the role
of product heterogeneity on the WTO membership. Section 5 summarizes the main
findings of the paper.
3.2 Extensive and Intensive Margin of Imports : Role of the WTO membership
Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b) mention that the WTO as a multilateral system is
commonly regarded as fostering a transparent and predictable world trading envi-
ronment that features open markets. According to Subramanian & Wei (2007), the
GATT/WTO system, by design, focuses on mutually-agreed reductions of trade bar-
riers (the reciprocity principle) and non-discriminatory treatment between countries
(the most-favored nation (MFN) principle). As non-member countries do not partic-
ipate in reciprocal liberalizations, the member countries do not have legal obligations
to extend the benefits of tariff concessions to non-members. Hence, the trade litera-
ture has primarily attributed the potential benefit of the WTO membership towards
the reduction in tariffs.
In recent years, the theoretical models of trade have ushered into the “new trade
theory” that incorporates firm-level productivity differences in trade pattern. Recent
studies such as Helpman et al. (2008) have advocated for the decomposition of trade
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volume into two margins: the extensive and the intensive margin. Various studies
such as Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) have analyzed the impact of trade liber-
alization on these two margins. Theoretical prediction of Melitz (2003) and Chaney
(2008) indicates that decline in variable trade costs (e.g. reduction in tariffs) increases
the extensive as well as the intensive margin. Chaney (2008) further stipulates that a
reduction in fixed cost affects only the extensive margin. This paper builds upon the
literature by inquiring whether the WTO membership creates new trading relation-
ships (the extensive margin) or increases trade in existing relationships (the intensive
margin) at the product level.
Recent theoretical literature in trade attributes the indirect benefits of the WTO
membership via tariff binds to reducing market uncertainty in addition to the reduc-
tion of tariffs (e.g. Mansfield & Reinhardt (2008), Francois & Martin (2004), Handley
(2011) and Sala et al. (2010)). When countries join the WTO or when they negotiate
tariff levels with each other during trade rounds, they make agreements on bound
tariff rates, rather than actually applied rates (Bchir et al. (2006)). Members have
the flexibility to increase or decrease their tariffs (on a non-discriminatory basis) as
long as they don’t raise them above their bound levels.37 Mansfield & Reinhardt
(2008) mention that the binds on tariff significantly reduces trade volatility mak-
ing trade policy and trade flows more predictable. Handley (2011) shows that tariff
binds reduce uncertainty by censoring the range of observable tariffs, while Francois
& Martin (2004) mention that more important to market access might be the reduc-
tion of variance of the tariffs rather than the mean of the tariff itself.38 Tariff binds
is shown to have reduced the risk exporter face that has substantial effects on trade
and country’s welfare (e.g. Francois (2001), Francois & Martin (2004) and Sala et al.
(2010)).
Several studies have investigated the importance of tariff binds in reducing un-
certainty and its impact on the extensive and the intensive margin. Handley (2011)
and Sala et al. (2010) argue that tariff binds that reduces uncertainty can increase
entry in the export market even when applied protection is unchanged. Sala et al.
(2010) mention that a one-sided reduction in the volatility of trade policy may in
effect appear like a reduction in expected future tariffs. They stipulate that if the
current applied tariffs stay unaltered, such risk reductions have no direct effect on
the current prices that exporters charge. Thus, from the importers’ perspective, the
demand for and sales volume of a given product or the intensive margin of trade re-
main unaffected. In other words the tariff bindings above applied rates are unable to
generate market access via the intensive margin of trade. They further stipulate that
the effect of bound tariffs on market access must be sought at the extensive margin
37The gap between the bound and applied MFN rates is called the “binding overhang”. This gap
tends to be small on average in industrial countries and often fairly large in developing countries.
38They further mention that while tariff bind allow tariff rates to vary below the level of the bind,
they reduce both the average applied tariff and the variability of the applied rate of protection.
Furthermore, early in the liberalization process, when tariff bindings may be high relative to
the underlying mean of the distribution of protection, the gains from subjecting protection to
multilateral disciplines may be due to more reductions in variability than to reductions in the
mean level of protection.
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of trade or it must stem from the export market entry decision of firms.39 Therefore,
even if current rates remain unchanged, negotiations in terms of bound rates affects
the extensive margin of trade, but not the intensive margin. Hence, the empirical
investigation in this study could be viewed as a test to whether the WTO facilitates
trade, if at all, either through tariff reduction or tariff binds.
3.2.1 Empirical Model and Estimations Issues
Initially, the paper employs the traditional log-linear gravity model of trade to exam-
ine the role of the WTO membership at the extensive and intensive margin of imports.
Subramanian & Wei (2007) mention that all the theories that underlie a gravity-like
specification yield predictions on unidirectional trade rather than total trade, and
assert that trade effects of WTO relates to imports.40 Hence, I focus on total imports
rather than total trade. For total aggregate imports, I have the specification of the
following form :
lnTijt = β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIijt + β5WTODijt + ijt (22)
where i denotes the importer, j denotes the exporter and t denotes time. Tijt repre-
sents real bilateral imports for a country pair. This section analyzes importer-exporter
relationships based on the WTO membership. WTOIijt is a dummy variable, which
is equal to 1, if importers are industrial WTO members and the exporters are also
WTO members. WTODijt is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1, if importers
are developing WTO members and the exporters are also WTO members. I employ
the same definition of industrialized and developing countries as Subramanian & Wei
(2007). In their study, Subramanian & Wei (2007) utilize these dummies and find
that industrial WTO members witnessed a large increase in trade, while for devel-
oping WTO members it was not significant. They mention that under the GATT
regime, industrial WTO members actively took part in reciprocal liberalization while
the developing members were largely exempted from these obligations.
Y eart is year-specific fixed effects implemented to take into account any time-
specific common trends or effects (e.g. business cycles, oil price shocks). Impkt are
the list of time-varying importer dummies that take a value of one if k = i and zero
otherwise for a given time t. Explt are the list of time-varying exporter dummies
that take a value of one if l = j and zero otherwise for a given time t. These
dummies are included to account for the multilateral resistance controls as suggested
by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). They stipulate that a consistent and efficient
39Furthermore, they stipulate that the profitability of such a strategy depends on the expected
protection rate and therefore on plausible future tariff reversions. The tariff-binds acts as a ceiling
to the risk of such an occurrence by effectively limiting the future possible increment of a tariff
and, where the overhang is small, it makes the likeness of the tariff increase more negligible.
40They mention that when a countryj grants GSP preferences or j liberalizes its imports under the
WTO, there is reason to expect j′s imports from k to increase but there is no theoretical reason
why j′s exports to k should also increase by the same proportion
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estimate of a theoretical gravity equation is achieved by considering the multilateral
and the bilateral trade resistance, hence the omission of these dummies leads to mis-
specification of the model and biases the estimates of the trade costs towards zero.41
The row vector Zijt represents a list of common gravity control variables (or prox-
ies) for transportation costs and geographical or cultural proximities that are not
absorbed by the fixed effects. It includes the natural log of the bilateral distance
(Dij), various bilateral pair dummies for country pairs such as using same the cur-
rency at time t (CUijt), sharing a common language (ComLangij), sharing a common
land border (ComBorderij), colonized by the same country (ComColij), country i
colonized j at time t or vice versa (Colijt) and if country i ever colonized j or vice
versa (EverColij). Some country-year specific covariates are absorbed into the time-
varying importer and exporter fixed effects (Eicher & Henn (2011) and Subramanian
& Wei (2007)).42
RTAijt is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if i and j belong to regional
trade agreement in year t. GSPijt is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1
if the importing industrial country grants preferences under the generalized scheme
of preferences to the exporting country j at time t.43 According to Subramanian
& Wei (2007), RTA represents the culmination of trade integration, whereas the
WTO represents some intermediate way station.44 Similarly, this study relies on the
fact that the RTAs, GSP and the WTO involves different degrees of liberalization.
Hence, I define them mutually exclusively in order to isolate the impact of each
variable from the other. The coding is “hierarchical”, for e.g., if the country pairs
are the members of WTO, GSP and the RTA, only RTA dummy takes the value
of one. When a country pair belongs to the WTO and in a GSP relationship, only
GSP takes a value of 1. Hence, with mutually exclusive coding, the coefficient on
the WTO membership could be interpreted as a “pure WTO effect”. Eicher & Henn
(2011) mention that with mutually inclusive coding, the WTO dummy might exhibit
collinearity with the importer-year dummy that controls for multilateral resistance.45
In the mutually inclusive coding convention, all the dummies for RTA, GSP and
WTO can be assigned the value of “1” if the conditions are met.
Following Eicher & Henn (2011), the aggregate RTA vector, RTAijt, is replaced
with dummies that allow each RTA to account for its own individual effect on bi-
41Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) mention that the specification requires both importer and ex-
porter fixed effects as trade between any two countries depends on the multilateral resistance of
both importers and exporters. Some studies have used time-invariant importer and exporter fixed
effects, however Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) argue that these time-invariant fixed effects are not
sufficient as the omitted trade costs are time variant.
42 Due to the inclusion of the time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects, country-specific
covariates such as GDP, GDP per capita, population and land area are absorbed.
43Refer to the Appendix table 46 for the list of industrial and developing countries.
44For example, if a country pair belongs to both WTO and RTA, they would not be expected to
trade more with each other than if they are simply members of the RTA but not the members of
the WTO.
45By construction this collinearity is avoided in mutually exclusive coding since WTO importers are
not considered WTO members when the WTO importer is in a RTA or GSP relationship with the
exporter (Eicher & Henn (2011).
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lateral imports. Eicher & Henn (2011) argue that omitted variable bias ensues when
specifications include only one average RTA control. They mention that the individ-
ual RTA trade effects matter, since preferential tariff reductions differ vastly across
RTAs. They assert that when these individual trade effects are omitted from the
empirical approach, the WTO coefficient may be biased upward if it assumes part
of a positive, but omitted RTA effect. This analysis employs the set of RTAs as
suggested by Eicher et al. (2010).46 Including additional RTAs into the regression
also implies that it also diminishes the number of WTO relationships and correct for
any upward bias in WTO effect. BTAijt is a dummy variable that takes on a value
of 1 if i and j belong to bilateral trade agreement in year t.47
This paper further examines whether the results extend to product level exten-
sive and intensive margin of imports. This chapter utilizes disaggregated data at
the four-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2 product
level to construct the measure of the extensive and the intensive margins of imports.
The methodology applied in this analysis to construct the two margins of imports
is referred to as the count method. This methodology has been applied in previous
studies such as that of Nitsch & Pisu (2008), Bernard et al. (2007), Flam & Nordstrm
(2006), and Dutt et al. (2011). Accounting for the role of product level extensive and
intensive margin of imports, in the traditional log-linear form, the decomposition of
Tijt (total imports) can be expressed as follows:
ln(Tijt) = ln(Nijt) + ln(
Tijt
Nijt
) (23)
where Tijt, the real aggregate bilateral imports (sum of total imports for all products
for a given year) between a country pair is decomposed into two different dependent
variables (Nijt and
Tijt
Nijt
). Nijt (the extensive margin) is the number of products
imported per year per country pair and
Tijt
Nijt
(the intensive margin) is the average
volume of imports per product per year. The estimation equation for the extensive
margin of imports or the number of products imported is given as:
lnNijt = β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIijt + β5WTODijt + ijt (24)
and the estimation equation for the intensive margin (or the average volume of imports
per product) is given as :
ln(
Tijt
Nijt
) = β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIijt + β5WTODijt + ijt (25)
There are alternative means of constructing the extensive and the intensive margin
46Refer to the Appendix table46 for the complete list of individual RTAs along with the date of
their inception.
47Refer to the Appendix table47 for further illustration on the bilateral trade agreements.
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of trade with product level data which is not explored in this paper.48
3.2.2 Poisson Specification
The log-linear specification of the gravity model of trade (as shown in equation (22)
) is obtained by taking logarithms of the gravity equation, where the parameters
are estimated by OLS. Recent empirical trade literature has indicated that the log-
linear gravity model leads to inconsistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedastic
residuals. As mentioned by Silva & Tenreyro (2006), the expected value of the log of
a random variable is not equal to the log of its expected value (i.e.E(lnT ) 6= lnE(T )),
but also depends on the higher-order moments of its distribution. Hence, whenever
the variance of the error term in equation (22) depends on the regressors (e.g. GDP,
distance), the conditional expectation of ln(ij) will also depend on the regressors,
violating the condition for consistency of OLS. Hence, under heteroskedasticity, the
parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS lead to biased estimates of
the true elasticities (Liu (2009), Silva & Tenreyro (2006), and Felbermayr & Kohler
(2010b)).
Various literatures have proposed the Poisson regression as an alternative solution,
such as Flowerdew & Aitkin (1982) and Silva & Tenreyro (2006). They suggest the
gravity equation be estimated in the multiplicative form, without taking logarithm
of Tij and allowing for heteroskedasticity. The common assumption of the PPML
estimation method is that the conditional variance is proportional to the conditional
mean, i.e. E(Tij|Z) ∝ V (Tij|Z), although the Poisson model is consistent even when
the variance function is misspecified. Silva & Tenreyro (2006) mention that even if
E(Tij|Z) ∝ V (Tij|Z) does not hold, the PPML estimator is likely to be more efficient
than other estimators (i.e. Non-linear square estimators) when heteroskedasticity
increases with the conditional mean. All that is needed for this estimator to be
consistent is the correct specification of the conditional mean. Therefore, the data
do not have to be Poisson at all, and the dependent variable need not be an integer
for the estimator to be consistent. This is the well-known PML result first noted by
Gourieroux et al. (1984).
As emphasized by Wooldridge (2002), the dependent variable for PPML esti-
mation does not have to be count data, and the fixed effect Poisson estimator works
whenever the conditional mean assumption holds. Hence, I implement the fixed effect
Poisson model in this paper.49 The most commonly used conditional mean specifica-
tion in the Poisson model is E(Tijt|Zijt)= exp(Zijtβ), for which the coefficients can
be explained as an elasticity if the dependent variable (Tijt) is in level and covariates
48An alternative measure of the margins at the product level is used by Hummels & Klenow (2005).
Dutt et al. (2011) mention that the count method and the Hummels & Klenow (2005) method
of extensive and intensive margins are comparable with each other. In their study they find the
correlation of the extensive margin between the count and the Hummels & Klenow (2005) method
to be around 0.86, and the correlation between the intensive margins to be around 0.88.
49The random effect Poisson model needs additional maintained assumptions for efficiency against
the fixed effect Poisson model. The Hausman specification test, however, rejects the random effect
model in favor of the fixed effect model.
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(Zijt) are in logarithms.
50 I have the specification of the following form for the total
imports :
Tijt = exp (β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIijt + β5WTODijt) + ijt (26)
where i denotes the importer, j denotes the exporter and t denotes time. Tijt rep-
resents real bilateral imports for a country pair, measured in levels. Accounting for
the role of product level extensive and intensive margin of imports with a non-linear
Poisson model, the decomposition of Tijt (total imports) can be expressed as follows:
(Tijt) = (Nijt) ∗
(
Tijt
Nijt
)
(27)
where Tijt, the real aggregate bilateral imports between a country pair is decomposed
into two different dependent variables (Nijt and
Tijt
Nijt
) . Nijt is the extensive margin
and
Tijt
Nijt
is the intensive margin of imports.
The estimation equation for the extensive margin of imports or the number of
products imported is given as:
Nijt = exp (β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIijt + β5WTODijt) + ijt (28)
and the estimation equation for the intensive margin (or the average volume of imports
per product) is given as :
(
Tijt
Nijt
) = exp (β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIijt + β5WTODijt) + ijt (29)
3.2.3 Non-linear Gravity Model : Selection Bias Issues
I further take into account the presence of zero trade flows prevalent in trade data.
Past studies such as that of Eicher & Henn (2011) analyze the role of the WTO
50Using nonparametric tests, Henderson & Millimet (2008) confirm that the concerns over estimation
in levels versus logs, posed in Silva & Tenreyro (2006), are well-founded. There are various
alternatives to estimate the gravity equation multiplicatively, such as nonlinear least squares (NLS)
and the Gamma Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimator (GQMLE). According to Liu (2009), NLS
provides more weight to large predicted trade observations in its first order condition. By contrast,
GQMLE assumes that the conditional variance is proportional to the square of conditional mean
and hence gives less weight to large predicted trade flows. According to Silva & Tenreyro (2006),
there seems to be a substantial trade-off between the quantity of data and their variances since
larger trade flows and GDP usually have smaller measurement errors with larger variances. The
first order conditions of the Poisson model give the same weight to all observations. They suggest
(based on a simulation study) that the Poisson model performs remarkably better than the other
models under heteroskedasticity.
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membership with only positive trade flows. By restricting the sample to only positive
trade flows, their analysis has ignored the possibility that the WTO membership may
be important for whether or not two countries trade with each other. Liu (2009)
mentions that if the GATT/WTO provides any incentive for countries to start new
trading relationships, then bilateral trade is less likely to be zero if both trading
partners are the GATT/WTO members. According to Liu (2009) and Helpman et al.
(2008), the presence of zero trade flows in trade data is not random as it is conditioned
upon various factors such as distance and trade costs. Heckman (1979) mentions
that if the sample selection is based on the value of the dependent variable, then
the parameters of the model will always be biased if estimated with OLS. Hence,
the log-linear gravity model estimated by the OLS with only positive trade flows,
has endogenous sample selection issues. Furthermore, Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b)
mention that estimating a gravity equation on non-zero observations alone suffers
from an omitted variable bias.
A traditional means of dealing with the presence of zero trade flows in empirical
trade literature has been the random effect Tobit model. Tobit model might be even
more inconsistent than the OLS in the presence of heteroskedastic and non-normal
residuals (Liu (2009), Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b)). Helpman et al. (2008) estimate
a Heckman-type selection model to account for the prevalence of zero trade flows
in trade data. This empirical methodology adopts the log-linear specification in the
regression which is susceptible to providing biased estimates due to the presence of
heteroskedasticity in trade data (Liu (2009), Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b), and Silva
& Tenreyro (2006)). Furthermore, according to Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b), even
though the Heckman-type procedures can deal with presence of zero trade flows, it
is however not robust to the misspecification of the error term.51 Hence I utilize the
PPML estimation to deal with the non-linearity of the model that involves zero trade
relationships.
3.2.4 Data
This chapter utilizes a panel data set that consists of observations for every 5 years
beginning in 1965 and ending in 2005 for 175 countries. The data source is described in
more detail in Appendix table 45. The countries are listed in Appendix table 46. The
disaggregated product level export data is based on the 4-digit Standard International
Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2. The system makes it easier for compiling
and also promoting the comparability of international trade statistics. There are
1,249 tradable product categories under this classification. The data is retrieved from
the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. Within WITS, the dataset
is retrieved from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) Comtrade database.
This dataset is used in the analysis for the extensive and the intensive margins of
51Liu (2009) mentions that in Helpman et al. (2008) model, for identification purposes, the common
religion variable is assumed to affect the probability of having positive trade flows (selection
equation), but not the trade volumes. He mentions that the validity of this exclusion condition
is often hard to justify and the difficulty to find good instruments might be a concern of their
proposed two-stage procedure.
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trade. The level of disaggregation affects the extensive margin between countries as
there are data available at finer level of classification. However, there are measurement
errors associated with finer level of disaggregation and furthermore the choice of the
4-digit classification was made to ensure that the data coverage is the longest possible
(e.g. 1962 onwards). 52 The data for the gravity variables are retrieved from the Liu
dataset which was used in Liu (2009) study.53 The data for individual RTA agreement
is retrieved from Eicher et al. (2010).
Past empirical studies that account for zero trade flows typically assume that the
country pairs not covered in the dataset have zero bilateral trade (e.g. Felbermayr
& Kohler (2006b)). However, according to Liu (2009), on average for any given
year, one third of countries have missing data. Hence, it is likely that more missing
positive trade flows are incorrectly assigned as zeros. This consequence of incorrectly
assigning zero values to missing trade data, according to Liu (2009), has non-trivial
consequences and leads to biased estimates. He further mentions that if this error is
positively correlated with the WTO membership, it will cause an overestimation of
the role of the WTO membership at the extensive margin.
To minimize such errors while accounting for zero trade flows in the dataset, this
study matches the zeros trade flows with Liu (2009) trade dataset.54 The trade data
from UN Comtrade does not report zero trade flows but those categories are omitted
from the trade data altogether.
3.2.5 Empirical Results
Table 29 analyzes importer-exporter relationships based on WTO membership for
total imports. The estimation includes dummies WTOIijt and WTODijt where im-
porters are industrial and developing country WTO members respectively, and the
exporters are also WTO members. The table reports results for the log-linear model,
poisson estimation and poisson with zero-trade flows (full sample) respectively. The
result indicates that there exists a considerable heterogeneity across RTAs in terms
of its impact on imports. Hence, in line with Eicher & Henn (2011), these individual
RTAs minimizes the omitted variable bias that could render the WTO coefficient to
be biased upwards. The log-linear model is similar to Eicher & Henn (2011) spec-
ification that includes the multilateral resistance controls, individual RTAs and the
country-pair fixed effects to minimize the omitted variable bias. With the log-linear
model, the result indicates that the industrial WTO members experience increase in
total imports from exporters who are also WTO members by about 22% (22 % =
(e0.20− 1). On the other hand, the developing WTO members do not experience any
increase in imports from exporter who are also WTO members. However, once we
52 The data set for UN Comtrade begins from 1962 onwards.
53 Dr. Xuepeng Liu provided me with his dataset. This dataset is not publicly available.
54Liu (2009) mentions that zero observations in his dataset are systematically recorded accounting
for more than 50 % of the dataset. Liu (2009) retrieves trade data from various sources to minimize
the error associated with incorrectly assigning zero values for missing data. He uses trade data
retrieved from the World Export Data (WED); the World Trade Flows (WTF) dataset and the
original IFS Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) dataset.
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resort to the PPML estimation, the result indicates that both the members expe-
rience decrease in total imports by about 14% (-14% = (e−0.15 − 1). Hence, under
heteroskedasticity, the parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS lead to
biased estimates of the true elasticities (Liu (2009), Silva & Tenreyro (2006), and
Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b)). Furthermore, the result is robust to accounting for
the sample selection issues with the inclusion of zero-trade flows.
Table 30 reports the results for the extensive margins of imports. With the log-
linear model, the result indicates that the industrial WTO members experience in-
crease in the extensive margin of imports by about 11% while the developing WTO
members do not experience any increase in the extensive margin. However, once again
with the PPML estimation, both the members experience decrease in the extensive
margin of imports. The result is further robust to the full sample (with zero-trade
flows).
Table 31 reports the results for the intensive margin of imports. With the log-
linear model, the result indicates that the industrial WTO members experience in-
crease in the intensive margin of imports by about 11% while the coefficient on the
intensive margin is insignificant for the developing WTO members. With the PPML
estimation for positive trade flows and full sample, the coefficient on both the mem-
bers are positive, but statistically insignificant.
Dutt et al. (2011) utilizes a both-in dummy (that takes a value of 1, if both the
country-pairs are the members of the WTO) to examine the role of the WTO at the
extensive and the intensive margin of exports with product level data. The dummies
that I have implemented in the specification are somewhat similar to theirs, except, I
disaggregate WTO importer members into industrial and developing countries. They
find that the WTO membership has positive impact on the extensive margin and
insignificant or even negative impact at the intensive margin of exports. Owing to
several key differences between their specification and mine, the results indicate that
with the PPML estimation, the positive impact on the extensive margin actually
turns out to be negative.
Appendix table 41 reports the results with just the industrial and developing WTO
members dummy. WTOIndijt and WTODingijt are dummies for importers that are
industrial and developing WTO members. Eicher & Henn (2011) also estimate a
log-linear gravity model with these dummies, while Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b)
estimate these dummies with the Poisson specification and account for zero-trade
flows.55 The result with the log-linear model, obtained in this paper are similar
to that of Eicher & Henn (2011), whereby both members do not experience any
benefit from the WTO membership. With the PPML estimation, my result is a
stronger indictment of the lack of effectiveness of the WTO membership as compared
to Eicher & Henn (2011) results. The results also extend to the two margin of
imports. Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b) find that the WTO increased imports only
55 Subramanian & Wei (2007) also utilize the log-linear model with these dummies and find that
industrial WTO members witnessed a large increase in trade, while for developing WTO members
it was negative and significant. They mention that under the GATT regime, industrial WTO
members actively took part in reciprocal liberalization while the developing members were largely
exempted from these obligations.
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at the country-level intensive margin, and more importantly developing countries
benefit more than industrial countries. However, my results perhaps suggest that
their mutually inclusive coding convention along with a single RTA dummy (for an
average RTA control) might have exaggerated the WTO effect.
Table 1 provides a rather bleak outlook for the role of WTO in facilitating imports.
However, I argue that past studies might have underestimated the role of the WTO
membership by excluding the heterogeneity of trade flows for the WTO members
across their level of development.
3.3 Extensive and Intensive Margin of Imports : Heterogeneity in the WTO mem-
bership
3.3.1 Empirical Model
In this section I examine the heterogeneity of trade flows across WTO members at the
extensive and intensive margin of imports based their level of development. Subra-
manian & Wei (2007) mention that since developing members were not as actively en-
gaged in reciprocal liberalization, trade liberalization should occur on products of ex-
port interest to industrial countries but not that of developing countries. Hence, they
postulate that imports between industrial members should be large, while imports
between industrial and developing members should be small or even non-existent.
Even though tariff reductions might have been heterogeneous across sectors (hence
towards exporters), industrial importers had bound majority of their tariff lines (up
to 87% of tariff lines). Hence, in line with the theoretical predictions of Sala et al.
(2010), tariff binds can reduce uncertainty and can increase entry of firms in the export
market (or exports from developing to industrial members) even when applied tariff
reduction is minimal or unchanged. Hence, theoretically industrial WTO members
should see increase in the imports at the extensive margin from developing members
with little or no increase in the intensive margin. This prediction was substantiated by
Handley & Limo (2010) in their case study of Portugal’s accession to EC, where they
find considerable entry of firms even in industries where applied tariffs didn’t change
much. They attribute the increase in entry towards reduced market uncertainty faced
by Portuguese exporters. Furthermore, they mention that effects of uncertainty are
more important for small and developing economies where trade is central to both
consumers and firms. I examine this possibility utilizing the product level data to
account for the two margins of imports. For total aggregate imports, with the log-
linear specification, I have the specification of the following form :
lnTijt = β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIIijt + β5WTOIDijt
+ β6WTODIijt + β7WTODDijt + ijt (30)
Hence, WTOIIijt and WTOIDijt are dummies for importers that are industrial WTO
members while the exporters are industrial and developing WTO members respec-
tively.
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Furthermore I utilize two additional dummies , WTODIijt and WTODDijt, for
importers that are developing WTO members while the exporters are industrial and
developing WTO members respectively. Past studies have not analyzed this relation-
ship. Even though the developing members have had high tariff barriers, they have
tariff binds on 58% of the tariff lines in the industrial sector. According to Subra-
manian & Wei (2007), the conclusion of the Uruguay Round has partially remedied
the developing country exemption. In particular, developing countries that wanted
to join the WTO after 1994 have been required to engage in serious trade liberaliza-
tion, with up to 94% binds in tariff lines of the industrial sector. Sala et al. (2010)
mention that bound tariffs are more effective with higher risk destinations markets
(e.g. developing countries), where even a large binding overhang may still command
substantial market access. They further predict that reductions in bound tariffs can
generate effective market access even when the bound rates remain above current
and long term applied rates. Hence, theoretically the developing members should see
increase in the imports at least on the extensive margin.
I test whether this prediction translates into empirics in this paper. With the
product level data, I have the estimation equation of the following form:
lnYijt = β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIIijt + β5WTOIDijt
+ β6WTODIijt + β7WTODDijt + ijt (31)
where Yijt is the dependent variable of interest is categorized into Tijt (real aggregate
bilateral imports), Nijt (the extensive margin) and
Tijt
Nijt
(the intensive margin).
Similarly, for the Poisson Model with the product level data, I have the estimation
equation of the following form:
Yijt = exp (β0 +
∑
αktImpkt +
∑
θltExplt +
∑
φY eart + γZijt + β1RTAijt
+ β2GSPijt + β3BTAijt + β4WTOIIijt + β5WTOIDijt
+ β6WTODIijt + β7WTODDijt) + ijt (32)
where Yijt is categorized into Tijt (real aggregate bilateral imports), Nijt (the extensive
margin) and
Tijt
Nijt
(the intensive margin).
3.3.2 Empirical Results
The results for the log-linear model, PPML estimation with positive trade flows and
full sample are reported in Table 2. Table 32 reports the results for the total imports.
With the log-linear model, the results indicate that industrial WTO members expe-
rience increase in total imports only from developing WTO members by about 26%.
The result is robust to the PPML estimation with both positive trade flows and full
sample. The results obtained in this paper is in stark contrast to Subramanian &
Wei (2007), where they find that industrial WTO members witnessed a large increase
in imports from industrial exporters. On the contrary, the industrial WTO members
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experience decrease in total imports from industrial WTO members by about 25%
(PPML estimation with positive trade flows) and 27% (PPML estimation with full
sample). The coefficients on total imports for developing members are negative but
statistically insignificant with the PPML estimation (both positive trade flows and
full sample).
Table 33 reports the results for the extensive margin of imports. The results in-
dicate that the industrial members experience increase in imports at the extensive
margin only from the developing WTO members. The results are robust to all three
specifications. In other words, the industrial WTO members import on average 27%
(PPML estimation with positive trade flows) and 32% (full sample) more number of
products from developing WTO members. The coefficients on the extensive margin
between two industrial WTO members are either insignificant or negative and signif-
icant. Similarly, the developing members experience increase at the extensive margin
of imports, and furthermore, only from the industrial exporter members by about
22% (PPML estimation with positive trade flows) and 28% (full sample). However,
the coefficients on the extensive margin between two developing WTO members are
statistically insignificant.
Table 34 reports the results for the intensive margin of imports. With the PPML
estimation, the results indicate that neither WTO members experience any positive
impact at the intensive margin of imports. The developing WTO members actually
experience a decrease in the intensive margin from industrial WTO members. Hence,
even though the extensive margin of imports increases, the intensive margin declines,
resulting in an insignificant WTO effect on total imports.
Various studies (e.g. Rose (2004), Eicher & Henn (2011)), have indicated the lack
of effectiveness of the WTO membership, especially for developing members (e.g.
Subramanian & Wei (2007)). The results indicate that total trade masks significant
heterogeneity in terms of the impact of the WTO membership and the failure to
account for the intensive and extensive margin at product level has underestimated
the benefits of WTO membership. Furthermore, with the exception of Subramanian
& Wei (2007), past might have understated the benefit of WTO membership by
failing to account for importer-exporter relationship of WTO membership based on
country’s level of development. The increases in imports for industrial members
from developing members are realized exclusively from the extensive margin and the
result is robust to accounting for zero-trade flows. Furthermore, any positive benefits
of the WTO membership for developing nations are realized entirely through the
extensive margin of imports from the industrial exporter members. In other words,
the WTO membership for developing nations enhances imports of products that were
not previously traded. The WTO membership however, doesn’t lead to deepening of
existing trade relationships at the product level (it might even decrease the volume
of exports).
The results are more in line with the alternate literature that attributes the role
of the WTO membership to tariff binds that reduces market uncertainty, leading to
increased entry of firms in the export market (e.g.Handley (2011) and Sala et al.
(2010)).
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3.4 Extensive and Intensive Margin of Imports : WTO Membership and Product
level Heterogeneity
Chaney (2008) provides theoretical illustration on the impact of changes in trade
barriers to the two margins based on the elasticity of substitution among goods. He
mentions that changes in variable costs (e.g. trade barriers) have a larger effect on the
extensive margin for goods with lower elasticity of substitution (differentiated goods),
while homogeneous goods should experience higher increase in the intensive margin of
imports. Examining the role of WTO membership with product heterogeneity could
be viewed as an empirical examination of Chaney (2008) theoretical proposition.
Spearot (2010) mentions that despite the massive amount of heterogeneity in va-
rieties within narrowly defined products, the rules of the GATT/WTO, seems to
be designed for a more homogeneous environment. The WTO mandates that these
products (homogeneous or differentiated) are treated equally in setting tariffs, and
when liberalizing tariffs.56 Hence, given the homogeneous nature of tariff reduction
in a heterogeneous product environment, examining the role of product heterogeneity
could be viewed as an empirical test as to whether the benefit of the WTO mem-
bership is realized entirely through the reduction of tariffs. If that is the case, one
would expect higher increase in imports for homogeneous products compared to the
differentiated products as the latter has a lower elasticity of substitution (e.g. Bastos
& Silva (2010) and Fink et al. (2005)) or lower price elasticities (e.g. Erkel-Rousse &
Mirza (2002)).
Based on Rauch (1999) classification, I take into account the role of product het-
erogeneity in terms of the WTO membership on the extensive and intensive margin of
imports. Rauch (1999) classified product categories into three groups: homogeneous,
reference priced, and differentiated products. According to Rauch (1999), homoge-
neous goods are those traded on organized exchanges, reference price goods are those
not traded on organized exchanges but nevertheless possess reference prices, and
all other commodities owing to their intrinsic features are labeled as differentiated.
Rauch (1999) argues that search costs tend to be higher for differentiated products
and asserts that the networking effect (or search process) conditioned strongly by
proximity and pre-existing ties are more prominent for these goods. Rauch & Casella
(2003) shows that differentiated goods have larger the impact of international ties be-
tween wholesalers on bilateral trade, while Marcouiller (2000) mentions that the value
of differentiated goods is more relationship-specific. Using Rauch & Casella (2003)
search cost model, Besedes & Prusa (2006) show that transactions in differentiated
goods tend to start involving smaller values than that of homogeneous goods and
trade relationships tend to be longer for differentiated products. Furthermore, dif-
ferentiated goods are subjected to heterogeneity in manufactures (Rauch & Casella
(2003)); lower price elasticities (Erkel-Rousse & Mirza (2002)) ; smaller border ef-
fects (Evans (2003)); greater tariff evasion (Javorcik & Narciso (2007)) and higher
communication costs (Fink et al. (2005)).
56He further mentions that this applies within any product, across all export sources without pref-
erential status, and does not discriminate by quality or other characteristics.
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3.4.1 Empirical Model
Bastos & Silva (2010) suggest that Rauch (1999) categorization is well suited for cap-
turing vertical product differentiation in empirical applications. Broda & Weinstein
(2006) also demonstrate that goods traded on organized exchanges are indeed more
substitutable than those which are not. They further stipulate that the failure to ac-
count for product heterogeneity seems to be the major problem with the empirics of
trade that assumes movements in trade costs are unaffected by movements in import
demand. The total imports is now disaggregated into imports for homogeneous and
differentiated goods categorized at the 4-digit SITC level according to Rauch (1999)
classification. I run separate regressions for the two product levels. This paper also
analyzes the role of the product heterogeneity and its impact on the extensive and
the intensive margin of imports. Hence, for the total aggregate imports, I have the
specification of the following form :
lnTijth = β0 +
∑
αkthImpkth +
∑
θlthExplth +
∑
φY eart + γZijth + β1RTAijth
+ β2GSPijth + β4WTOIijth + β5WTODijth + ijth (33)
with h : product group (h = 1 or 2, for differentiated and homogeneous goods)
I implement similar specification for extensive and intensive margin with log-linear
model, PPML estimation and PPML estimation with zero trade flows.
3.4.2 Empirical Results
The results from the log-linear model and the PPML estimation with product differ-
entiation for the total, extensive and the intensive margin of imports are reported in
table 35-table 37. The estimation includes dummies WTOIijt and WTODijt where
importers are industrial and developing country WTO members respectively, and the
exporters are also WTO members. Table 35 reports the results for total imports for
differentiated and homogeneous goods respectively. With the log-linear model, the re-
sult indicates that the industrial WTO members experience increase in total imports
from WTO member exporters for both the differentiated and homogeneous goods
respectively. On the other hand, the developing WTO members do not experience
any increase in imports from WTO exporter members for both product categories.
However, once again, when we resort to the PPML estimation, the result indicates
that both the members actually experience decrease in total imports for differen-
tiated goods. The result is consistent with the PPML estimation and with the full
sample. On the other hand, for homogeneous goods, the coefficient on both the WTO
members are statistically insignificant with the PPML estimation.
Table 36 reports the results for the extensive margin of imports. Similar to ta-
ble 35, although the log-linear model indicates that the industrial WTO members
experience increase in total imports from WTO member exporters for both the differ-
entiated and homogeneous goods, the result remains either statistically insignificant
or even negative with the PPML estimation. The developing WTO members do not
experience any increase in imports from WTO exporter members for both product
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categories at the extensive margin. Table 37 reports the results for the intensive mar-
gin of imports. Apart from the log-linear model for differentiated goods, the results
indicate that both the members do not experience increase in the intensive margin for
both of the goods. The result also extends to the PPML estimation with full sample.
Table 38-table 40 analyzes importer-exporter relationship based on WTO mem-
bership and country’s level of development. Table 38 reports the results for total
imports for both of the goods. For differentiated goods with the log-linear model, the
results indicate that the industrial WTO members experience increase in total im-
ports from both industrial and developing WTO members. However, with the PPML
estimation, the coefficients on total imports between industrial WTO members remain
negative and statistically significant. Similar to table 32, with the PPML estimation
(full sample), the results indicate that the industrial WTO members experience in-
crease in total imports only from developing WTO members. For developing WTO
members the coefficient on total imports are negative ( and statistically significant).
For homogeneous goods, the results are similar to the one obtained in table 32. The
industrial WTO members experience increase in imports only from developing WTO
members, and is consistent with the PPML estimation with both positive and full
sample.
Table 39 reports the results for the extensive margin of imports. Similar to table
33, with the PPML estimation, the results indicate that industrial WTO members
experience increase in the extensive margin only from the developing WTO mem-
bers. The result is robust to both goods and the full sample. Similarly, the develop-
ing WTO members experience increase in the extensive margin only from industrial
WTO members. With the PPML estimation, the result extends to both goods and
the full sample. The PPML estimation with full sample indicates that the industrial
WTO members experience increase in extensive margin of imports from the devel-
oping WTO members by about 30% for differentiated goods and by about 34% for
homogeneous goods. Similarly, the developing WTO members experience increase in
extensive margin of imports from the industrial WTO members by about 28% for
differentiated goods and by about 21% for homogeneous goods.
Table 40 reports the result for the intensive margin of imports. The results with
the PPML estimation indicate that neither WTO members experience any increase in
the intensive margin from either members. The result further extends to the PPML
estimation with full sample and is robust to both of the goods.
Even after accounting for product heterogeneity, the empirical examination of the
WTO membership on the extensive and intensive margin of imports reveals that the
benefits of membership are realized entirely from the extensive margin of imports.
The results are further robust to accounting for zero-trade flows. The results further
indicate that the benefits of the WTO membership are contingent upon the importer-
exporter relationship and country’s level of development. The industrial members
experience increase in imports only at the extensive margin, and furthermore, only
from developing members and vice-versa. The result is robust to both differentiated
and homogeneous goods and for zero-trade flows.
The results are at odds with the theoretical prediction of Chaney (2008) as illus-
trated by the fact that the entire increase in imports is realized through the extensive
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margin and is robust to both differentiated and homogeneous goods. More impor-
tantly, the impact on the intensive margin is insignificant or even negative. Perhaps
these results further provide reinforcement to the argument that the WTO member-
ship is attributed to more than just tariff reduction. Perhaps these results provide
support towards the alternate trade literature that stresses the benefits of the WTO
membership through tariff binds rather than reduction. The results are in line with
the predictions of Handley (2011) and Sala et al. (2010) whereby reduction or elim-
ination of uncertainty in the market (achieved through tariff binds) facilitates the
entry of firms in the export market (or increases the extensive margin).
3.5 Conclusion
Past studies such as Rose (2004), Rose & Spiegel (2011a) and Eicher & Henn (2011)
fail to find a positive impact of the WTO membership on the volume of trade. This
study contributes to the existing literature by examining the role of WTO membership
on the product level extensive and intensive margin of imports along with product
heterogeneity. Furthermore, I take into account the role of importer-exporter rela-
tionships based on WTO membership and the country’s level of development. This
study further accounts for several estimation issues that have plagued the empirical
WTO literature. This paper employs mutually exclusive coding of WTO membership
to isolate the impact of the WTO trade effect and avoid collinearity issues that the
mutually inclusive coding is susceptible to. This paper utilizes the time varying im-
porter and exporter fixed effect and individual RTA dummies to minimize the problem
of omitted variable bias. Finally, I utilize the PPML specification for both positive
and zero-trade flows to account for the heteroskedastic and non-normal residuals as
well as sample selection issues.
The results indicate that any positive benefit of the WTO membership is realized
entirely through the extensive margin while the impact on the intensive margin is
insignificant or even negative. Total trade masks significant heterogeneity in terms of
the impact of the WTO membership and the failure to account for the intensive and
extensive margin at product level has underestimated the benefits of WTO member-
ship. Various studies have indicated the lack of effectiveness of the WTO membership,
especially for developing members. The results further indicate that the positive im-
pact on the extensive margin is contingent upon the importer-exporter relationship.
In other words, the developing WTO members experience increase in imports at the
extensive margin only from the industrial WTO members and vice-versa. The result
is robust to accounting for product heterogeneity and sample selection bias (zero-
trade flows). Hence, although the WTO membership leads to increase in the varieties
of product imported, however, it doesn’t lead to the deepening of existing trade rela-
tionships at the product level (it might even decrease the volume of exports).
The results are at odds with the theoretical prediction of Chaney (2008) on the
reduction in variable costs and its impact on the two margins based on the elasticity
of substitution among goods. The results extend to accounting for zero trade flows,
suggesting perhaps that the WTO benefits might not have been generated through
tariff reduction.
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The results are more in line with the theoretical predictions of Handley (2011) and
Sala et al. (2010), that attributes the role of WTO membership to reducing market
uncertainty through tariff binds rather than tariff reduction. They mention that even
though the reduction of bound rates may in practice command no reduction of the
applied rates, it can reduce or eliminate uncertainty leading to increased entry of
firms in the export market. They also mention that the tariff bindings above applied
rates are unable to generate market access via the intensive margin of trade. Sala
et al. (2010) predict that bound tariffs are more effective with higher risk destination
markets (e.g. developing countries) where a large binding overhang can command
substantial market access for these countries. Handley & Limo (2010) also mention
that the effects of uncertainty are more important for small, developing economies
where trade is central to both consumers and firms.
Recent studies have illustrated the importance of the extensive margin. Export
diversification or a broader export basket reduces the risks of balance of payment crisis
and large fluctuations in domestic output after-shocks that can negatively affect the
performance of the external sector such as price fluctuations in markets, or output
swings in trading partners (Agosin (2007), Lederman & Maloney (2003)). Hummels &
Klenow (2005) indicate that exports growth based solely on the intensive margin can
have terms of trade effects, which can be reduced by broadening the exporting base of
the country. Broda & Weinstein (2006) imply that the extensive margin or increased
imports of varieties leads to increase in welfare gains and productivity growth. They
estimate the value to U. S. consumers of the expanded import varieties between 1972
and 2001 to be 2.6 percent of GDP.
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3.6 Tables
Table 29: The Extensive and the Intensive Margin - Total Imports
Log-linear (positive) Poisson (positive) Poisson (Full sample)
WTOI 0.20*** -0.15* -0.18**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
WTOD 0.01 -0.15*** - 0.17**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
GSP -0.02 -0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Bilateral FTA -0.06 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
ANZCERTA -0.27 -0.72** -0.77**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
APEC -0.23*** 0.60*** 0.59***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
AP 1.12*** 0.30* 0.33*
(0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
AFTA -0.47** -0.09 -0.08
(0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
CACM —- 1.33*** 1.64***
—- (0.20) (0.21)
CARICOM 0.77*** 2.08*** 2.22***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25)
EEA 0.42*** -0.02 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
EFTA 0.23** 0.26** 0.24**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
EU 0.56*** -0.05 0.09
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
LAFTA 0.75** 0.01 0.06
(0.32) (0.14) (0.14)
MERCUSOR 0.30 1.38*** 1.36***
(0.21) (0.17) (0.17)
NAFTA 0.36** 0.58*** 0.57***
(0.16) (0.10) (0.10)
SPARTECA 1.02*** 2.14*** 2.19***
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
USIR 0.52* 1.01*** 1.06***
(0.28) (0.18) (0.18)
Log Distance —- -0.73*** -0.73***
—- (0.03) (0.03)
Common Language —- 0.43*** 0.44***
—- (0.08) (0.08)
Common Border —- 0.25*** 0.24***
—- (0.06) (0.06)
Currency Union 0.36* 0.21 0.22*
(0.21) (0.13) (0.13)
Common Colonizer —- -0.01 -0.01
—- (0.09) (0.09)
Current Colony 0.46* 1.04*** 1.06***
(0.24) (0.29) (0.30)
Ever Colony —- 0.02 0.02
—- (0.13) (0.14)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effect Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -15524.17 -67437.18
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.89 0.93 0.94
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 175 countries for every five year from 1965-
2005. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 30: The Extensive and the Intensive Margin - Extensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson
(positive) (positive) (Full)
WTOI 0.10*** -0.07** -0.13***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
WTOD -0.01 -0.22*** - 0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effect Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -1240556.30 -1429325
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.94 0.81 0.81
Table 31: The Extensive and the Intensive Margin - Intensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson
(positive) (positive) (Full)
WTOI 0.10*** 0.20 0.03
(0.05) (0.16) (0.18)
WTOD 0.02 0.17 0.13
(0.04) (0.15) (0.17)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effect Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -15498.88 -4296.65 -4296.65
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.80 0.73 0.63
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five
year from 1965-2005. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs
are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in table 29 are also
included but not reported.
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Table 32: Heterogeneity in the WTO Membership - Total Imports
Log-linear Poisson Poisson
(positive) (positive) (Full)
WTOII -0.03 -0.29*** -0.32***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
WTOID 0.23*** 0.27** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.14) (0.14)
WTODI -0.15** -0.11 -0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
WTODD -0.04 -0.09 -0.08
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -15497.49 -67119.48
Country-pair fixed effect Yes
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.89 0.94 0.94
Table 33: Heterogeneity in the WTO Membership - Extensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson
(positive) (positive) (Full)
WTOII 0.01 -0.01 -0.07*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
WTOID 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.28***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
WTODI 0.03 0.20*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
WTODD -0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effect Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -1232744.90 -1416220.60
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.94 0.81 0.81
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five
year from 1965-2005. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs
are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in table 29 are also
included but not reported.
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Table 34: Heterogeneity in the WTO Membership - Intensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson
(positive) (positive) (Full)
WTOII -0.04 0.16 -0.17
(0.06) (0.20) (0.23)
WTOID 0.10* 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.22) (0.22)
WTODI -0.18*** -0.36** -0.34
(0.04) (0.17) (0.22)
WTODD -0.03 0.09 0.10
(0.04) (0.17) (0.19)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effect Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -4295.25 -4515.66
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.80 0.73 0.63
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for ev-
ery five year from 1965-2005. Robust standard errors clustered by
country pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in
table 29 are also included but not reported.
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Table 35: The Role of Product Heterogeneity - Total Imports
Log-linear Poisson Poisson Log-linear Poisson Poisson
positive positive full positive positive full
(n) (n) (n) (w) (w) (w)
WTOI 0.23*** -0.23** -0.24*** 0.14** 0.01 -0.09
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.16)
WTOD -0.09** -0.36*** -0.38*** -0.06 -0.10 -0.13
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying
Imp. and Exp.
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair
fixed effects Yes Yes
N 82,757 82,757 126,888 65,616 65,616 126,406
R2 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.84 0.76 0.76
Table 36: The Role of Product Heterogeneity - Extensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson Log-linear Poisson Poisson
positive positive full positive positive full
(n) (n) (n) (w) (w) (w)
WTOI 0.10*** -0.06* -0.14** 0.07*** 0.02 -0.16***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
WTOD -0.03 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.02 -0.21*** -0.29***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying
Imp. and Exp.
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair
fixed effects Yes Yes
N 82,757 82,757 126,888 65,616 65,616 126,406
R2 0.93 0.79 0.80 0.91 0.77 0.77
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five year
from 1965-2005. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in
parenthesis. All the other control variables in table 29 are also included but
not reported.
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Table 37: The Role of Product Heterogeneity - Intensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson Log-linear Poisson Poisson
positive positive full positive positive full
(n) (n) (n) (w) (w) (w)
WTOI 0.13*** 0.12 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.10
(0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.18) (0.22)
WTOD -0.06* 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.13
(0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.13) (0.15)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying
Imp. and Exp.
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair
fixed effects Yes Yes
N 82,757 82,757 126,888 65,616 65,616 126,406
R2 0.83 0.70 0.68 0.79 0.67 0.62
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five year
from 1965-2005. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in
parenthesis. All the other control variables in table 29 are also included but
not reported.
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Table 38: Heterogeneity in the WTO Membership and the Role of
Product Heterogeneity - Total Imports
Log-linear Poisson Poisson Log-linear Poisson Poisson
positive positive full positive positive full
(n) (n) (n) (w) (w) (w)
WTOII 0.13*** -0.22** -0.22** -0.10 -0.37** -0.56***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16)
WTOID 0.24*** 0.17 0.19* 0.16** 0.46** 0.54***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.20)
WTODI -0.09* 0.06 0.08 -0.19** -0.15 -0.12
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15)
WTODD -0.12* -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.12* 0.08 0.06
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying
Imp. and Exp.
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair
fixed effects Yes Yes
N 82,757 82,757 126,888 65,616 65,616 126,406
R2 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.84 0.78 0.77
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Table 39: Heterogeneity in the WTO Membership and the Role of
Product Heterogeneity - Extensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson Log-linear Poisson Poisson
positive positive full positive positive full
(n) (n) (n) (w) (w) (w)
WTOII 0.02 -0.01 -0.07* 0.04 0.02 -0.18***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
WTOID 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.07*** 0.21*** 0.29***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
WTODI 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.25*** -0.06*** 0.09*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
WTODD -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.04** -0.11*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying
Imp. and Exp.
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair
fixed effects Yes Yes
N 82,757 82,757 126,888 65,616 65,616 126,406
R2 0.93 0.79 0.80 0.91 0.78 0.78
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five year from 1965-2005. Robust standard
errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in table 29 are also included but
not reported.
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Table 40: Heterogeneity in the WTO Membership and the Role of
Product Heterogeneity - Intensive Margin
Log-linear Poisson Poisson Log-linear Poisson Poisson
positive positive full positive positive full
(n) (n) (n) (w) (w) (w)
WTOII 0.11** -0.02 -0.15 -0.13 -0.57*** -1.09***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.17) (0.21)
WTOID 0.10** -0.17 -0.09 0.09 0.10 0.20
(0.05) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.23) (0.25)
WTODI -0.16*** -0.32* -0.21 -0.13* - 0.29* -0.32
(0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15) (0.21)
WTODD -0.11*** -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.22 0.23
(0.04) (0.17) (0.20) (0.06) (0.14) (0.17)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying
Imp. and Exp.
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair
fixed effects Yes Yes
N 82,757 82,757 126,888 65,616 65,616 126,406
R2 0.83 0.70 0.69 0.79 0.67 0.62
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five year from 1965-2005. Robust standard
errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control variables in table 29 are also included but
not reported.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 41: Importer WTO membership - Total Imports
Log-linear (positive) Poisson (positive) Poisson (Full sample)
WTOInd 0.08 -0.33*** -0.35***
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
WTODing -0.15** -0.25*** - 0.26***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -15522.45 -67441.16
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.89 0.94 0.94
Table 42: Importer WTO membership - Extensive Margin
Log-linear (positive) Poisson (positive) Poisson (Full sample)
WTOInd 0.03 -0.01 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
WTODing -0.10*** -0.03 - 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -1248666.30 -1438637.20
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.94 0.80 0.80
Table 43: Importer WTO membership - Intensive Margin
Log-linear (positive) Poisson (positive) Poisson (Full sample)
WTOInd 0.06 0.06 0.12
(0.07) (0.26) (0.25)
WTODing -0.06 -0.10 -0.03
(0.06) (0.22) (0.21)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Time varying importer
and exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo Log-likelihood -4298.16 -4516.94
N 92,424 92,424 128,091
R2 0.80 0.73 0.63
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 175 countries for every five year from 1965-2005.
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis. All the other control
variables in table 29 are also included but not reported.
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Table 44: Country-pair fixed effects in the empirical specification
Eicher & Henn (2011) mention that a potential omitted variable involves unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity. Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) argue that there exists associated
bias for coefficients of interest when two countries exhibit unobserved affinities for
bilateral trade before joining a trade agreement. Hence, the omission of country-pair
fixed effects then renders WTO and RTA estimates biased upwards if the included
controls do not account for all bilateral heterogeneity, for instance because some is
unobserved (Eicher & Henn (2011)).
Felbermayr & Kohler (2010b) argue true endogeneity seems a less severe problem with
WTO membership compared to RTAs. An upward bias would arise, for instance, if
there is some unobserved dyad-specific variable which is positively correlated with
both WTO membership and bilateral trade. According to Felbermayr & Kohler
(2010b), this type of concern seems far less convincing for the WTO which is a
multilateral, not a regional trading arrangement. They further argue that jointly
entering a multilateral agreement like the GATT/WTO is a very unlikely response
to being natural bilateral trading partners. In a similar vein, the notion that certain
countries are more natural trading partners than others for the whole world (instead
of bilaterally) seems far-fetched. Hence, they do not include country-pair fixed effects
in their estimation.
Furthermore, Eicher & Henn (2011) themselves suggest that the heterogeneity of
RTAs and the multilateral resistance as most important factor that drove their results.
Country-pair fixed effects seemed to be more relevant for the RTA as opposed to the
WTO membership.
Furthermore, in STATA, one can implement Poisson estimation by running a fixed
effect Poisson estimator. Like any other non-linear estimations, the inclusion of time
varying importer and exporter dummies makes the convergence of the likelihood func-
tion extremely difficult. Silva & Tenreyro (2006) developed a PPML code in STATA
to account for this problem. Essentially the program drops the perfectly collinear
explanatory variables in the OLS regression, which in turn facilitates the convergence
of the likelihood estimation. However, this program doesn’t allow for fixed effects
estimation, hence one need to include country pair dummies to account for country
pair fixed effects. With the presence of computationally cumbersome time-varying
exporter and importer fixed effects the inclusion of country pair dummies exceeds the
matrix size in STATA. Hence, due to the limitations of STATA, country pair fixed
effect is not feasible to be estimated with Poisson specification that includes the time
varying dummies.
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Table 45: Data
• Imports data at product level are obtained from the World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS) database deflated by US CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-
U), all items, 1982-84=100. Within the database, the import data is retrieved
from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) COMTRADE (Commodity
Trade) database.
• Import data is available at the four-digit SITC- Revision 2 classification.
• All the common gravity variables are obtained from the dataset provided by
Liu .
• Country-specific data (retrieved from Liu dataset) such as common border,
language, colonizer, and independence are taken from 2003 CIA World Factbook
website by Liu.
• The great circle distances are constructed from latitudes and longitudes of coun-
try pairs by Liu.
• Currency-union data taken from Glick-Rose (2002).
• GSP data are retrieved from the UN publication : Operation and Effects of the
Generalized System of Preferences by Liu. I extend the GSP information for
2005 from the WITS database.
• Individual Regional trade agreements are retrieved from Eicher et al. (2010).
• GATT/WTO formal memberships are retrieved from Subramanian & Wei
(2007) and the WTO website:
http : //www.wto.org/english/tratope/regione/eife.xls
• For bilateral FTAs until 2000, this paper uses the ones listed in Subramanian &
Wei (2007). For additional bilateral FTAs I use the WTOs website on regional
agreements :
http : //www.wto.org/english/tratope/regione/eife.xls
by selecting all agreements notified to the WTO whose date of entry into force
fell between 2001 and 2005.
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Table 46: Country List
Albania (2000) Ghana (1957) Panama (1997)
Algeria Greece (1950)* Papua N. Gui. (1994)
Angola (1994) Grenada (1994) Paraguay (1994)
Antigua and Barbuda (1987) Guatemala (1991) Peru (1951)
Argentina (1967) Guinea (1994) Philippines (1979)
Armenia(2003) Guinea-Bissau (1994) Poland (1967)
Australia (1948)* Guyana (1966) Portugal (1962)*
Austria (1951)* Haiti (1950) Qatar (1994)
Azerbaijan Honduras (1994) Romania (1971)
Bahamas Hong Kong (1986) Russia
Bahrain (1993) Hungary (1973) Rwanda (1966)
Bangladesh (1972) Iceland (1968)* Samoa
Barbados (1967) India (1948) Sao Tome & Prin.
Belarus Indonesia (1950) Saudi Arabia (2005)
Belgium (1948)* Iran Senegal (1963)
Belize (1983) Iraq Seychelles
Benin (1963) Ireland (1967)* Sierra Leone (1961)
Bermuda Israel (1962) Singapore (1973)
Bhutan Italy (1950)* Slovak Rep. (1993)
Bolivia (1990) Jamaica (1963) Slovenia (1994)
Botswana (1987) Japan (1955)* Solomon Isl. (1994)
Brazil (1948) Jordan(2000) Somalia
Bulgaria (1996) Kazakhstan South Africa (1948)
Burkina Faso (1963) Kenya (1964) Spain (1963)*
Burma(Myanmar) (1948) Kiribati Sri Lanka (1948)
Burundi (1965) Korea, South (R)(1967) St. Kitts & Nevis (1994)
Cambodia(2004) Kuwait (1963) St. Lucia (1993)
Cameroon (1963) Kyrgyz Republic (1998) St. Vincent & Gren.(1993)
Canada (1948)* Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Sudan
Cape Verde Latvia (1999) Suriname (1978)
Central African Rep. (1963) Lebanon Swaziland (1993)
Chad (1963) Lesotho (1988) Sweden (1950)*
Chile (1949) Liberia Switzerland (1966)*
China(2001) Libya Syria
Colombia (1981) Lithuania(2001) Tajikistan
Comoros Luxembourg (1948)* Tanzania (1961)
Congo, Dem. Rep. of (Zaire) (1971) Macedonia Thailand (1982)
Congo, Rep. (1963) Madagascar (1963) Togo (1964)
Costa Rica (1990) Malawi (1964) Tonga(2007)
Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) (1963) Malaysia (1957) Trinidad & Tob. (1962)
Croatia(2000) Maldives (1983) Tunisia (1990)
Cyprus (1963) Mali (1993) Turkey (1951)
Czech Republic (1993) Malta (1964) Turkmenistan
Denmark (1950)* Mauritania (1963) Uganda (1962)
Djibouti (1994) Mauritius (1970) Ukraine (2008)
Dominica (1993) Mexico (1986) U.A.E. (1994)
Dominican Rep. (1950) Moldova (2001) United Kingdom (1948)*
Ecuador (1996) Mongolia (1997) United States (1948)*
Egypt (1970) Morocco (1987) Uruguay (1953)
Years of accession in GATT/WTO are in parentheses.* denotes Industrial countries based on Subramanian and Wei
(2007).
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Table 47: List of Regional Trade Arrangements (RTA)
Abbreviation Start Member countries
ANZCERTA 1983 Australia, New Zealand
APEC 1989 Australia, Brunei, Canada, China (1991), Chile (1994),
Taiwan (1991), Hong Kong (1991), Indonesia, Japan,South Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico (1993), New Zealand,Papua New Guinea (1993),
Peru (1998), Philippines,Singapore, Thailand, United States,
Vietnam (1998).
AP 1969 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela (1973),
Former: Chile (1969-76)
AFTA 1967 Brunei (1984), Cambodia (1998), Indonesia, Laos (1997)
Malaysia, Myanmar (1997), the Philippines, Singapore,Thailand
Vietnam (1995)
CACM 1960 Costa Rica (1963), El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,Nicaragua.
CARICOM 1968 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas (1983), Barbados
Belize (1995), Dominica (1974), Guyana (1995), Grenada (1974)
Jamaica, Montserrat (1974), St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia(1974)
St. Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname (1995),Trinidad & Tobago.
EEA 1994 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany
Greece, Luxembourg, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Liechtenstein
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
EFTA 1960 Iceland, Liechtenstein (1991), Norway (1986)
Switzerland; Former: Denmark (1960-72), United Kingdom (1960-72)
Portugal (1960-85), Austria (1960-94), Sweden (1960-94)
Finland (1986-94)
EU 1958 Austria (1995), Belgium, Denmark (1973), Finland (1995)
France, Germany, Greece (1981), Luxembourg
Ireland(1973), Italy, Netherlands, Portugal (1986)
Spain (1986),Sweden (1995), United Kingdom (1973)
LAIA/LAFTA 1960 Argentina, Bolivia (1967), Brazil, Chile
Colombia (1961) Ecuador (1961), Mexico
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,Venezuela (1966)
MERCOSUR 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
NAFTA 1988 Canada, United States, Mexico (1994).
SPARTECA 1981 Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua-New Guinea, Salomon Islands
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Australia, New Zealand.
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4 Fiscal Episodes and the Extensive and Intensive Margin of Exports
4.1 Introduction
Alesina & Ardagna (2010) examine the impact of large changes in fiscal policy stance,
such as large increase (stimuli) or reduction (consolidation) of budget deficits of all
OECD countries on both the economy and the dynamics of the debt. They find
that fiscal consolidation or stabilization of debt is associated with the avoidance of
economic downturns or even economic expansions (rather than recessions). Utilizing
a sample of advanced economies over the last 30 years, IMF (2010) finds that fiscal
consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output in the short-term. IMF
(2010) uses simple statistical techniques (previously implemented by Cerra & Saxena
(2008) and Romer & Romer (1990)) to investigate the short-term effects of consol-
idation on international exports and growth, among others. They find that fiscal
consolidation reduces GDP and raises unemployment.
This paper pertains to examining the impact of fiscal episodes on international
exports and furthermore provides evidence on the mechanism by which such fiscal
episodes stimulate exports. IMF (2010) find that interest rates fall in response to
fiscal consolidation episode supporting consumption and investment. Similarly, they
find that currency depreciation (due to fiscal consolidation) spurs net exports. Hence,
these two factors provide a cushioning role on the contractionary impact of fiscal
episodes on output. Utilizing the standard gravity model of trade, this study ana-
lyzes the impact of fiscal stimuli and fiscal consolidation (collectively known as fiscal
episodes) on total exports for 20 advanced economies from 1970-2010. Furthermore,
I utilize disaggregated product-level trade data to analyze whether fiscal episodes
leads to new trading relationships (the extensive margin) or an increase in trade in
existing relationships (the intensive margin). The extensive margin is measured as
the number of products exported by country i to country j at time t. The intensive
margin is defined as the average volume of trade in existing product-country trade
relationships or average exports per product from country i to country j at time t.
Exchange rate depreciation due to fiscal consolidation could be viewed as a reduc-
tion of the price of exports. Hence, from the importers’ perspective the demand for
and sales volume of a given product or the intensive margin of trade would increase. If
the positive impact of fiscal consolidation on exports is primarily due to the exchange
rate channel (as indicated by IMF (2010)) then we should see an increase in the inten-
sive margin of exports. This paper argues for an additional channel (facilitated due
to fiscal consolidation) - the interest rate channel, which also impacts exports. I argue
that a decrease in interest rates leads to a decrease in fixed cost of exports (e.g. cost
of borrowing and capital expenditures). Griffoli (2006) mentions that interest rates
affect production and, more importantly, the number of firms active in the export
market because of fixed costs. This study argues that changes in interest rate due
to fiscal episodes would also affect exports primarily via the extensive margin. IMF
(2010) fails to elaborate on the connection between interest rates and international
exports, which is one of the focal points of this paper.
Finally, this paper analyzes whether the impact on exports from episodes is con-
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tingent upon the fiscal stance from the importers. IMF (2010) argues that if countries
simultaneously implement fiscal consolidation, then the impact on exports will dimin-
ish since all countries cannot increase net exports at the same time. The argument
is based on the notion that both countries would experience currency depreciation;
hence there would be no relative decrease in the price of exports. However, this study
argues that the exporters still could experience increase in exports via the extensive
margin based on the interest rate channel irrespective of the importers’ fiscal stance.
This analysis examines the total effect or the cumulative effect (e.g. adding the
effect on exports from time t till time t+ 3) of fiscal episodes on total, extensive and
intensive margins of exports.57 The results from the log-linear estimation reveal that
exporters that implement fiscal consolidation experience increases in total exports.
The paper also examines the marginal effect (impact of fiscal episode one, two or three
year after the initial year of episode) of fiscal episodes on exports. Results indicate
that there is a delayed positive effect of fiscal consolidation on total exports.58 The
results are in line with the findings of IMF (2010) that exports expand in response
to fiscal consolidation, providing a key cushioning role on the impact of fiscal consol-
idation on output. Furthermore, fiscal stimuli leads to decreases in total exports.
Results indicate that fiscal consolidation leads to an increase in exports solely
through the extensive margin of exports. In other words, fiscal consolidation leads to
an increase in new relationships at the product level. However, this paper finds that
the effect on the intensive margin is negative and statistically significant, implying
that fiscal consolidation leads to a decrease in existing trading relationships at the
product level. Hence, the results perhaps suggest that the positive effect on exports
is realized via the interest rate channel whereby decrease in interest rates leas to
increases in the extensive margin of exports. Additionally, fiscal stimuli has a negative
impact on total, extensive and intensive margins of exports.
When both countries implement fiscal consolidation simultaneously, the results
indicate that exporters do not experience any increase in total exports. However, the
exporters experience increases in the extensive margin at the expense of the intensive
margin of exports. Similarly, the results extend to the scenario when exporters imple-
ment fiscal consolidation and importers implement fiscal stimuli. Hence, irrespective
of the importers’ fiscal stance, exporters who experience fiscal consolidation experi-
ence increases in the extensive margin of exports. However, countries that implement
fiscal stimuli do not experience increases in total, extensive or the intensive margins
of exports irrespective of the importers’ fiscal stance (in fact their exports decrease
and is statistically significant).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the impact
of fiscal episodes on total exports via the exchange rate and the interest rate channel.
It also discusses its impact on the extensive and the intensive margin of exports.
57Alesina & Ardagna (2010) and IMF (2010) mention that there is a delayed effect of fiscal episodes
on the economy. For example, according to IMF (2010), in response to fiscal consolidation interest
rate fall by about 20 basis points after two years while GDP falls by about 0.5%.
58The impact of fiscal episode at the year of the episode is insignificant. However, there is significant
positive impact after one year following the episode. Three years after the episode, the effect
diminishes.
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Section 3 presents the empirical specification (log-linear gravity model of trade) and
discusses the data along with the definition of fiscal consolidation and stimuli. Finally,
it presents the results for the marginal and cumulative effect of fiscal episodes on total,
extensive and the intensive margin of exports. Section 4 examines the impact of fiscal
episodes contingent upon the fiscal stance by the importers. Section 5 examines the
impact of fiscal episodes based on IMF (2010) definition on total exports and the
extensive and intensive margin. Section 6 summarizes the main findings of the paper.
4.2 Fiscal Episodes and International Trade
4.2.1 The Impact of Fiscal Episodes on Total Exports: The Exchange Rate and the
Interest Rate Channel
According to IMF (2010), budget deficits and government debt soared during the
Great Recession. In 2009, the budget deficit averaged about nine percent of GDP in
advanced economies, compared to only one percent of GDP in 2007. Furthermore,
by the end of 2010, government debt is expected to reach about 100 percent of GDP
- its highest level in 50 years. Similarly, Alesina & Ardagna (2010) mention that,
as a result of the fiscal response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the US will
experience the largest increases in deficits and debt accumulation. The key question
for governments as Alesina & Ardagna (2010) put it, would be how to stop the growth
of the insurmountable debt and return to normal public finances. The governments
of the advanced economies have already undertaken or planned substantial spending
cuts and tax increases. IMF (2010) states that although there might be widespread
agreement that reducing debt has important long-term benefits, the central question
to economists is whether fiscal consolidation will hurt economic growth in the short-
term.
Alesina & Ardagna (2010) find that fiscal consolidation based upon spending cuts
and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits and debt over GDP ratios
than those based upon tax increases. IMF (2010) also examines the impact of fiscal
consolidation in 15 advanced economies over the past 30 years. In contrast to Alesina
& Ardagna (2010), they find that fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary
effect on output. According to IMF (2010), a fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP
typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within two years and raises the unemployment
rate by about 0.3%. Furthermore, they find that the domestic demand (primarily
consumption and investment) also falls. Even though there are disparate findings as
to whether fiscal episodes (notably consolidation) are truly expansionary, the focus
of this paper is the impact of these episodes on international exports.
IMF (2010) mentions that in response to a fiscal consolidation, the exchange rate
depreciates and this real depreciation is almost fully explained by nominal exchange
rate depreciation or currency devaluation boosting net exports. They find that for
each 1% of GDP of fiscal consolidation, the value of currency usually falls by about
1.1%, and the contribution of net exports to GDP rises by about 0.5%. Hence they
mention that net exports expand in response to fiscal consolidation, providing a key
cushioning role on the impact of fiscal consolidation on output. The increase in net
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exports reflects both an increase in real exports in response to the real exchange rate
depreciation and a decline in real imports, which also reflects the fall in income.
Similarly, IMF (2010) finds that reductions in interest rates also usually support
output during episodes of fiscal consolidation. They find that for each 1% of GDP of
fiscal consolidation, interest rates usually fall by about 20 basis points after two years.
IMF (2010) stipulate that a fall in interest rates is likely to support consumption and
investment. However, they fail to elaborate on the connection between interest rates
and international exports, which is one of the focal points of this paper. Utilizing
the standard gravity model of trade, we analyze the impact of fiscal stimuli and fiscal
consolidation on exports for 20 countries from 1970-2010.
According to Alesina & Ardagna (2010), if agents believe that the fiscal tightening
generates a change in regime that “eliminates the need for larger, maybe much more
disruptive adjustments in the future,” it would have expansionary impact on the
economy. If agents believe that the stabilization is credible and avoids a default on
government debt, they can ask for a lower premium on government bonds. Private
demand components sensitive to the real interest rate can increase if the reduction in
the interest rate paid on government bonds leads to a reduction in the real interest
rate charged to consumers and firms. The decrease in interest rate can also lead to the
appreciation of stocks and bonds, increasing agents’ financial wealth, and triggering
a consumption/investment boom. Similarly, IMF (2010) mentions that the rate of
inflation usually does not change much following fiscal consolidation, the fall in real
interest rates is similar. At the same time, the long-term nominal interest rate on
government bonds falls broadly in line with short-term rates. Furthermore, they
mention that the response of long-term rates suggests that fiscal consolidation may
reduce risk premiums.
4.2.2 Fiscal Episodes and the Extensive and Intensive Margin of Exports
This study examines the impact of these fiscal episodes on the extensive and the
intensive margin of exports. The recent theoretical models of trade have emphasized
firm-level productivity differences in trade structure. For ex. Helpman et al. (2008)
incorporate firm-level heterogeneity and advocate for the decomposition of trade vol-
ume into the extensive and intensive margins. In addition to analyzing the impact
of fiscal episodes utilizing the standard gravity model of trade, this paper builds on
IMF (2010) by inquiring whether these fiscal episodes lead to new trading relation-
ships (the extensive margin) or an increase in trade in existing relationships (the
intensive margin) at the product level. Various studies have analyzed the impact
of trade policies such as trade liberalization on these two margins, notably Melitz
(2003) and Chaney (2008). These studies indicate that a decline in variable trade
costs (e.g. reduction in tariffs, exchange rate depreciation) increases the extensive as
well as the intensive margin. These studies have placed substantial emphasis on fixed
trade costs. Furthermore, Chaney (2008) shows that a reduction in fixed costs (e.g.
information costs) affects only the extensive margin.
Exchange rate depreciation for exporters could be viewed as a reduction of the
price of exports or the reduction of prices that the exporters charge. Hence, from
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the importers’ perspective the demand for and sales volume of a given product would
increase.
This study argues that a decrease in interest rates could be viewed as a decrease
in fixed costs (e.g. cost of borrowing and capital expenditures). Hence, in line with
Chaney (2008), this paper argues that changes in interest rates due to fiscal episodes
would also affect exports primarily via the extensive margin. Griffoli (2006) mentions
that interest rates affect production and, more importantly, the number of firms
active in the export market because of fixed costs. In sum, the cost of capital (used
to finance the fixed cost) affects trade through the extensive margin. He mentions
that as interest rates diminish, fixed costs decline, more firms are able to enter the
market, and all firms increase capital investment, two forces that boost total exports.
Hence the argument is that a fixed cost of entry is dependent on interest rates.
Firms borrow funds at the ongoing real interest rate to set up or expand an export
business, or that exporting requires investment in capital whose rental cost depends
on the real interest rate. Griffoli (2006) mentions that the requirements to enter
or expand operations in the export market are dependent on capital expenditures.
Hence, logistics, production, product adaptations or just maintaining an office abroad
are all capital intensive activities for which the relevant cost is the interest rate. Costs
of entry are much more tangible and immediate to firm managers and thus are more
likely to be sensitive to changes in interest rates.
Various studies have indicated the importance of both margins. Export diversi-
fication, or a broader export basket, reduces the risks of balance of payments crises
and large fluctuations in domestic output after-shocks that can negatively affect the
performance of the external sector, such as price fluctuations in international markets
or output swings in trading partners (Agosin (2007), Lederman & Maloney (2003)).
Feenstra & Kee (2008) suggest that increases in sectoral export variety boost country
productivity as the new exporting basket can improve the use and allocative efficiency
of the economy. Hummels & Klenow (2005) indicate that export growth, based solely
on the intensive margin, can have terms-of-trade effects, especially for large economies
which can be reduced by broadening the exporting base of the country.
Besedes & Prusa (2010) argue that the survival of trading relationships is impor-
tant for long-run export growth, and that the majority of growth in exports occurs
at the intensive margin. Felbermayr & Kohler (2006a) postulate that the intensive
margin historically explains the majority of export growth, leaving room for the ex-
tensive margin to increase in importance for future export growth. Amurgo-Pacheco
& Pierola (2008) also find that export growth is primarily determined along the in-
tensive margin, especially for developed economies.
4.3 Empirics: Log-linear gravity model
4.3.1 Total Aggregate Exports
IMF (2010) utilizes a simple statistical technique to investigate the short-term growth
effects of consolidation and how those effects are influenced by such factors as mon-
etary policy and international trade. They estimate the average impulse response of
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output to action-based fiscal consolidation using panel data analysis. The estimated
equation makes use of an autoregressive model in growth rates estimated on annual
data for 1980-2009 for 15 advanced economies. In this paper we utilize the standard
log-linear gravity model of trade to examine the impact of fiscal episodes on interna-
tional exports. In addition to measuring the impact of fiscal episodes on total exports,
we also examine the impact of fiscal episodes on the extensive and the intensive mar-
gins of exports. The standard specification of the gravity model estimated by OLS is
of the following form:
lnTijt = β0 +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFCit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFSit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFCit+k
+
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFSit+k +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart
+ γZijt + ijt (34)
where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, and t denotes time. Tijt denotes
real exports value of country i to j at time t. EFCit+k is a binary variable which
is unity if i implements fiscal consolidation at time t+k, where k = 0, 1, 2, 3 and
zero otherwise. Similar to Alesina & Ardagna (2010) we advance the impact of
fiscal episodes to one, two and three years following the beginning of an episode.59
According to IMF (2010), including lags of fiscal episodes allows for a delayed impact
of fiscal consolidation on exports. Their results indicate that the impact of fiscal
consolidation on exchange rates and interest rates usually take around two years from
the start of the episode to fully materialize. Hence, these year specific dummies are
intended to capture the marginal effect of fiscal episodes on exports or additional effect
of fiscal episodes on exports after the year of implementation of episodes. Similarly,
EFSit+k is a binary variable which is unity if i implements fiscal stimuli at or before
time t, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, IFCit+k and EFSit+k are binary variables
which are unity if j implements fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimulus at time t+k,
respectively.
Impa are the list of importer dummies that take the value of one if a=j, and zero
otherwise. Expb are the list of exporter dummies that take the value of one if b=i, and
zero otherwise. These dummies are comprehensive sets of exporter and importer fixed
effects that take into account any time-invariant country-specific factors. Y eart is a
year-specific fixed effect implemented to take into account any time-specific common
trends or effects (e.g. business cycles, oil price shocks). The row vector Zijt represents
a list of common gravity control variables (or proxies) between the bilateral country
pair that are not absorbed by the fixed effects. It includes the natural logs of variables
such as the bilateral distance, population, annual real GDP per capita and product
of the areas of the countries. It further includes bilateral pair dummies such as
country pairs using the same currency at time t, country pairs i and j sharing a
59For example, if U.S implements fiscal consolidation in year 1980, we analyze the impact of episodes
with four different time frames: 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983.
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common language, country pairs i and j having a regional trade agreement at time
t, country pairs sharing a common land border, number of island countries in the
country pair, country pairs colonized by the same country, country i colonized j at
time t or vice versa and if country i ever colonized j or vice versa.  represents the
omitted influences, assumed to be well behaved.
To ensure that the results are robust, I also implement the specification of the
following form:
lnTijt = β0 +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFCit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFSit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFCit+k
+
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFSit+k +
∑
α1aij +
∑
α2Y eart + γZijt + ijt (35)
where aij are a list of country pair dummies that take the value of one if i exports
to j, and zero otherwise. These country pair dummies are a comprehensive set of
dyadic-specific fixed effects that absorb any time-invariant characteristics common to
a country pair. Inclusion of year fixed effects and country/dyadic-specific fixed effects,
according to Rose & Spiegel (2011b), can be viewed as a difference-in-differences
estimator. Zijt includes all the other control variables mentioned in equation (34)
pertinent to the gravity model of trade.
4.3.2 Extensive and Intensive Margin of Exports
This study further examines the impact of fiscal episodes on the extensive and in-
tensive margins of exports. This paper utilizes disaggregated data at the four-digit
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2 product level to con-
struct a measure of the two margins. The methodology applied in this paper to
analyze the two margins of exports is commonly referred to as the count method.
Previous studies, such as those of Nitsch & Pisu (2008), Bernard et al. (2007), Flam
& Nordstrm (2006), and Dutt et al. (2011), have adopted a similar methodology to
decompose total trade into the extensive and the intensive margins. In the traditional
log-linear form, the decomposition of total exports can be expressed as follows:
ln(Tijt) = ln(Nijt) + ln(
Tijt
Nijt
) (36)
where Tijt, the real aggregate bilateral exports (sum of total exports for all products
for a given year) or total exports between a country pair is decomposed into two dif-
ferent dependent variables (Nijt and
Tijt
Nijt
). Nijt (the extensive margin) is the number
of products exported per year per country pair and
Tijt
Nijt
(the intensive margin) is the
average volume of exports per product per year. Utilizing the log-linear gravity model
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specification, total exports can be expressed by the following estimation equation :
lnTijt = β0 +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFCit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFSit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFCit+k
+
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFSit+k +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart
+ γZijt + ijt (37)
The estimation equation for the extensive margin of exports is given as :
lnNijt = β0 +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFCit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFSit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFCit+k
+
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFSit+k +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart
+ γZijt + ijt (38)
and for the intensive margin is given as :
ln(
Tijt
Nijt
) = β0 +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFCit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kEFSit+k +
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFCit+k
+
k=3∑
k=0
βt+kIFSit+k +
∑
α1Impa +
∑
α2Expb +
∑
α3Y eart
+ γZijt + ijt (39)
This study further estimates the role of the extensive and the intensive margins with
a comprehensive set of dyadic-specific fixed effects similar to equation (35).60
There are alternative means of constructing the extensive and the intensive margin
of trade, which are not explored in this paper.61 This study acknowledges that there
might be some limitations to the count method of constructing the two margins.
According to Baldwin & Nino (2006), each of the product categories encompass a
range of individual goods, so one cannot hope to pick up the full extensive margin.
60Variable Z includes all the pertinent control variables for the gravity model of trade.
61An alternative measure of the margins at the product level is used by Hummels & Klenow (2005).
They define the extensive margin as a weighted count of the categories in which a country exports
relative to the categories exported by the rest of the world. The intensive margin is defined as
the nominal exports from a country relative to the nominal exports from the rest of the world
in the categories that the country also exports. Hence, the extensive margin can be viewed as
a measure of diversification and the intensive margin as a measure of trade volume. Dutt et al.
(2011) mention that the count method and the Hummels & Klenow (2005) method of extensive
and intensive margins are comparable with each other. They find the correlation of the extensive
margin between the count and the Hummels & Klenow (2005) method to be around 0.86, and the
correlation between the intensive margins to be around 0.88.
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Hence, this measure cannot ascertain the full link between the fiscal episodes and the
number of varieties as some changes in the intensive margin may capture changes in
the extensive margin.
4.3.3 Data
The disaggregated product level export data is based on the 4-digit Standard Inter-
national Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2. There are 1,249 tradable product
categories under this classification. The data is retrieved from the World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITS) database. Within WITS, the dataset is retrieved from the
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) Comtrade database. This dataset is used
in the analysis for the extensive and the intensive margins of trade. The level of dis-
aggregation affects the extensive margin between countries as there are data available
at finer level of classification. However, there are measurement errors associated with
finer level of disaggregation and furthermore the choice of the 4-digit classification
was made to ensure that the data coverage is the longest possible (e.g. 1962 onwards).
GDP per capita and population data are retrieved from WDI (2012). The rest of the
data for gravity variables are retrieved from Rose’s website. Refer to appendix table
59 for further description of the data set. The paper utilizes a panel of 20 OECD
countries for the time period from 1970-2010. The rationale for focusing on advanced
economies according to IMF (2010) is due to the fact that fiscal policy adjustment
needs are particularly large, on average, for the group of advanced economies. Ap-
pendix table 60 and table 61 lists all the countries in the sample and their respective
years of fiscal episodes.
4.3.4 Definitions of Fiscal Episodes
This paper adopts the definition of fiscal episodes proposed by Alesina & Ardagna
(2010). They focus on the size of the fiscal packages (i.e. the magnitude of the change
of the government deficit) and the composition (i.e. the percentage change of the main
government budget items relative to the total change). They utilize cyclically adjusted
values of the fiscal variables to account for variations of the fiscal variables induced
by business cycle fluctuations. They implement the method proposed by Blanchard
(1990) that corrects various components of the government budget for year-to-year
changes in the unemployment rate.62
Alesina & Ardagna (2010) define a period of fiscal adjustment (stimulus) for a year
where the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (deteriorates) by at least 1.5 %
of GDP. They argue that these definitions of episodes are based on a rather demanding
criterion that rules out small but prolonged consolidation or stimuli. Hence, these
are very sharp and large episodes that clearly indicate a change in the fiscal stance.
62Alesina & Ardagna (2010) further mention that the cyclically adjusted value of the change in a
fiscal variable is the difference between a measure of the fiscal variable in period t computed as if
the unemployment rate were equal to the one in t− 1 and the actual value of the fiscal variable in
year t− 1. To calculate the measure of the fiscal variable in period t as if the unemployment rate
were equal to the one in t− 1, they follow the procedure in Alesina & Perotti (1995).
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Furthermore, these large fiscal changes allow one to isolate changes in fiscal policy
which are policy induced as opposed to cyclical fluctuations of the deficits.63 They
use the primary deficit, which is the difference between current and capital spending,
excluding interest rate expenses paid on government debt, and total tax revenue as
opposed to the total deficit, to avoid that episodes selected result from the effect that
changes in interest rates have on total government expenditures.64
4.3.5 Empirical Results - Cumulative Effect
The results from the log-linear gravity model utilizing product level export data
are shown in table 1. In this section we examine the total effect (summation of
all the marginal effects) of fiscal episodes on total, extensive and intensive margins
of exports. In other words, we test the hypothesis whether the total effect or the
cumulative effect of episodes on exports starting from time t to time t+3 is statistically
different from zero. Table 1 tabulates the results where we add all the coefficients
(or marginal effects) of each episode (at different time periods) together and test the
null hypothesis that the coefficients jointly equal 0.65 Table 48 tabulates the total
effect of fiscal episodes for exporters. The results indicate that the total effect of
fiscal consolidation for exporters (from time t to t + 3) is positive and statistically
significant. In other words, countries that implement fiscal consolidation experience
an increase in their total exports by about 7%. The result is robust to the inclusion
of country pair fixed effects. These results are in line with IMF (2010) that exports
expand in response to fiscal consolidation, providing a key cushioning role on the
impact of fiscal consolidation on output.
Table 48 also reports the results for the cumulative impact of fiscal stimuli on total
exports. The results indicate that the total effect of fiscal stimuli for exporters (from
time t to t+ 3) is negative and statistically significant. In other words, countries that
implement fiscal stimuli experience a decrease in their total exports by about 21%.66
Based on the intuition advanced by IMF (2010), one could argue that fiscal stimuli
(in contrast to fiscal consolidation) would lead to exchange rate appreciation, making
their exports more expensive from the importers’ perspective. Hence, this would lead
to a decrease in total exports. Similarly, an increase in output would also lead to an
increase in interest rates, making borrowing more expensive and ultimately reducing
investment.
Table 48 also reports the results for the cumulative impact of fiscal episodes on
the extensive and intensive margin of exports. As mentioned before, if the impact
of fiscal consolidation on exports is purely via the exchange rate channel, then one
63This definition misses fiscal adjustments and stimuli which are small in each year but prolonged
for several years.
64Using these criteria, according to Alesina & Ardagna (2010) they focus as much as possible on
episodes that do not result from the automatic response of fiscal variables to economic growth
or monetary policy induced changes on interest rates, but they should reflect discretionary policy
choices of fiscal authorities.
65 The nlcom command in STATA tests the null that the addition of coefficients jointly equals 0. It
provides us with the coefficient estimate and the standard error respectively.
66The results are robust to the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects.
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would see an increase in the intensive margin. However, if the effect is via the interest
rate channel (decrease in fixed cost), then one would see an increase primarily in
the extensive margin of exports. The coefficient of the total or cumulative effect
on the extensive margin of exports for countries experiencing fiscal consolidation is
also positive, statistically significant, and robust to both exporter and importer or
country-pair fixed effects. Hence, countries implementing fiscal episodes experience
an increase of 16% on the extensive margin. However, the coefficients on the intensive
margin of exports are negative and statistically significant. Hence, the results suggest
that the positive impact of fiscal consolidation on exports is realized entirely through
the extensive margin at the expense of the intensive margin. The results further
indicate that the positive effect on exports are realized via the interest rate channel
whereby the decrease in interest rates could be viewed as a decrease in fixed costs
leading to an increase in the extensive margin of exports. The results for the impact of
fiscal stimuli extend to the extensive and intensive margin. In other words, countries
that experience fiscal stimuli do not experience any positive impact on exports at
either margins (in fact it is negative and statistically significant).
4.3.6 Empirical Results - Marginal Effect
The results in table 2 report the marginal effect of fiscal episodes on exporters. Table
50 includes year fixed effects along with exporter and importer fixed effects. The
left column contains the coefficient of fiscal consolidation and stimuli experienced by
exporters on total exports. We advance the impact of fiscal episodes to one, two,
and three years following the beginning of an episode to allow for a delayed impact
of fiscal episodes on total exports. These fiscal episode dummies are intended to
capture the marginal effect of fiscal episodes on total exports. In others words, these
dummies capture the additional effect of fiscal episodes on total exports one, two and
three years after the initial year of implementation. The results indicate that the
coefficient on fiscal consolidation at time t is statistically insignificant. However, at
time t+ 1, the coefficient on the fiscal consolidation dummy is statistically significant
and positive. Hence, countries that have implemented fiscal consolidation at time
t have exports that are higher by 4% at time t + 1, or one year after the date of
implementation. Similarly exports increase by 3%, two years after the initial date
of fiscal consolidation. However three years after the date of fiscal consolidation the
impact on total exports fades away. The preliminary results indicate a potential non-
linear impact of fiscal consolidation on exports. The results remain robust to the
inclusion of country-pair fixed effects as tabulated in table 51.
Table 50 also reports the results for the impact of fiscal stimuli on total exports.
Similar to the previous result, the coefficient on fiscal stimuli at time t is negative
and statistically significant. Hence, at time t, countries that have experienced fiscal
stimuli have exports that are lower by 8% . The results further indicate that the
coefficients are negative and statistically significant throughout the different time
periods. The results remain robust to the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects as
92
tabulated in table 5167
Table 50 also reports the results for the extensive and intensive margins of exports
for countries implementing fiscal episodes. The coefficient on the extensive margin
of exports for countries implementing fiscal consolidation is positive, statistically sig-
nificant, and robust to both exporter and importer or country-pair fixed effects. At
time t + 1 or 1 year after the date of the episode, countries that have implemented
fiscal consolidation have exports that are higher by 5% with importer/exporter fixed
effects and country-pair fixed effects. However, the coefficients on the intensive mar-
gin of exports are statistically insignificant for earlier years of the episode but as
we advance the effect to two and three years after the episode, the results indicate
a significant negative effect. Hence, the results suggest that the positive impact of
fiscal consolidation on exports is realized entirely through the extensive margin at
the expense of the intensive margin. Hence, the results reinforce the argument that
perhaps the interest rate channel is more plausible for explaining the positive impact
of fiscal episodes on exports, thereby providing some cushioning effect towards the
negative impact of fiscal consolidation on GDP. The results for the impact of fiscal
stimuli extend to the extensive and intensive margin. In other words, countries that
experience fiscal stimuli do not experience any positive impact on exports at either
margins (in fact at time t+ 2 and t+ 3 it is negative and statistically significant).
4.4 Fiscal Episodes and Exporter-Importer Relationship
In this section the paper analyses whether or how the impact of fiscal episodes on
exports changes when many countries conduct fiscal episodes simultaneously. This is
especially relevant since a number of advanced economies set fiscal consolidation in
motion. In other words, this section analyzes whether the impact on exports from
episodes is contingent upon the fiscal stance from importers.
IMF (2010) argues that the fiscal consolidation in the importers reduces demand
for exports from exporters that also experience fiscal consolidation. Assume, for
example, that the U.S. implements a fiscal consolidation episode in 1980. If the
majority of the countries in the data set also implement similar fiscal consolidation,
then perhaps the U.S. might not experience a significant increase in exports as opposed
to the alternative. Hence, according to IMF (2010) the exchange rate channel provides
a smaller buffer as currencies cannot all depreciate at the same time and net exports
cannot increase for all countries simultaneously. This would imply that there could
be large output costs associated with fiscal consolidation implemented across all the
large economies concurrently. However, IMF (2010) also points out that large changes
in interest rates could perhaps provide a cushioning role in this situation.
4.4.1 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the results for the impact of fiscal episodes contingent upon ex-
porter and importer relationship. Table 52 examines the impact on total, extensive
and intensive margins of exports when both exporters and importers implement fiscal
67 The analysis for importer fiscal episodes will be presented in Section 4.
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consolidation simultaneously. Here, we simply add the coefficients of the impact of fis-
cal consolidation on exporters and importers as tabulated in table 50 (e.g. coefficient
on exporter consolidation + coefficient on importer consolidation) and test the null
hypothesis that the cumulative effect equals 0. The results indicate that when both
exporters and importers experience fiscal consolidation simultaneously, exporters do
not experience any increase in total exports. The results remain robust to both esti-
mation strategies. However, once we turn to the extensive margin, the results indicate
that exporters that experience fiscal consolidation export higher numbers of products
to countries that also experience fiscal consolidation. Hence, the results once again
suggest that perhaps the interest rate channel is driving the increase in the extensive
margin. The results on the intensive margin once again are negative and statistically
significant.
Table 53 tabulates the results for exporters and importers that experience fiscal
stimuli simultaneously. The results indicate that exporters experience a decrease in
total, extensive and intensive margins of exports. Table54 tabulates the results for
exporters that experience fiscal consolidation and importers that experience fiscal
stimuli. The results indicate that exporters do not experience any increase in total
exports. However, the impact on the extensive margin reveals a different story. Two
years after the date of the episode, exporters experience an increase in the extensive
margin by 5% when importers implement stimuli simultaneously. Hence, the results
indicate that, irrespective of the importers’ fiscal stance, exporters who implement
fiscal consolidation experience increases in the extensive margin of exports.
Table 55 tabulates the results for exporters that implement fiscal stimuli and
importers that implement fiscal consolidation simultaneously. Similar to table 53,
when exporters implement fiscal stimuli they do not experience an increase in total,
extensive or intensive margins of exports. Hence, irrespective of the importers’ fiscal
stance, exporters who implement fiscal stimuli do not experience any positive impact
on exports; in fact their exports decrease and the result is statistically significant.
4.5 Robustness Check
In contrast to Alesina & Ardagna (2010), IMF (2010) provides alternative method for
identifying periods of fiscal consolidation based on policy actions intended to reduce
the budget deficit. IMF (2010) argue that the problem with the standard approach is
that it ignores the motivation behind fiscal actions. According to them, it omits years
during which actions aimed at fiscal consolidation were followed by an adverse shock
and an offsetting discretionary stimulus.68 The standard approach would therefore
tend to miss cases of consolidation followed by adverse shocks, because there may be
little or no rise in the CAPB despite the consolidation measures.
68For example, according to IMF (2010), assume that two countries adopt identical consolidation
policies, but then one is hit by an adverse shock and adopts discretionary stimulus, while the
other is hit with a favorable shock. Here, the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budgetary
balance (CAPB) would show a smaller increase for the first country than for the second country,
despite the presence of identical consolidation measures.
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IMF (2010) identify cases in which the government implemented tax hikes or
spending cuts to reduce the budget deficit. In contrast to Alesina & Ardagna (2010)
where they identify periods of consolidation based on successful (cyclically adjusted)
budget outcomes, IMF (2010) identifies episodes based on fiscal policy actions moti-
vated by deficit reduction, irrespective of the outcomes. Hence, they claim to have
examined accounts and records of what countries actually did.69
In this paper, we conduct robustness check based on IMF (2010) definition of
fiscal consolidation. The analysis is based on 15 advanced economies from 1980-2009.
Appendix table 62 lists the countries in their sample and the respective years of fiscal
consolidation according to their definition. The results based on their definition are
shown in table 4. The results indicate that the coefficient on fiscal consolidation at
time t and t+ 1 is statistically significant and imply that countries that have imple-
mented fiscal consolidation have exports that are higher by 6% and 9% respectively.
However two years after the date of fiscal consolidation the impact on total exports
fades away. The results remain robust to the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects.
Table 56 also reports the results for the extensive and intensive margins of exports for
countries implementing fiscal consolidation. The coefficient on the extensive margin
of exports is positive and statistically significant at time t+ 1 and t+ 2 and is robust
to both exporter and importer or country-pair fixed effects. In contrast to Alesina
& Ardagna (2010), however, the coefficients on the intensive margin of exports are
statistically significant and positive for the time periods t and t+1. Hence, the results
suggest that the positive impact of fiscal consolidation on exports is realized via both
the extensive and intensive margins.
Table 57 examines the total effect of fiscal consolidation on total, extensive and
intensive margins of exports. The results indicate that the total effect of fiscal con-
solidation for exporters is positive and statistically significant. Hence, countries that
implement fiscal consolidation experience an increase in their total exports by about
17%. The coefficient on the cumulative effect on the extensive and intensive margin
of exports is also positive, but unlike previous results, are statistically insignificant.
Table 58 presents the results for the impact of fiscal consolidation contingent upon
exporter and importer relationship or when both exporters and importers implement
fiscal consolidation simultaneously. The results indicate that when both exporters and
importers experience fiscal consolidation simultaneously, exporters do not experience
any increase in total exports. The results remain robust to both estimation strategies.
The result further indicates that exporters that experience fiscal consolidation export
higher numbers of products to countries that also experience fiscal consolidation at
time t+ 2. The results on the intensive margin are statistically insignificant.
Alesina & Ardagna (2010) argue that IMF (2010) methodology involves many
judgment calls. More importantly, according to Alesina & Ardagna (2010), the idea
that this procedure would eliminate endogeneity (i.e., fiscal policy responding to the
economy and not the other way around) is highly questionable. They further mention
that the descriptive IMF and OECD reports usually describe what happens to the
69They analyze OECD Economic Surveys, IMF Staff Reports, IMF Recent Economic Developments
reports, country budget documents, and additional country-specific sources.
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deficit in a particular period, and hence do not go into the details of policy makers
intentions, discussions and congressional records. They argue that many other studies
have used different methodologies, and have identified cases of expansionary fiscal
adjustments, thereby drawing similar conclusions to their study.
4.6 Conclusion
Past studies such as Alesina & Ardagna (2010) and IMF (2010) examine the im-
pact of fiscal episodes on the economy, notably growth. While Alesina & Ardagna
(2010) find that fiscal consolidation can be expansionary, IMF (2010) finds that fis-
cal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output and employment in
the short-term. Furthermore, IMF (2010) finds that fiscal consolidation leads to a
depreciation of the exchange rate and a reduction of the interest rate. They further
find that exchange rate depreciation increases net exports and the decline in interest
rate stimulates consumption and investment, thus providing a cushioning role on the
contractionary impact. This paper argues for additional channel through which fiscal
consolidation would impact exports - the interest rate channel.
This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of fiscal
episodes on total exports utilizing the standard log-linear gravity model of trade.
Furthermore, this paper utilizes disaggregated product-level trade data to analyze
whether fiscal episodes lead to new trading relationships or an increase in trade in
existing relationships. Furthermore, this paper examines the total or the cumulative
effect of fiscal episodes on total exports and the two margins of exports. Finally, this
study analyzes whether the impact on exports from episodes is contingent upon the
fiscal stance from the importers.
The results indicate that fiscal consolidation increases total exports, however there
is a delayed response of exports to fiscal consolidation. The results also indicate
that fiscal stimuli lead to a decrease in total exports. The positive impact of fiscal
consolidation on exports from the exchange rate channel would potentially be reflected
by the increase in the intensive margin of exports, as exchange rate depreciation can
be viewed as a reduction in the price of exports. This study argues that a decrease in
interest rates due to fiscal consolidation leads to a decrease in fixed cost of exports,
hence affecting total exports primarily through the extensive margin of exports.
Utilizing disaggregated product-level data, the results indicate that fiscal consoli-
dation leads to an increase in exports solely through the extensive margin of exports
or an increase in new product relationships. However, this paper finds that the effect
on the intensive margin is negative and statistically significant, implying that fiscal
consolidation leads to a decrease in existing trading relationships. Additionally, fiscal
stimuli has a negative impact on total, extensive and intensive margins of exports.
Hence, the results obtained are more in line with the interest rate argument whereby
the positive effect on exports is realized due to a decrease in interest rates leading to
an increase in the extensive margin of exports.
Furthermore, irrespective of the importers’ fiscal stance, when exporters imple-
ment fiscal consolidation they do not experience any increase in total exports. How-
ever, the results indicate that exporters experience an increase in the extensive margin
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at the expense of the intensive margin of exports. However, countries that implement
fiscal stimuli do not experience increases in total, extensive or intensive margins of
exports, irrespective of the importers’ fiscal stance.
Various studies have indicated the importance of the extensive margin of exports.
Export diversification, or a broader export basket, reduces the risks of balance of
payments crises and large fluctuations in domestic output after-shocks that can neg-
atively affect the performance of the external sector, such as price fluctuations in
international markets or output swings in trading partners (Agosin (2007), Lederman
& Maloney (2003)). Feenstra & Kee (2008) suggest that increases in sectoral export
variety boost country productivity as the new exporting basket can improve the use
and allocative efficiency of the economy. Hummels & Klenow (2005) indicate that
export growth, based solely on the intensive margin, can have terms-of-trade effects,
especially for large economies which can be reduced by broadening the exporting base
of the country.
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4.7 Tables
Table 48: Total effect of Fiscal Episodes - Exporters
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Consolidation 0.07* 0.15*** -0.08** 0.06* 0.15*** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Stimuli -0.24*** -0.14*** -0.10** -0.24*** -0.13*** -0.10***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 20 countries from 1970-2010. Dependent variables are
in logs. All the other control variables are also included but not reported. Robust standard errors
clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
Table 49: Total effect of Fiscal Episodes - Importers
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Consolidation -0.07 0.03 -0.10** -0.07* 0.03 -0.10**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Stimuli -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 20 countries from 1970-2010. Dependent variables are
in logs. All the other control variables are also included but not reported. Robust standard errors
clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 50: Marginal Effect of Fiscal Episodes - Importer and Exporter
Fixed Effect
Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin
EFCt 0.00 0.01** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFCt+ 1 0.04*** 0.05*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFCt+ 2 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFCt+ 3 -0.00*** 0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
EFSt -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFSt+ 1 -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFSt+ 2 -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFSt+ 3 -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt -0.03*** 0.00 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt+ 1 -0.01 0.01 -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt+ 2 -0.02 0.01 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt+ 3 -0.02 0.01 -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt -0.03** -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt+ 1 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt+ 2 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt+ 3 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.92 0.83 0.88
N 14,441 14,441 14,441
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 20 countries from 1970-
2010. Dependent variables are in logs. All the other control vari-
ables are also included but not reported. Robust standard errors
clustered by country pairs are in parenthesis.
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Table 51: Marginal Effect of Fiscal Episodes - Country pair Fixed Effect
Total Extensive Intensive
Exports Margin Margin
EFCt 0.00 0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFCt+ 1 0.04*** 0.05*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFCt+ 2 0.02** 0.05*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFCt+ 3 -0.00*** 0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
EFSt -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFSt+ 1 -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFSt+ 2 -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EFSt+ 3 -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt -0.03** 0.00 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt+ 1 -0.01 0.01 -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt+ 2 -0.02 0.01 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFCt+ 3 -0.02 0.01 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt -0.03** -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt+ 1 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt+ 2 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IFSt+ 3 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.97 0.93 0.94
N 14,441 14,441 14,441
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 20 countries from 1970-
2010. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in
parenthesis. All the other control variables are also included but
not reported.
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Table 52: Fiscal Stimuli and Consolidation on Exporter-Importer
Relationship : EFC-IFC
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Time-t -0.02 0.02** -0.04*** -0.03 0.02* -0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+1 0.03 0.06*** -0.03* 0.03 0.06*** -0.03*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+2 0.01 0.06*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.06*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+3 -0.02 0.04*** -0.06*** -0.02 0.04*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
Table 53: Fiscal Stimuli and Consolidation on Exporter-Importer
Relationship : EFS-IFS
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Time-t -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.11*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+1 -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.03 -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+2 -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+3 -0.06*** -0.02** -0.04** -0.06*** -0.02** -0.04**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
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Table 54: Fiscal Stimuli and Consolidation on Exporter-Importer
Relationship : EFC-IFS
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Time-t -0.03 0.01 -0.03* -0.03 0.00 -0.03*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Time-t+1 0.02 0.05*** -0.02 0.02 0.05*** -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+2 0.01 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.01 0.05*** -0.04**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+3 -0.01 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.04*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
Table 55: Fiscal Stimuli and Consolidation on Exporter-Importer
Relationship : EFS-IFC
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Time-t -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+1 -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03* -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.03**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+2 -0.07*** -0.02* -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.02* -0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Time-t+3 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
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Table 56: IMF Definition of Fiscal Consolidation - Marginal Effect
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
EFCt 0.06* 0.01 0.05* 0.06* 0.01 0.05*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
EFCt+ 1 0.09*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.10*** 0.05** 0.05**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
EFCt+ 2 0.03 0.03** 0.00 0.04* 0.03** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
EFCt+ 3 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
IFCt 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
IFCt+ 1 -0.04 0.00 -0.04* -0.04 0.00 -0.04*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
IFCt+ 2 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
IFCt+ 3 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.92 0.78 0.90 0.97 0.89 0.96
N 5,965 5,965 5,965 5,965 5,965 5,965
Table 57: IMF Definition of Fiscal Consolidation - Total Effect
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
EFC 0.16* 0.07 0.09 0.18* 0.07 0.11
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
IFC -0.09 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.07
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
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Table 58: IMF Definition of Fiscal Consolidation : Exporter-Importer
Relationship
Total Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int.
Time-t 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Time-t+1 0.06 0.05** 0.01 0.06 0.05* 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Time-t+2 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Time-t+3 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Importer f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic f.e Yes Yes Yes
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4.8 Appendix
Table 59: Data Sources
• GDP per capita and population data is retrieved from the WDI website:
http : //data.worldbank.org/data
• All the common gravity variables are obtained from Rose’s website .
• Exports at product level are obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) database, deflated by US CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), all
items, 1982-84=100.
• Within the database, the export data is retrieved from the United Nations
Statistics Division (UNSD) COMTRADE (Commodity Trade) database.
• Export data is available at the four-digit SITC- Revision 2 classification.
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Table 60: List of Countries and Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli
Country Year
Australia 1990, 1991
Austria 1975, 2004
Belgium 1975, 1981, 2005
Canada 1975, 1982, 1991, 2001
Denmark 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1982
Finland 1978, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2003
France 1975, 1981, 1992, 1993, 2002
Germany 1995, 2001
Greece 1981, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2001
Ireland 1974, 1975, 1978, 2001, 2007
Italy 1972, 1975, 1981, 2001
Japan 1975, 1993, 1998, 2005, 2007
Netherlands 1975, 1980, 1995, 2001, 2002
New Zealand 1988
Norway 1974, 1976, 1977, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1998, 2002, 2007
Portugal 1978, 1985, 1993, 2005
Spain 1981, 1982, 1993
Sweden 1974, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2002
United Kingdom 1971, 1972, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2003
United States 2002
Source: Alesina & Ardagna (2010)
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Table 61: List of Countries and Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation
Country Year
Australia 1987, 1988
Austria 1984, 1996, 1997, 2005
Belgium 1982, 1984, 1987, 2006
Canada 1981, 1986, 1987, 1995, 1996, 1997
Denmark 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2005
Finland 1973, 1976, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000
France 1979, 1996
Germany 1996, 2000
Greece 1976, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2005, 2006
Ireland 1976, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 2000
Italy 1976, 1980, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997, 2007
Japan 1984, 1999, 2001, 2006
Netherlands 1972, 1973, 1983, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1996
New Zealand 1987, 1989, 1993, 1994, 2000
Norway 1979, 1980, 1983, 1989, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2005
Portugal 1982, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1995, 2002, 2006
Spain 1986, 1987, 1994, 1996
Sweden 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2004
United Kingdom 1997, 1982, 1988, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000
Source: Alesina & Ardagna (2010)
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Table 62: List of Countries and Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation - IMF
Definition
Country Year
Australia 1986, 1987
Belgium 1982, 1983, 1987, 1993
Canada
Denmark 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986
Finland 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998
France
Germany 1997
Ireland 1982, 1983, 1987, 1988, 2009
Italy 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997
Japan 1997
Portugal 1983, 2002
Spain
Sweden 1983, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997
United Kingdom 1981, 1997
United States 1991
Source: IMF (2010)
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5 Conclusion
Utilizing disaggregated product level trade data, this dissertation examines the impact
of trade liberalization, fiscal consolidation and membership in multilateral organiza-
tions on the extensive and intensive margins of trade. This dissertation offers insight
on the channel by which such trade policies stimulate trade. The results indicate that
past studies limited to total aggregate trade masks the heterogeneous trade creating
effect, and hence underestimate the impact of these policy variables. The results also
indicate that the traditional empirical model (log-linear gravity model) of trade that
has been extensively employed to analyze trade flows leads to biased estimates in the
presence of heteroskedastic residuals. Hence, given the nature of trade data where
heteroskedasticity is prevalent, the PPML estimation proves to be a more appropriate
methodology.
The first chapter of the dissertation shows that the traditional log-linear model
as employed by Rose & Spiegel (2011b) exaggerated the impact of hosting/bidding
for mega-events on exports. Utilizing a Poisson model specification at the aggregate
trade level, the results indicate hosts and candidates do not experience a permanent
increase in exports. However, utilizing disaggregate trade level data with the Poisson
model indicates that total exports mask the heterogeneous impact of mega-events.
The results indicate that hosting the mega-events matters since only the hosts expe-
rience a permanent increase in exports solely at the intensive margin of trade. Given
the importance of the intensive margin for long-run export growth and less export per-
sistence among developing countries, perhaps an avenue to maintain long-run export
growth, especially for developing economies, could be hosting a mega-event. Avenue
for further research would be to analyze whether the Olympic effect has heteroge-
nous impact for exporters at lower end of the productivity distribution (i.e. lower
per-capita income level), compared to the one at the upper end of the productivity
distribution (i.e. higher per-capita income level). Studies indicate that exports for
countries at lower end of the productivity distribution have higher elasticity with
respect to change in variable trade costs. This could provide more insight in regards
to the benefits of hosting mega-events especially for developing economies. Hence,
one could separate the dataset into quartiles according to the distribution of the per-
capita income variables (i.e. product of GDPs per capita), whereby the quartiles can
objectively control for per-capita income differences among countries.
The second chapter finds that total trade masks significant heterogeneity in terms
of the impact of the WTO membership and the failure to account for the inten-
sive and extensive margin at product level has underestimated the benefits of WTO
membership. Various studies have indicated the lack of effectiveness of the WTO
membership, especially for developing members. I find that the benefit of the WTO
membership is realized entirely through the extensive margin. The results are in
line with the argument put forth by studies such as Handley (2011) and Sala et al.
(2010), that attributes the role of WTO membership to reducing market uncertainty
through tariff binds rather than tariff reduction, thereby leading to increased entry
of firms in the export market. Hence, the results indicate that the WTO membership
would prove beneficial in reducing the effects of uncertainty especially for higher risk
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destination markets and small and developing economies where trade is central to
both consumers and firms. Furthermore, export diversification (or increases in the
extensive margin) is shown to reduce the risks of balance of payment crisis and large
fluctuations in domestic output after-shocks that can negatively affect the perfor-
mance of the external sector such as price fluctuations in markets, or output swings
in trading partners (Agosin (2007), Lederman & Maloney (2003)).
Further research would include investigating the impact of the WTO membership
along the distribution of trade flows or level of trade flows. Past literature looks
at impact of the WTO membership on average trade flows or at the conditional
mean of the sample distribution of trade flows. However, bilateral trade flows at the
upper end (or country that already trade at high volume) and lower ends of the trade
volume distribution could be unevenly influenced by traditional gravity determinants,
especially by trade agreements such as the WTO. Countries that already trade at
the higher level of trade distribution perhaps enjoy lower trade costs or established
networks. However, countries that trade at the lower end of distribution might be
doing so due to higher trade costs or no established trade relationships. Hence, the
argument is that trade initiatives such as the WTO membership for countries at
the lower end of the distribution could reveal stronger trade effects due to higher
elasticity in response to decreasing trade costs or market uncertainty. Hence the
WTO membership could prove even more beneficial for developing economies.
The third chapter of this dissertation examines the impact of fiscal episodes on in-
ternational exports and provides some support for the channel by which these episodes
impact exports. The results indicate that fiscal consolidation (stimuli) leads to in-
crease (decrease) in total exports. Furthermore, the results indicate that fiscal con-
solidation leads to an increase in exports solely through the extensive margin. The
results support the argument put forth by the paper that the decrease in interest
rate (due to fiscal consolidation) leads to a decrease in fixed costs of exports, hence
increasing the extensive margin of exports or the number of products. IMF (2010)
mention that in 2009, the budget deficit averaged about nine percent of GDP in ad-
vanced economies, compared to only one percent of GDP in 2007. Furthermore, the
governments of the advanced economies have already undertaken or planned substan-
tial spending cuts and tax increases. Hence, this chapter suggests that countries that
have undertaken fiscal austerity measures can experience an increase in exports at the
extensive margin, thus providing a cushioning role on the potentially contractionary
impact on growth due to fiscal consolidation.
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